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Letter:

KHIEU SAMPHAN

During my academic years at university, I translated a thesis by Khieu Samphan, “Development of Economy and Industry of Cambodia”. Like many youths at the time, prior to commencing the translation I had thought that Khieu Samphan was a genuine “intellectual”- morally clean and uncorrupt.

The exact nature of the thesis was simply an out-of-date dissertation written in French at the University of Paris in 1959, and clearly revealed Khieu Samphan’s lack of realism. Khieu Samphan, as President of Democratic Kampuchea, plunged the Cambodian economy into negative growth rates that proximately resulted in the death by starvation of tens or hundreds of thousands of people. At the fifth summit of non-alligned nations in Colombo, Sri Lanka (16-19 August 1976), Khieu Samphan, as President of Democratic Kampuchea, delivered a speech in which he declared, “....so as to gain pure economic independence, we have to try very hard by adhering to the self-reliance standpoint, and once

our economy proceeds on an independent basis, homogenous political independence would be ensured...”. This Khmer Rouge search for pure economic independence as the basis for a “great leap forward” that would result in “three tons per hectare”, spearheaded by Khieu Samphan, included the abolishment of such basic economic concepts as money and the marketplace.

Khieu Samphan was just an individual with the experience of having been schooled in France. Currently, there are tens of thousands of such Khmer youths, none of whom have managed to inflict famine upon Cambodia. Far from contributing to the nation and the Cambodian people, the core concepts of Khieu Samphan’s dissertation left no stone unturned in devising an economic disaster that eventually would inflict misery and death upon more than one million people under the Khmer Rouge regime.

Youk Chhang



Khieu Samphan

CHINA: BURMA AND KHMER ROUGE REGIME

By Bertil Lintner

In late November 1977, Burma's military dictator Ne Win became the first—and only head of state of a non-communist country—to visit Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge was still in power. He spent several days in the country, hosted by Khieu Samphan and other Khmer Rouge leaders. Ne Win was taken to Angkor Wat, to a crocodile farm near Siem Reap, and he toured Phnom Penh, which at that time must have been almost completely deserted.

In a speech in the capital on November 26, Ne Win stated that “April 17 was a historic day for the people of Kampuchea. We are very happy that the Kampuchean people on that day won a decisive victory in their struggle for independence.” The Burmese leader reiterated his support for the “Kampuchean revolution” in a second speech at a farewell banquet which was held in his honour on November 28: “Kampuchea became independent only recently. But even during this short period it has become clear that the people of Kampuchea, in a spirit of self-confidence, have made remarkable achievements in their struggle for national reconstruction.”

Despite the rhetoric, and the diplomatic niceties, the Chinese were no doubt behind the unusual visit, hoping to draw the Khmer Rouge out of its diplomatic isolation. Ne Win played along, for his part hoping that Beijing would further reduce its support for the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which had been fighting against the Burmese government virtually since independence from Britain in

1948—and with massive Chinese aid since 1968. The Chinese poured in more arms, ammunition and other support—including military advisers and “volunteers”—to the CPB than it did to any other communist movement in Asia, outside Indochina.

The CPB also resembled the Khmer Rouge in many ways. Its chief ideologue, Khin Maung Gyi attended Moscow's Academy of Social Sciences in 1957-1960, and then wrote a thesis on agrarian problems in Burma which is strikingly similar to Khieu Samphan's infamous Sorbonne thesis on the same issue in Cambodia. Following the split in the international Communist movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Burmese Communists sided with China, and their representatives in Moscow, including Khin Maung Gyi, were forced to leave the Soviet Union in 1963. In 1968, China decided to give all-out support for the CPB's “revolutionary struggle” in Burma, and within a few years, a 20,000-square kilometre “liberated area”



Khmer Rouge Cadres Welcoming a Burmese Delegation headed by Ne Win



had been established in northeastern Burma, conveniently located along the Yunnan frontier.

The CPB, which was recognised as a “fraternal communist party” by the Chinese, dealt with the infamous intelligence chief Kang Sheng and his International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Communist Party of China. The ILD reported directly to the Central Committee and, as Australian researchers John Byron and Robert Pack put it, “[it] had an almost unlimited charter in external affairs during the 1950s and 1960s, wielding far greater influence than its government counterpart, the Foreign Ministry.”

During the 1970s, the CPB’s headquarters at Panghsang near the Yunnan frontier was not only the main base for the Burmese communists; there were also about a dozen representatives of the Communist Party of Thailand and more than 20 cadres from the PKI, the Indonesian Communist party, including two daughters of its once powerful Chairman, D.N. Aidit. The Communist Party of Malaya’s *Suara Revolusi Malaya* (“Voice of the Malayan Revolution”) broadcast from Hengyang south of Changsha in Hunan province.

All “fraternal communist parties” also had offices in Kunming as well as in the diplomatic quarter of Beijing. Kang Sheng had grand plans and the CPB’s

base area along the Yunnan frontier was the springboard from which he hoped to spread communism down to Southeast Asia. But then, Kang Sheng, the CPB’s mentor, died in Beijing on 16 December 1975 at the age of seventy-seven. On 8 January 1976, less than a month later, Zhou Enlai died of cancer of the bladder. It was widely believed that Zhou had intended to position the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping to take over the government. With Kang out of the picture, the hardliners felt that their influence was in danger of being curbed. Mao’s wife, the voluptuous former film actress Jiang Qing, launched a vicious campaign aimed at ousting Deng and other moderates.

The power struggle raged until April 1976, when China’s radical Left managed to reassert itself and oust Deng. The CPB - unlike other communist parties in the region - made the crucial mistake of speaking out loudly in favour of the hardliners: “The revisionist clique [with which Deng was linked] headed by Liu Shaoqi has been defeated,” the CPB stated in a congratulatory message on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the CPC in June 1976. It went on: “The movement to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, and the decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on measures taken against

rightist chieftain Deng Xiaoping are in full accord with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought”.

Then Mao Zedong himself died on 9 September. The CPB stated in a message, mourning the old Chairman’s death: “Guided by Chairman Mao Zedong’s proletarian revolutionary line, the Chinese people seized great victories in the socialist revolution and socialist construction in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in criticising Liu Shaoqi’s counter-revolutionary revisionist line, in criticising Lin Biao and Confucius and in criticising Deng Xiaoping and repulsing the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus, consolidating the People’s Republic of China - the reliable bulwark of the world proletarian revolution.

The CPB had reason to reevaluate the reliability of that bulwark when Deng reassumed power at a Central Committee meeting in Beijing in July 1977. Kang was gone, and so was Mao. The Beijing Review and other official Chinese publications, which had previously published battle news and CPB documents, stopped printing anything about the “revolutionary struggle in Burma”. The CPB had been mentioned for the last time in November 1976 when CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin and vice chairman Thakin Pe Tint went to Beijing to call on Mao’s successor as Chairman, Hua Guofeng, who was soon to lose power to Deng.

In was in that context that the Burmese military government, led by General Ne Win, quickly and shrewdly exploited the rift by lending its good offices to China in Cambodia, by then forming the focus of Chinese interest as concern in Beijing increased over Vietnam’s designs on its Indochinese neighbour. Communist forces had emerged victorious in all three Indochinese countries, only to fall out with each other, with China supporting the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, and the Soviet Union backing Vietnam and Laos.

Ne Win’s visit to Phnom Penh paid off. In 1978, the CPB’s entire China-based central office, including the broadcasting station, the People’s Voice of Burma, was forced to return to Panghsang. The Chinese “volunteers” were also recalled. Relations between Beijing and Rangoon were showing signs of serious in decades.

Admittedly, Deng had at about the same time declared in Malaysia that “government-to-government” relations were different from “party-to-party” relations, thus implying that Chinese support for the CPB and similar communist rebellions in the region would continue. But the writing was on the wall: all the erstwhile Chinese patrons of Thakin Ba Thein Tin and the CPB, were either dead or out of power—and Deng, the old “capitalist roader”, to use the pejorative of the Red Guards, was back at the helm in Beijing. He had other plans for spreading China’s influence in Southeast Asia than arming communist revolutionaries.

Faced with this new situation, the CPB central committee met for a marathon meeting that lasted from November 1978 to June 1979. The party’s fortieth anniversary on 15 August 1979 was subdued. In a lengthy speech to his sullen comrades, Thakin Ba Thein Tin emphasised that the party must be “self-reliant” and, without being specific, said that the CPB “had made many mistakes” during its 40-year long history. In other announcements, “non-interference” was declared as a major aspect of the CPB’s relations with “fraternal communist parties”.

The CPB continued its struggle for another ten years, but in 1989, a mutiny among the mainly hill-tribe rank and file of the party’s army—which made up more than 90% of the communist fighting force—drove the old, mainly Burman Maoist leadership into exile in China, where they still remain. The old CPB army split up along ethnic hilltribe lines into four different regional resistance armies, which soon entered into cease-fire agreements with the Burmese government in Rangoon. The most powerful of these former rebel armies, which sprung out of the old CPB s the United Wa Sate Army (UWSA), today Southeast Asia’s main armed drug smuggling organisation. Heroin—and methamphetamines—for its area have found their way even to Cambodia.

Ne Win’s visit to Phnom Penh in 1977 may have helped save Burma from being taken over by the CPB. China may also have decided to scale down its support for Burma’s Maoists—but regional power politics prompted even the so-called “pragmatist” Deng Xiaoping to continue his support for Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge well into the 1990s.

1975, I did not notice that April 17, 1975 was the end of the People's Democratic Revolution. I did not realise that currency abolition and people evacuation had been practiced in terms of class struggle in order to continue the Socialist Revolution and to establish a socialist country. Then I realised that they were very important acts that needed to be done after the exhausting war. Besides, they were just the necessary measures. This thought of mine had come from the inaccurate internal information I had only read the book.

After having been re-educated, I understand and support the party's measures. The Socialist Revolution took place three times in the World history. The first one was in October 1917 in Russia led by Lenin. The second one was in October 1949 in China. the third and the last one was in April 17th, 1975 in Cambodia. The measures that the party used to continue the Socialist Revolution have never existed before. I believed that if it was not for this measure, Cambodia would have inevitably faced difficulty and may have lost independence, sovereignty and integrity. The sacrifice of one million Cambodian lives would have become useless. If not for this absolute measure the Vietnamese may come to oppress our country. With these measures, they still seize our land. Therefore, what would happen if the party did not use the measure?

Now the situation of the Socialist Revolution is very good and is better than in Vietnam and Laos. Within one year period, we can solve the problem of food shortage. This has never happened before. We succeeded in establishing the People's Democratic Revolution just after we had liberated our country and our people. Moreover, we have promoted and developed the Socialist Revolution. This is extraordinary. The abolition of currency in our country is a superb measure which has never existed in world history. I am very proud of these commitments and I am going to continue working

based on the party line under the clear sighted leadership of the party. Besides the abolition of individual property in the individual mind is the best way to dig up the roots of the revisionist in the party line. This movement has made me realise that I who used to be an oppressor is a subject of the Socialist Revolution. I must get rid of the personal property spirit. I gradually get rid of it and become more cheerful but I must continue getting rid of it.

The family property consciousness is still in existence, especially the sentiment with children but if compared with the past, it is much better. No matter what happens, I will never forget that the party have re-educated and trusted me. During the 1970 coup, the party called me to join the party again, I consider that the party has saved my life. With the trust and re-education I have received from the party, I took a role in the revolution until the victory and have worked to promote and develop the Socialist Revolution. I really do not know what would have happened to me if I had not met the party. I can not forget this beneficiary action and I will continue improving myself by getting rid of the personal property spirit. I will serve the revolution from the bottom of my heart and fill my life with good means.

This autobiography does not tell every step of my life but I am always pleased to tell everything if necessary.

December 25th, 1976

KHMER ROUGE SLOGAN

- ◆ Be committed to weakening and smashing feudalists, conservatives, and imperialists who are "reactionaries".
- ◆ Be committed to smashing hidden enemies burrowing inside—CIA and KGB agents!
- ◆ Be committed to sacrificing our lives in fulfilling Angkar's labor tasks!

FIRST CONFERENCE OF CABINET OF MINISTERS

(Continued from issue N°4)

The world evolution is toward “independence”, notwithstanding the lack of party leadership in certain countries. The countries where there is great potential are the Southeast Asian Nations, due to the fact that they have party leadership and are active in attacking the enemy. In the event that the Southeast Asian Nations gain independence, they may have a mighty influence over the world. Algeria, Senegal, Egypt, etc., are eager to gain independence, but their goal will not be achieved unless they satisfy the need to have party, people, and army.

Many countries in the world really need us. Their need for us increases from day to day. Therefore, we have to try very hard. In order to have a strong country, the internal factors—building and defending—must be strong, and dikes and crop production must be improved according to the party’s directions.

To sum up, we have every possibility of maintaining independence. Enemies cannot attack us from outside. Their objective is to assail our machinery of leadership via dark means. Thus, revolutionary surveillance must be upheld.

III. The Tasks of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea

1) Communal Tasks

Four tasks promulgated by instruction from the Assembly to the President of the State and Judicial Committee on April 14, 1976:

1) Implement our constitution and agitate the masses and our revolutionary army to be aware of and feel proud of and protect their regime;

2) Protect the country, revolutionary authority, revolutionary achievements, party, people, army, independence, sovereignty, etc. against all manner of enemy activities, both open and secret. We must have a high revolutionary vigilance and self-mastery. In order to be in self-mastery, we must indoctrinate the masses, ministries, army, cooperatives, syndicates, etc. Don’t hold a view that only the Committee can function, for

the masses with a good awareness also contribute to the factors of self-mastery. In so doing, there must be regular meetings, training courses, and experiment-learning;

3) Build up the country in all fields: economy, agriculture, industry, transportation, social and health care affairs, etc. via the procedures set forth by, and on the request of, the party, so that each ministry and entity can successfully fulfill their tasks with the speed of a great leap forward; and

4) Mobilize as many friends as possible in the world day by day; strengthen and extend friendship with countries from near and far so that the enemy in the west and the east cannot isolate us. Now they are not able to isolate us due to the fact that we have a clear stance, which has been clearly stated in the state constitution. It’s because we have been adhering to such a stance that the world judges us as having a correct stance.

We have practiced foreign policy with a maximum effect. We haven’t boasted of the revolution or socialism. Basically, it is the result of practical implementation, not of talk. If we don’t do so, how we will be perceived—revolutionary or non-revolutionary. Through observation, perhaps we are regarded not only by the world and our friends, but also by the enemy, as the most extreme revolutionary. Their perception arises from two facts: first, we have been making the revolution with our own efforts, which contributes to the world’s revolution. If we are not strong enough, enemies will encroach on our land, both from the east and the west. As a consequence, we will suffer from economic crisis and may not assist the world’s revolution. This question is widely understood. Moreover, they believe and obviously they know that we have contributed greatly to the world’s revolution.

◆ The results of our foreign policies are not the accomplishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone, but of our joint endeavors. Thus, don’t say what is beyond the framework of our constitution, and



promulgation of our assembly. By so doing, we don't need to propagandize in regard to the communist. Our party is not acceptable to the public yet. If we do so, we will gain nothing, and lose. In the situation where the world is in a position of controversy and intricate circumstances, our policy is to further extend friendship. If we fail to do so, we will end up reducing friends and increasing enemies.

◆ Another experience has something to do with foreign countries. We are the host, so we should welcome our guest in the manner of hospitality and firm stance. If we manage to do so, friends from all directions will express their satisfaction. Although we are still poor and facing shortages, if we adhere to such behavior, every one may satisfy us. Don't be put off by the protocol of capitalists. Therefore, we must be friendly and vigilant.

We don't need to be cordial with the enemy. Even in the United Nations forum, we don't scold the enemy frivolously, but within our framework.

This is not a bad thing to do for the sake of the revolution. For this reason, anything which serves the

interests of the party and the revolution must not be done reluctantly. We must dare to grasp it. It is no harm to be humble to some extent. The experience is very effective.

2) Practical tasks for ministries

◆ leading, not technical issues. Leadership involves political, ideological, and organizational work on the basis of democratic centralism.

◆ Leadership does not arise from mere educational sessions in a particular school, but is accomplished on a daily basis. Leading the people to fulfill all tasks requires our guidance and their clear cut, firm grasp and personal satisfaction. Therefore, despite any obstacles, if settlement is reached through this procedure, there will be calm. In these matters, our party has had great experience.

◆ Don't let cadre get hung-up in the implementation of democratic centralism. Let them practice; don't make them afraid to make mistakes. After practice, there must be examination aimed at correction. After they realize their mistakes, correct and refresh them. Within one year, two years, or three years



examining a situation. We don't say eavesdropping. For example, they want to know what each of our cadre is doing; what stance our leading cadre are adhering to; what are their aptitudes, their weak and strong points?...The reason for their curiosity is to make analysis and then carry out activities for their benefit. Yet, sometimes they may cause damage or create unfavorable conditions against us if they are dissatisfied. In general, they examine every individual on our side. They may question both leading and ordinary cadre, and male and female youths. Via these techniques, they analyze our party and revolution.

◆ However, they practice this method at an average level, as they are our friends. Their party and government will not spy on us. Yet simultaneously, there also exist no-good elements. Our enemy-countries hire such elements to spy in our country. Thus, diplomatic components of some countries are CIA agents. The U.S. sends its agents to the Soviet Union and vice-versa. The giant countries seek a number of ways to spy on each other by using a variety of modern technological materials, including Asiano (?).

3) In contact with foreigners, we have to be vigilant in ways such as the following:

◆ Be friendly, warm, but clever. Silence is a basic surveillance.

◆ Better to be trained rather than trained by the other.

We need their training due to the fact that in the post-war period, we lack experience. This will reflect not only our politeness but also our method of attack.

◆ We let them speak much more than we do. We will wait and listen. Do not speak so much before their speech. Speaking will lead to mistakes, which will not only impact the honor of the diplomatic corps but also their leaders and heads of state.

◆ In our turn, we will say what is supposed to be said. In other words, we don't want them to learn much about us. With sufficient account of our activities, they will perceive us soon after our speech. If they don't have knowledge of us, they may not be able to attack us. It is a very effective method, which can be applied both

to war and diplomatic relations. In diplomatic relation, if they don't know much about us, they may not master the negotiation. However, in the case that they know in advance, they will take measures. As a consequence, they place emphasis on a particular issue and then take advantage over us. This technique can be applied not only to our local friends, but also to foreign ones.

Conclusion

The aforementioned issues will be the basis for our government procedure. In fact, these are our party tasks. Concerning the actual practice and detailed tasks of each ministry, the ministries have their own plans of action. We will proceed on the basis of designating responsibility to each ministry and draw experience from our own section. Therefore, we have to intensively fulfill the tasks assigned within the framework of government and ministries.

Each section has to have a clear direction for both short-term and long-term goals. If they are all set, it will be easy for us to go on to our work, because we are not confused with one another. We have a clear and systematic working process. For example, how many hospitals should we have? How many medical staff do we need? How much medicine will we require? Which ones?

Our arrangements need more than a single day. After we set our goals, we have to proceed step-by-step. Each section and ministry has to follow these steps. In the near future, our people's living standard will be higher. Clothes and food supplies will be sufficient. Hopefully, we will be better off than others in terms of rice to eat, meat, housing, fresh air, etc.

Following this directive, in three years time, we will play a significant role in the world, especially in non-aligned countries. Upon reaching this stage, perhaps there will be no diplomatic corps, only rice? Thus, building is needed. Foreign relations, agriculture, industry, etc., must be upgraded in the short and long term. Ten years with consecutive practice of these procedures may bring about sufficient electricity throughout the country.

KILLING PITS IN BANTEAY MEANCHEY PROVINCE

By Kosal Phat

1) Chamkar Khnao

Chamka Khnao was one of the prisons and execution sites for holding and slaughtering alleged “enemies of Democratic Kampuchea”. It is about 2 Kilometers to the west of Serey Sophon District. Chamkar Khnao execution site is located in O Ambil Village, O Ambil Sub-district, Sisophon District, Banteay Meanchey Province. Under the Democratic Kampuchea administration, this location was subsumed under Region 5, Northwest Zone, according to the DK “political map with a scale of 1: 2,000,000, published in 1976 by Ministry of Education. The road to the execution site is accessible by car in all seasons. Our mapping team began its work at 11 a.m. of April 29, 1999. It was the first mapping trip of the Documentation Center of Cambodia to Serey Sophon District. The execution site is located at latitude 13°35’3087” north, longitude 102°57’2689” east. The data recorded with our Global Positioning System is classified as file No. 042903A, and has been incorporated into our Cambodian execution sites map, copies of which are kept at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, the University of New South Wales Australia, and Yale University in the United States of America. This digital map indicates all execution sites so far discovered from the reign of Democratic Kampuchea between 1975-1979. The markers for each site briefly note the estimated number of victims as revealed by witnesses or the number of killing pits. Based on our April, 1997 mapping trip, the execution site at

Chamka Khnao (currently a plantation belonging to villagers), covers a hectare of land in the area surrounded by Phom Kaun Khla, Phnom Svay and Phnom Chunch Chaing.

Sarang, 65, is an elder from O Ambil Village. He took part in uncovering the killing pits at Chamka Khnao between 1983-1984 under the direction of the Research Committee on Genocide Crime of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. He remembers that he saw approximately 100 large pits, each about five to ten meters wide and from one and one-half to two meters deep, and many other smaller ones. Some of the exhumed remains were taken to a memorial at Wat Sopheak Mongkol for preservation and purposes of a national rally, the “Day of Vengeance” celebration. Regarding the earlier excavation work, another Achar at the monastery, age 68, asserted that at that time he had been chief of Achars of the district, and had worked for the contribution fund to exhume the bones. Workers were hired to dig the bones in 1979 at a price of 20 Thai baht per 20 sacks of remains. As of 1983 the work had still not been completed. Some pits have remained unexcavated up to the present.

Achar Say, who had been a traditional healer in the pre-Khmer Rouge period, was held at this prison for two or three months in late 1978. Achar Say saw twenty trucks loaded with prisoners under the direction of the Chamkar Khnao security apparatus. These victims were deluded into believing that they were being “sent to Thai border”. In reality, all of the



Say

people on the trucks were executed at Chamcar Knao. Achar Say asserted that the people targeted for execution were soldiers, civil servants, students, university students, teachers, police, and military police of the prior Khmer Republic.

In addition there was the wave of killing of Chinese and Vietnamese families that reached its peak at the end of 1978. Achar Say concluded that approximately 20,000 executions took place at Chamcar Knao. As of now, the victims' remains are being kept at the Wat Mongkol memorial.

2) La-ang Kuoy Yum and Phum Thom Prison


La-ang Kuoy Yum was a Khmer Rouge prison and a major execution site located behind O Prasat Junior High School in Chi Tbong Village, Phnom Tauch Sub-district, Mongkol Borey District, Banteay Meanchey Province. According to the previously noted Democratic Kampuchea political map published in 1976, this site was located in Region 3, Northwest Zone. It is located at the foot of some mountains about five kilometers from the Mongkol Borey District Office, and is difficult to access in the rainy season. Our mapping team arrived at the La-ang Kuoy Yum execution site at 3: 45 p.m. of April 29, 1997. This site is located at latitude 13° 25'5664" north, and longitude 103°00'4330" east. The data has been recorded and classified as file N0. 042908 A by

Global Positioning System.



Mr. Nut, 61, currently living in Thom Village, O Prasat Sub-district, was held at the prison in the village. The prison was supervised by Khmer Rouge District Chief "comrade Bo" and Sub-district Chief "comrade

Nhim". Nut was imprisoned after being accused of having ordered young children to slaughter a pig for food. Before his arrest, Nut served as the chief of the dining hall of a village-based cooperative. Nut went on to tell us that the inmates held at the prison had consisted of both minor and serious offenders. Serious offenders were foot-cuffed and did not work. Minor offenders were escorted to work on a daily basis. Mr. Nut recalled that most of prisoners were slaughtered by late 1978. However, Nut noted that a few prisoners, including himself, had survived the killing due to the arrival of the Vietnamese liberation troops. Nut estimate that the number of victims killed exceeded 20,000.



Mr. Ol Vos, 40, had been a worker ordered to break stones into pieces. He was imprisoned by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in this village between 1978 and 1979. He recounted that he often saw trucks loaded with prisoners. Vos claimed that

the La-ang Kuoy Yum killing pit was ten meters deep, and estimated the number of victims at about 100 to 200. The victims were walked from the prison in Thom Village to be executed at killing pits on the foot of the mountains behind the present-day O Prasat Junior High School. It is said that due to the lack of security in the area, the killing pits at La-ang Kuoy Yum and behind the school have never been exhumed.

KHMER ROUGE SLOGAN

- ◆ Angkar is the master of the territory.
- ◆ Angkar is very correct, bright and terrific!
- ◆ Angkar selects only those who are never tired!
- ◆ Must be loyal and love Angkar!
- ◆ Must love Angkar with no limit!

MEETING WITH A STUDENT AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF KAING KEK IEV, ALIAS “COMRADE DUCH”, IN KAMPONG THOM

(Continued)

Kosal: When you knew that Duch was the chief at S-21, Tuol Sleng, how did you feel then?

Sarun: I didn't yet know about Tuol Sleng prison. I didn't know what kind of prison it was... because the Pol Pot regime at that time... during Pol Pot I didn't know anything [about it]... not until after '79 did I know that Tuol Sleng prison was real.... I knew Duch and Mr. Mom Nai, Mr. Kaing Kek Iev alias Duch, and Mom Nai alias Chan, Mr. Tung Seng Hoan alias Pon... but Mom Nai, we weren't very close. But Tung Seng Hoan was my student.

Kosal: Really?!


of the prisoners then put the name Pon.

Kosal: We really see [the name] Pon a lot. Who was Pon, if you still remember?

Sarun: Pon... was a teacher. Kiev took him away [to join the revolution]. He was my relative. He lived in Sanko with me. (Kosal: So that's Pon) When he went away with Kiev, at the beginning of '73... but Kiev left at the end of '73. Pon... his siblings are alive. They did not think the same way as Pon. His younger brother is a businessman. His older brother is on the staff at the Ministry of Public Works in Phnom Penh.

Kosal: How many siblings did Pon have?

Sarun: Pon... probably many siblings... eight or nine.



Sarun: Yes.

Kosal: There was [someone named] Tung Seng Hoan, too?

Sarun: There was [someone named] Tung Seng Hoan, too.

Kosal: There was?

Sarun: He's alive now.

Kosal: Hoan, ah, Hoan... The name Pon... We don't have [someone named] Pon. All we have are reports, but we don't know if he's alive or not. He hasn't been found yet. But the documents have the name Pon.

Peou Dara: But we have the name Pon, who was the one who wrote the confessions (Kosal: Yes, the confessions)

But only he [joined the revolution].

Kosal: But two are left in Kampong Thom? No... Do you know how many are alive?

Sarun: In Kampong Thom, there is only one brother. In Phnom Penh, living with him, there are only sisters. I don't know how many [of his sisters] are alive. Three or four. Two of his brothers died in all.

Kosal: What year was Pon born?

Sarun: If not the year of the goat... the monkey.

Kosal: How [old] would you estimate? 40...

Sarun: Around fifty...fifty-three...fifty-four. In '79, his co-workers arrived [in Kampong Thom]... They told me that Hoan was still alive. They said that he had gone

somewhere already ... They said he had gone to Oral. That's all I know. About Kiev? He was there too. He had gone (there) already. Regarding Mom Nai, the child of a teacher there [in Kampong Thom] knows a lot. I don't know much about Mom Nai... They told me that Mom Nai was there, too. They had all gone together.

Kosal: Pon... What about Pon's character?

Sarun: Pon! That one didn't speak much.

Kim Suor: Pon?

Kosal: Pon was his alias.

Sarun: His name is Hoan. Actually, it is Tung Seng Hoeun.

Peou Dara: Tung Seng Huoen... but when you read it, it comes out "Hoan".

Sarun: One of his younger brothers, Tung Seng Hoeun, is now called Tung Kimla. The older sibling in Phnom Penh is Tung Kimlean.

Kosal: Tung Kimlean.

Sarun: Yes.

Kosal: He has more siblings in Phnom Penh now... his own students?

Sarun: The students used to live at his monk's quarters.

Peou Dara: You said a moment ago that after '79, you heard there was news. Did you know that Hoan...?

Sarun: He was alive and had gone to Oral... Oral [in] Kampong Speu because there were people who came from there. They met him and convinced him to come. He came a part of the way, but he became suspicious and returned (to Oral).

Kosal: Now, he's disappeared?

Sarun: Now, he's disappeared... His younger siblings still search for him. If they knew somehow that he were living, they would want to go [to post bail]... People here say his siblings think about him, also. They keep coming to ask me what's the news.

Kosal: If I knew, I would tell you.

Sarun: But I asked Keo Horn. He said Pon [was known by] the name "Noeu." Inquire about this from Mom Nai.

Peou Dara: Another name, "Noeu"?

Sarun: He's still alive... not yet dead. But it's not clear. I don't know. I'm afraid Pon is someone else. I don't know.

Peou Dara: There's a note, namely in the documents of prisoners' confessions that Pon was [the one who transcribed them], and afterwards...the documents that

had Pon's name, many of them, Duch signed again above [Pon's name]. Whether they were sent to another person, I don't know. Thus, could Pon and Duch have worked together?

Sarun: [They did work] together, because the students have said that the chief was Duch. The deputy was Chan. The member was Pon. It's certain that he has left. As far as I know, Duch left Phnom Penh but sent Pon away first. Then Duch left afterwards. Mom Nai was still at Kampong Thom. At Kampong Thom, during the Lon Nol period, they were still in [the government]. They weren't [part of the revolution]. By the end of '79, I didn't know why, they went to meet together over there [in Oral]. I didn't know their situation, but there was someone else who was here at Lycee Yukantor, Iev Paly, whom I also used to know. My teacher there, Kunthon Tharak, was associated with him [in Kampong Thom].

Kosal: What is the very last year that you met Kiev?

Sarun: At the end of '73... was the very last time. I was continuing to study [when] he left. He only whispered that he was going.

Kosal: When you saw the newspapers coming out and knew that he had been arrested, what were your initial impressions?

Sarun: I thought that I wanted to see his picture [to know if] it were true or not. When I saw that it was really him, I thought that this was his Karma... because if I look closely, I see that after '79... '82...'83, I went to study in Phnom Penh. When I went to see Tuol Sleng prison, I could only sit in shock that [Kiev had done that to them]. [In the past], when he sat down, he would be quiet. If someone swore at him, he acted like he didn't hear. When he spoke, he talked logically.

Kim Suor: We also wanted to have government documents of that regime. But we didn't find any. We should have seized [some documents] at O Smach...

Kosal: Handwritten notebooks, we also have those from Anlong Veng. If we obtain documents, we get only Khmer Rouge documents, which we have gathered. Yet, the Khmer Rouge documents are of different types. There are confessions, documents of meetings from the Steering Committee, various notebooks, Revolutionary Flag (magazines), songs, slogans, statutes, etc..

Sarun: If we talk about essential documents that they [the Khmer Rouge] wrote, which came from the Party

Center, they are never different. But when we talk about their implementation, [the cadres at] the Base were wrong. There were innovations at Srok Baray. I used to... they used to indoctrinate Kiev and me. The Communist commission in Phnom Penh used to indoctrinate my friends who were Khmer Rouge leaders. Some died... some without a trace every day.

Kosal: Khmer Rouge words... They liked to use the word, “bampeak bampan” [to indoctrinate]. At that time, when you heard the word, “bampeak bampan,” what did it mean?

Sarun: “Bampeak bampan” meant to raise one’s consciousness and technique.

Kosal: How were people indoctrinated?

Sarun: [They called us for indoctrination when] our consciousness did not yet comprehend. They made us to understand with more explanation. Further explanation [was not done] just once. They explained to make us understand until we were indoctrinated. The word “bampan” had a specific and exact meaning for them.

Kosal: I’ve seen that word many times. I’ve seen that it has [a common usage]. If we consult scholars or historians, they use this word often. We want to know... we want to know if, at that time, (the word) indoctrination had the meaning of “bampeak” and “bampan.” “Bampeak” means “to do something” and, “bampan,” “until you understand.”

Sarun: Yes. “Bampan” means “to have someone get something.” “Bampeak” means “consciousness” and “not to let yourself be very afraid [of the enemy].” Don’t let yourself love imperialism. Don’t let yourself like serving the tricks of capitalists. They would indoctrinate you constantly for a long time until [you got it].

Kosal: I’m surprised at how the Khmer Rouge used such unusual words.

Sarun: Unusual! The meaning of their words! The meaning of their words! Not this... Ah... So exact! Technical words they used like the word “snae” [“to request information”]. My hair stood on end! The word “snae” replaced the word “banhchea” [“to order”]. The word “som” [“to ask for something”] was replaced by the word “snae,” because whenever someone used to the word “som,” it would be in a capitalist context. It had a meaning like that. Then, [before 1975], I... I was at the University of Phnom Penh in the literature

department. The teachers, [at the University] would interpret Khmer Rouge words [between ‘70 and ‘75]. The meaning of a particular word is clearly understood (when it is used in context). Words that are different, that are not the quite same. Their meanings are slightly different. The word “bampeak-bampan” [to indoctrinate], Seng Bun Than, and Sar Sarun, experienced teachers, [clarified its meaning]. But Sar Sarun is dead. [A teacher at the University who did this], Thuch Rin, was the number one skilled writer.

Kosal: Oh! That’s what it means! The scholars... insert Khmer Rouge words into the literature little by little.

Sarun: They have taken the meaning of those words [and clarified them]. That group [of teachers] was clever to take those [Khmer Rouge] words and use them before [1975].

Kosal: What are some of the most important words that they used in order to replace words which were used during the capitalist regime, such as the word “snae” [“to ask information”] which replaced the word “som” [“to ask for something”]... “sante-sampoan” (“peace alliance”).

Sarun: Oh! Those words, “sante” and “sampoan” they only combined those two words. They didn’t have very much meaning. The word that they used most was the word “Khmer Sot” [“Pure Khmer”] and occasionally, Pali words, borrowed from Pali. [But] words borrowed from elsewhere, they didn’t like to use very much. That group, they had the idea to oppose [foreign influences]. They didn’t want to use [anything] foreign.

Kosal: What are some words, which you still remember, that the Khmer Rouge started to insert through broadcasts, publications [or] literature?

Sarun: I recall ... I would say one word. That word was a borrowing, but no one knew that word, the word “Angkar.” “Angkar,” if we study “angkar” [in its current usage], we see that “angkar” is a group that has a task. But “Angkar” as used in the Khmer Rouge philosophy, meant to say whatever had effect, so a god. If you believed “Angkar,” it meant that you didn’t believe in any individual. The individual representative enabled the god to come to work there. Whoever didn’t obey would soon die. (Kosal: Thus, this means that all of the Khmer Rouge were representatives of Angkar with absolute rights.) (Kosal jokes with Sarun.)

Kosal: What about the word “chat tang” [“to assign”]?

DUCH'S DEPUTY AT S-21

BIOGRAPHY OF PON (1976)



Original name: Tung Sing Hoeun
 Revolutionary name: Pon
 Age: 28
 Sex: Male
 Position: Member of Committee of Unit 21
 Class: Middle bourgeois class
 Joined the revolution: October 24, 1970
 Nominator: Brother Duch and Brother Rin
 Father's name: Tung Chheang.
 Mother's name: Ke Cheun
 Place of Birth: San Kor Village, San Kor Sub-district, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province.
 Education: Grade 2 [Cambodia's old educational system], Kampong Thom High School; teacher.

Original Name: Khoem Vat.
 Revolutionary name: Hor, 27 [1976].
 Joined the revolution on June 13, 1966.
 Joined the party on June 16, 1973.
 Became a full-rights member on February 16, 1973.
 Place of Birth: Nao Ny Village, Traey Sla Sub-district, Sa-ang District, Kandal Province.
 Father's name: Bun.
 Mother's name: Ly
 Implicated two elder siblings.

NOTE FROM PON

Dear Mr. Doeun,
 Your tape has already been sent to Angkar. Based on the historical analysis by Angkar, the content on the tape is not authentic. It's an invented one with two aims: 1) to attack the revolutionary forces; and 2) to hide genuine traitors. Such inventions will cost you your eyeballs. Please stop such acts. Which points have you counterfeited? How you hide your elements? Please clarify these two things as soon as possible. Don't write as lengthily as the one you have sent to us. It's long and detailed, but full of falsehood. It will not do. Be careful with your eyeballs?
 19 May, 1977.
 Pon

CONTRADICTIONS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE RESOLUTIONS

(Quoted from Comrade Chheng Pao's Khmer Rouge political notebook, entitled "Marx-Lenin Doctrines" (1977). Chheng Pao was a medical cadre at S-21.) by Meng-Try Ea.

1. Contradictions:

There are two kinds of contradictions: adversary contradictions and non-adversary contradictions. Adversary contradiction mean life-and-death contradiction, while non-adversary contradiction mean internal contradiction. For example, the contradiction between ourselves and CIA agents is life-and-death contradiction.

2. Stance and measures:

There are four possible resolutions:

- a) Heighten the responsibility for analyzing contradictions;
- b) Base all contradiction analysis on party guidelines;
- c) Base all contradiction analysis on materialism, that is realism, for analysis of internal issues; and
- d) Base all contradiction analysis on the collective for examination and resolution.

Rouge cadres shouted at him to pull down everything the people carried with them. Valuables were taken by the cadres, while suitcase cases and clothes were piled up and burned. Chhun La saw another Khmer Rouge holding an ax with a long blade and short handle. Women with babies were untied to allow for breastfeeding. The Khmer Rouge cadres forced women to urinate in front of them in their sarongs, and sometimes kicked women who were not fast enough to comply. Chhun La stated that he met Ke Pauk at Svay Chanty and remembered seeing Ke Pauk, who had a scar on his cheek, saying, “Who allowed to kill...Who did that.” But in late 1978, Ke Pauk ordered his men to make a list of the educated people. That time heard Ke Pauk say, “The educated should be on the top of the list because they were the exploiting class...” Chhun La suspected something, and managed to have his name removed from the list with the help of Granny Yim, who was very close to Ke Pauk.

According to Mr. Toeng Yat, current Svay Tiep sub-district chief, immediately after the liberation day he saw three mass graves, each two meters wide and thirty meters long, two bomb craters, each ten meters in diameter, and a military defense ditch, two meters wide,

100 meters long and one-and-a-half meters deep. He estimated that between 5000 and 7000 victims were buried at the site, and that about one-fourth of the remains had been exhumed and held in a hut nearby, but were no longer there after so many years of abandonment.

Ms. Doeun Yannee urged that if Ke Pauk and his brother in law, Oeun, denied their acts, or tried to put the blame on Pol Pot, do not believe them. “Pauk ordered the killing of many people, not only in her village, Thnal Bek Kaet.” Mr. Long Sokhay, a “base person” in Thnal Bek Kaet, witnessed the preparation of the killings at Svay Chanty and, at the site, Mr. Chhun La actually saw Khmer Rouge cadres tormenting women and a tool commonly used by the Khmer Rouge to kill people. Mr. Toeng Yat saw remains of from five to seven thousand victims at the site after the overthrow of the regime. On the other hand, Chhun La has stated that he heard Ke Pauk say, “Who allowed to kill...Who did this...”, and that two days after the massacre he ordered his subordinate, Comrade Yun, the sub-district chief, to be killed. The truth of Ke Pauk’s involvement in the Svay Chanty massacre will only be revealed at an independent trial.



Suong Sikoeun



The biography of comrade Kong, (or) Suong Sikoeun, is one of more than twenty thousand biographies of Khmer Rouge cadre now under the process of computerized documentation at Documentation Center of Cambodia. Who is Suong Sikoeun?

This biography will provide some parts of the whole confession. Some other parts may be available in a book entitled “Five years beyond the horizon,” by Mrs. Laurence Pich, formerly the wife of Suon Sikoeun, and a member of the leadership apparatus of Democratic Kampuchea, who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the administrative guidance of Ieng Sary. “Five years beyond the horizon” was written in French and translated into Khmer by Khieu Kanharith, secretary of state of Ministry of Information, Cambodia. The book is in the collection of the National Library of Cambodia. The last part of the answer to the question, “Who is Suong Sikoeun”, is a videotape of the Center for Social Development’s public debate on Khmer Rouge issues conducted in Battambang Province earlier this year (2000). These three informative accounts will help the reader comprehend “Who is Suong Sikoeun?”

Youk Chhang

BIOGRAPHY OF COMRADE KONG

Original name: Suong Sikoeun. Revolutionary name: Kong. Born on February 10, 1937 in Chroy Ampil Village, Chambak Sub-district, Prek Prasap District (current Kratie Province), Kampong Cham Region, Northern Zone. Male, Khmer. Father’s name: Nou Kak, born in Russei Keo Village, Russei Keo Sub-district, Prek Prasap District, Kampong Cham Region, Northern Zone. Deceased in 1936. I have never met him, as when he died I was just 3 months old. He was middle-class farmer. My grandfather’s name was Ta Suong, Buddhist clergyman (Achar). My mother’s name is Nou Ren, born in my birth place. Her father’s name was Ta Nou, an agent of the then feudal authority. I was born after the demise of my father. I have never seen him. I overheard people called him “Balat Nou” (District Chief Nou). The eldest brother of my mother was Nou Chhum, sub-district chief of Chambak, who served the feudal authority and French protectorate in 1947.

Subsequently, in 1954, my father was a candidate of the Liberal Party, led by contemptible traitor Sam Song Fenangdesh?? Since 1955, my father was my opponent, as I was an activist of Democratic Party during the 1955 elections.

I have only a sister, who died one year after my father. Therefore, I don’t know what my sister looked like. After the death of my father, I led a very hard life. He owned a hectare of farmland in Boeng Rey Village, about five kilometers from my village. He also possessed another hectare of farmland in Stung Thom Village, hired to a female cousin for cultivation. The income from the land was just enough to pay the government tax. Our family’s living condition gradually deteriorated from year to year. We had not enough clothes to wear. The reason for this was that at that time (1945-1954) bandits affiliated with the French and soldiers went down to the bases to collect contributions and tax on everything from villagers. The contribution campaign was aimed at “getting rid of insecurity”. At the same time, my mother had to borrow money from others to support our life and my study. In my childhood, I was so proud of the position of my father and my grandfather, who was sub-district chief. Moreover, I was angered by our unfavorable hand-to-mouth living condition.

In 1945, when Japanese militarists occupied my village, we lived without rice for six months. People had nothing to eat except cassava and corn. Still worse, the local villagers were mobilized as a military to attack the provincial town of Kratie. As consequences, a number of quasi-soldiers died on the battlefield. Some of my mother's relatives also died. After the Japanese were defeated, there emerged a bandit movement, which provoked insecurity in my village until 1955. During this period of time, my mother's elder brother and father's younger brother were executed by bandits under the orders of French colonial rulers. It was my first school year in 1945. I was really impressed by certain issues, namely nationalism and exploitation and oppression by the French protectorate, which I learned about via the propaganda of cotton merchants who came down from Tonle Tauch, Prek Changkran, to my village. These were agents of the Democrats.

In 1947, I started primary school in the District Town of Chhlong, where I became a "mobile propaganda group member" with a mission to collect financial contributions for the Democratic Party. Established by teachers, the party taught us to hate French and the King. In 1949-1950, I went to Sihanouk Junior High School in Kampong Cham. At night, I often came to Phnom Penh and stayed at the residence of my uncle (my mother's elder brother). Through contact with him, I was influenced by the People Campaign of Song Nhoc Thanh.

In 1951-1952 and 1953, riots were organized one after another against French rule and monarchy. I was also one of those activists. In 1952, I joined the riots two times in Kampong Cham provincial town where there was brutal suppression by police and military forces. In December 1953, Sihanouk went to Kampong Cham after a campaign demanding independence from French. On that occasion, "People Campaign Group" planned to assassinate King Sihanouk. They organized armed terrorists selected from among the students in Kampong Cham High School. I took no part in that movement. But I did spread leaflets against Sihanouk at night before his arrival. The terrorists were arrested by Sihanouk police, because two or three days before the event, their leadership links had a party, and shouted with enjoyment. At noon, after the party, they went hunting. As a result, the secrecy leaked to spies who

were also students. After the arrival of Sihanouk, all of terrorists were arrested by police. My name was also recorded on the list of persons to be arrested. Fortunately, I managed to escape when police started searching for weapons and money. The next morning, I boarded a ship loading charcoal for Phnom Penh.

I hid myself for six months in the vicinity of Prek Kak. During that time, my uncle, who used to be in the monkhood with Son Ngoc Minh, invited me along with contemptible A Chdao and Tres to join a group led by contemptible Chan Raingsei in Trapeang Kin, Kampong Speu. It was the time on the brink of Geneva Conference. During my time with these contemptible bandits, I had no duties, but lived in a "waiting situation". There, I knew a Japanese military captain who was advisor to contemptible Chan Raing Sei. The said Japanese, after the coup organized by contemptible Lon Nol, became a leader of Japanese espionage and CIA. Then I was not trained by any session or school. After the Geneva Conference, I entered Phnom Penh with these mentioned traitors with whom I worked in an office in charge of contacts between these traitors and military servants of the Sihanouk administration. After staying there for three months, I went to Kampuchbot School. Soon after I arrived Phnom Penh "People Campaign Group" led by Son Ngoc Thanh, asked me to write articles for their newspaper titled "Khmer Thmei" (New Khmer). The contradictions between this anti-movement group and I became acute when they attacked for left-ism the framework of the Democratic Party and attacked the "People Group". I decided to split myself from this group in 1955 after a joint visit to Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey Provinces, because at that time, I was impressed by their tricks against Communism and national strength regardless of collusion of American imperialism.

After resignation from the office, I stayed with my aunt-in-law whose residence was opposite to Pet Chen "Chinese Hospital". Due to hard working condition (selling plain water) in which I did not have time to go to school, I decided to leave for another house of my friend in the same grade (2) named Savil (deceased in 1960). The class took place in the Headquarter of Association of Former Students of Sisowath High School. At that time, I lived with Ol Chan and contemptible Ruos Sarin, and I contacted

comrade Khnol who specialized in dress-making and had just come from France. In 1956, I taught in Chamraen Vichea School, where I knew Mi Am and Men San (school counselors) and Brother Saloth Sar, a professor. Hou Youn also stayed there for a period of time. During that stay at the Association Headquarters, I bought and read a lot of books by Mao Tse Tung, which increased my affection for socialism and socialist idealism. Looking back to the years 1950-1955, I really hated monarchy and was angered by the way the peasants, especially my mother, led miserable lives full of hardship.

In 1956, I had a better knowledge and committed to joining the socialist revolutionary movement with the participation of progressive students and intellectuals from France. During my academic years in Kampuch Botr School, I was influenced by dialectic materialism and historical materialism by Hy Mann's teaching and propaganda. Professors there persuaded us to see the perils of American imperialists coming to replace French colonialists. At that time, movements against a Cambodia-U.S Military Agreement, signed on May 16, 1955, were very strong, coinciding with the public movements demanding that Cambodia adhere to political neutrality after the Bandung Conference.

Facing such a situation, those contemptible movement-ranking officials dared not speak out during the September 1955 Election campaign. At a time when I was being enticed by Chamraen Group, I made contact with some of its ranking elements. I joined a meeting with them concerning "Whether to create an 'open' party or to go on with the Democratic Party?" The meeting was held at the house of contemptible traitor Saing Savat, editor-in-chief of "New Khmer". However, all the participants were those who had responsibility (superiors). The meeting decided not to openly use the Democratic Party any more.

I served as propagandist of both the Democratic Party and the People Movement, because the candidate of the Democratic Party for Chhlong, Kratie Province, my hometown, was a member of the People Movement and friend of Nop Bophan. After the failure in the elections, the Democratic Party members became disgruntled. Some joined Sangkum Reastr Niyum, while some others (of the Chamraen Group) went on with their struggle. Then I felt very inclined to work with Chamraen's leftist intellectuals educated in France. This relationship separated me from Son Ngoc Thanh's clique. After their failure in the elections, this group, led by contemptible woman Sim Vann Sin, visited Siem Reap complex and Rovieng Samraong Chong Kall. During their visit, they scolded Stalin-style communism and Chamraen's intellectualism. As I defended the intellectuals and the group, they admonished me and warned me off being with contemptible Kong Orn, who was taking a neutral position. Furthermore, they criticized my teacher, Uch Ven, for convincing me to love communism. When I returned, I decided not to contact this group as they became more reactionary against communism and carried out activities to cause breaking-up among Chamraen's patriots.

(Continued)



DOCUMENTING THE KHMER ROUGE GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA

By Helen Jarvis

(Continued)

Accessing the Cambodian Genocide Data Bases

All material collected by CGP and DC-Cam is publicly available, whether in their original form at the DC-Cam office in Phnom Penh, or in electronic format as presented via the Cambodian Genocide Data Bases on the Internet or in CD-ROM. All our databases are searchable directly over the Internet (CGP at Yale: <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/> and CGP at UNSW: <http://www-cgp.sistm.unsw.edu.au/>) while individual province maps for the geographic database have been generated and printed with help from Yale University's Center for Earth Observation and Institute for Biospheric Studies, and are loaded onto the CGP Internet site as static images to supplement the dynamically interrogatable CGEO database using the ArcView Internet Map Server at UNSW's School of Geomatic Engineering, which requires users to have JAVA enabled on their client local computer.

We are continuing to add data to all the databases, and the output from our CDS/ISIS databases is periodically converted to WAIS (Wide Area Information Service) format and then made searchable over the World Wide Web by using CGI scripting and SFGate. We have also produced a CD-ROM version of the databases, particularly for those who do not have Internet access. The Cambodian Genocide Data Bases on CD-ROM is available from DC-Cam and UNSW. The cost is US\$100, but it is provided at no charge to Cambodian government departments and non-government organisations, as well as to donors of the work of the CGP.

In addition to the provision of access to the databases, the CGP and DC-Cam have embarked upon publication programs to make various aspects of their findings available in a more synthesised and analysed form as research monographs in hard-copy print format and/or on the Internet. Several items have already been published on the Internet (<http://www.yale.edu/cgp/translate/index.htm>) and several are in press. DC-Cam has just published the first issue of its new Khmer language magazine, *Searching for the Truth*, which is being distributed throughout Cambodia. An English language version is also being planned.

Despite the fact that the Cambodian Genocide Program and the Documentation Center of Cambodia have been fortunate to receive a number of grants, including major ongoing funding from the US Department of State, we are still seeking funding to continue and extend the program. Huge numbers of documents are being uncovered in Cambodia, as well, to a lesser extent, in private and government archives and databases around the world. We want to do considerably more imaging and cataloguing; to be able to analyse the documents in more detail; to make them more readily accessible and to ensure their long-term preservation. We also want to continue the training aspects of the program, developing a core of information specialists and documentalists set up with all the necessary equipment and skills to manage their own national historical documents, in a country with a severely impaired education infrastructure.

THE TRAGEDY OF KOH PHAL VILLAGE

By Sorya Sim

The “smashing” of the Cham village of Koh Phal for its cultural and religious differences was planned by the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK], ordered by Brother Pol Pot, came to the knowledge of Brother Nuon Chea, implemented by comrade Chhun. These facts are based on oral accounts of the Koh Phal survivors as well as the Khmer Rouge central policy documents and implementation reports.

About 1,600 out of the total 1,800 Chams disappeared following the evacuation of Koh Phal in September 1975 when the Khmer Rouge soldiers quickly defeated villagers in the revolt against its ban on traditional and religious practices. The villagers were officially disseminated into rural Khmer villages in Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Stung Treng provinces. The then Koh Phal village chief Res Tort said he was asked to gather villagers for September 12, 1975 meeting with Khmer Rouge cadres who announced these principles: the take-away [Dak] of 40 senior community and religious leaders [Ta Ta], the ban on prayer [Sambeah Yaing] and Ramadan fast, the elimination of holy Koran, the eating of pork [non-Halal or non-muslim] food, cutting short women hairs, and intermarriage between the Khmer and Chams.

Referring to Koh Phal and other Cham villages along the Mekong river, in Krauch Chhmar district, Kampong Cham province, that had just been evacuated, comrade Chhun reported to Brother Pol [Pol Pot] and copied Brother Nuon [Nuon Chea] in telegram no. 15 dated November 30, 1975, saying “This evacuation complies with the dispersion principle you have already told us” in order to normalize the [revolt] “atmo-sphere.” In the 1980s, a Khmer Rouge division commander named Sok gave a 10 page handwritten documents to Youk Chhang. The documents reveal the Khmer Rouge’s schedule starting April 17, 1975 for the nation-wide evacuation of

population and the 9 reasons for the evacuation as explained by CPK. The first reason explains that “Angkar following the theory of the Chairman of the Communist Party of China has to wipe clean internal enemy before making other decisions.” Other reasons are for the CPK to categorize people into who to be considered people of the Party and who “to be smashed” on basis of their proverb “Keep you no benefit, Take you away no loss,” and for the CPK to kill those “unreliable” category of people like [former] soldiers and civilians.

The Khmer Rouge constitution, other central policy documents and policy-training notebooks say that people have the rights to any beliefs and religions; but “absolutely” not “reactionary religions that destroy Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean people.” The CPK as well as the Youvakok [the Youth League of the CPK] as stipulated in its statute requires a member to have “clean social and political morale” and no connection with the enemy. So, to be “people of the Party” or simply the people under the Khmer Rouge regime, you have to have this quality, otherwise you will by default fall into unwanted category “Keep you no benefit, Take you away no loss.”

Because the Koh Phal villagers resisted giving up their religious and cultural practices, they became “reactionary” by the Khmer Rouge constitution, unclean in terms of “social morale” by the CPK statutes, unwanted nationals “to be smashed.”

Victims and historians have known Koh Phal as Koh Phes, meaning the island of high farming harvest becoming the island of ashes to describe how devastative Koh Phal was as a result of the Khmer Rouge regime. I briefly covered Koh Phal in Reaksmey Kampuchea Daily in November 1998 with sources that had lived close to Koh Phal village or heard of the event. Today, you will hear directly from those who actually saw it.

Mr. Res Tort, 67, Koh Phal village, 1999

I lived in Koh Phal village until the evacuation of 1975. At that time I had seven children. I was a deputy Hakem [Phou Chhuoy]. Between 1973-1975, I was the village chief and was appointed by Krauch Chhmar district chief named Ta Pha. I was imprisoned for six months and ten days at Krauch Chhmar district prison between late 1974 and early 1975. The prison chief named Ta Bong. I was stabbed with a knife and you can see here! the scar. I was hit with bamboo stems for three days and nights and I was not able to speak or hear for three months. I always said no when I was asked if I supported Lon Nol. I was released before the September 1975 evacuation. I was asked to gather people to meeting at a Sou Rav [place for prayers, smaller than mosque] on September 12, 1975. Four Khmer Rouge cadres, Ta Pha, district chief of Krauch Chhmar, Ta Bong, district prison chief and deputy of Ta Pha, Ta Yaup in Chumnik village and Ta Yaup in Trea village and about 20 armed soldiers were present. Other villagers and I joined the meeting. The soldiers were at every windows of the Sou Rav building. Ta Pha announced in the meeting two principles that I the Chams had to follow. The first one was that 40 senior Chams will be taken away. The second included five points. One, women had to cut short hair and intermarriage between the Chams and the Khmer had to be allowed. Two, all the Koran had to be collected for them [to be destroyed]. Three, the Chams had to raise and eat pork. When Ta Pha was saying this point, a child of about 6 years old slapped the mouth of Ta Pha. Ta Pha said that the kid was nasty and that the kid would become a good soldier. Four, the Chams had to stop prayer. Five, the Chams had to stop fasting [during the month of Ramadan].

It was Ta Pha who ordered the villagers and me to follow the principles. I did not agree with Ta Pha and I just did [tell people] verbally when he was around because I was scared of him. The religion was based on the Koran and with all Korans burned there would no longer be any religion. I was the village chief so I knew all of these.

I was in the village when the revolt occurred. It

was September 13, 1975 that the Khmer Rouge soldiers came to arrest the villagers. A Cham named Math Sales was shot dead. Another Cham man named Osman who was in the field out of the village taking care of his cows was arrested. Osman came back to the village after one night. The Khmer Rouge asked him to tell the villagers that Koh Phal would be destroyed from then on. "To destroy" meant to render a complete destruction that everything became "ashes." The revolt started from there. Those who revolted were young men and nobody told them to do so. They shouted out "Our religion eliminated!" for three days. Old people were frightened and tearful. The young people also said "To Sou Sabililah!", meaning jihad struggle! This revolt continued until September 19, 1975. That September of 1975 was the fasting month of Ramadan for Muslims. After the September 12 meeting, Ta Pha and other Khmer Rouge cadres no longer had any contact with me or the village. They stopped contacting [us] and they wanted to destroy [us].

On September 22, 1975 the Khmer Rouge soldiers deployed artilleries from four directions, for example, from the east it was about 700 meters far from the village. Artilleries were also put on ships from the direction of the river. I saw this deployment. Two days later shelling started no stop even for a minute. The sound was so loud we couldn't talk and understand each other. The shells did not hit the village and were blown in the sky or far from the village. I did not know where the soldiers and the weapons were from. I could not see where they were from. The villagers had knives and gathered around the edge of the village. We were able to bring 46 dead Chams and buried them. I did not know how many of those could not bring in. The attack lasted for three days. I escaped to Vietnam by boat the following nights and evacuation begun. The evacuation destination was everywhere.

There were 1,864 people in my village before the 1975 revolt and in 1979 there were 183 people. At present there were about 300 people, not much an increase because this village is very poor. **(Continued)**

out of Phnom Penh and soon disappeared from sight. In 1996, no longer affiliated with the Khmer Rouge, Duch met some American evangelical missionaries in Northwestern Cambodia and converted to Christianity. He was working as a medical orderly in April 1999 when a journalist discovered his past identity. Duch was later interviewed by Nate Thayer and spoke freely about his past before he was arrested by Cambodian police and imprisoned in Phnom Penh.

Duch's Assistants


Duch's deputy (anuprotean) at S-21 was Khim Vat (alias Ho), a soldier in his mid-twenties who served concurrently as the head of the prison's defense unit. Ho had been born and raised in Prek Touch, south of the capital, and had joined the revolutionary ranks as a teenager in 1966. Serving in the 11th (later the 703d) Division, he lost an eye in combat. His signature appears on many entry and execution lists. IN 1978, he often joined forces with Chan to interrogate Vietnamese prisoners of war. Ho was a fierce disciplinarian feared by his subordinates. Kok Sros

recalled:

I was scared of him. If I looked him in the face he looked mean, and if he gave us instructions and we made a mistake he would beat us. If we said something wrong, he beat us. We had to be careful when we spoke; whatever we said had to be to the point. I knew he was strict, so I was always careful.

Nothing is known of Ho's career after 1979. His deputy, Peng, hailed from the same district as Ho and had served with him in Division 703. Peng, a Sino-Khmer, had been born in 1950. At S-21 he commanded the guards. He also kept track of arriving prisoners and assigned them to rooms and cells. According to Khieu Lohr, a former guard, Peng had "keys to all the cells." He reported to Duch, who decided whether prisoners were to be interrogated, ignored, or taken off to be killed. Peng accompanied Duch on his tours of the prison and acted as his body-guard. Vann Nath was so frightened of Peng, who he called a "brutal young butcher," that he "never dared to look him in the eye." Ung Pech in his testimony at the trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in 1979, called Peng "savage and cruel," adjectives not applied to any other S-21 employee at the trial. Peng seems to have been demoted in 1978, when his duties were taken over by Him Huy, but, according to Kok Sros, Peng survived the Vietnamese invasion and died in southwestern Cambodia in the 1980s.

After Duch, Ho, and Peng, the most important person at S-21 was probably Chan, who headed the interrogation unit. Aside from his stint of teaching in the 1950s, we know nothing about his early life, although his fluency in Vietnamese, rare among Cambodians, suggests that he was born and raised in Vietnam. He arrived at S-21 with Duch in 1975 and remained there until the Vietnamese invasion. In 1990, he was still working with the Khmer Rouge as an interrogator. Nate Thayer, who saw him questioning prisoners at that time, recalled that Chan "was the most frightening-looking character" he had ever seen. When



sighted again by an United Nations official in 1996, Chan was semi-retired and engaged in Market gardening.

Chan's Deputy was another former mathematics teacher, Tang Sin Hean (alias Pon), a Sino-Khmer from Sector 25 who had served under Duch during the civil war. He was already working for santabal by July 1975. In a self-criticism session at the prison in December 1976, he deplored his "middle bourgeois" class background, confessed that he was often "individualistic" in his thinking, and admitted that because he worked so hard on santabal matters he had failed to "build himself" or learn as much as he should have done from the "masses." The document closed with warm testimonials about his performance at S-21 from Chan and Duch.

Pon interrogated many prominent prisoners, including Keo Meas, Ney Saran, Hu Nim, Tiv Ol, and Phouk Chhay. Several documents signed by Pon and attached to these interrogations propose extensive torture. At a biweekly self-criticism meeting held at the prison in 1978, staff claimed to be "frightened" of Pon, who criticized himself for not "following the masses," probably a euphemism for his top-down, authoritarian style.

The documents unit (krom akkesa), closely linked to the interrogations unit, was headed in 1977 and 1978 by Suos Thi, a former soldier in his mid-twenties who came from the same district as Ho and Peng. Suos Thi had "joined the revolution" (choul padevat) in August 1971. He had served with Ho in Division 703 before coming to S-21 in November 1975. In his self-critical autobiography Suos Thi claimed that he had become a revolutionary because he was "angry about imperialism, privilege, and capitalism that exploited poor people." Among his "shortcomings," he admitted that he "enjoyed going to movies," "linked to laugh," "quarreled with his siblings," and "got angry quickly." Among his virtues, he said, was a "willingness to perform any tasks for the

Party." He survived into the 1990s, when he was twice interviewed by journalists. Asked if he "regretted" working at S-21, he said that he was "very sorry for the killings, for the children and women. In fact, some of the people weren't guilty at all." At another point in the interview, he was more laconic. "When they gave you a job," he said, "you had to do it."

In the "separate" category in the telephone directory, listed with Duch, Pon and Chan appears the name of "Brother Huy." Two men with this name were working at S-21 in 1978. The one named in the directory was probably Him Huy, a self-described "lower-middle" peasant from Sector 25 who became a Khmer Rouge soldier in 1972 because, he wrote in his self-critical autobiography, he was "sick of capitalism and privilege." Serving under Ho, he had been wounded in the final assault on Phnom Penh. He came to S-21 in early 1977 as a guard, and in 1978 he took charge of documenting prisoners entering the facility and those executed at Choeung Ek, duties previously carried out by Peng. In late 1978 Huy was put in charge of security matters at the prison, placing him fifth or sixth in the chain of command. "After they killed all the [other] bosses," he told Peter Maguire, "they promoted me."

In many interviews with journalists and scholars since 1985, Him Huy had admitted that he drove truckloads of prisoners to Choeung Ek and also killed "several" prisoners there. He claims that he was imprisoned after 1979 for "a year" for these offenses. Vann Nath, however, remembers Huy as a "very cruel" member of the assassination squad that accompanied prisoners to Choeung Ek. Another survivor said that Huy had been responsible for "hundreds" of deaths. These grim views were echoed by Nhem En and others interviewed by a British journalist in Phnom Penh in 1997. In interviews Huy has often stressed his repentance, remarking at one point, "I don't feel that [working at S-21] is what my parents intended me to do." **(Continued)**

A SAMPLING OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE LINKING THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS

By Steve Heder

(Continued)

Kae Pok

An example of “confessions” marked for transmission to Central Zone Secretary Kae Pok that implicate him in guilty knowledge of killings are those of a Member of Baray District Committee in Sector 42 of that Zone, Aem Min alias Saen, who had concurrently been the district’s Vice-Chairman for Security.

Describing CPK policy in April 1975, Saen’s “confessions” say:

According to the Party’s plan arrangements were to be made to receive the people evacuated from Phnom Penh and provincial towns as well, keeping them to be put in place to live in the villages and subdistricts of the people. And as for those who had gone undercover among the people, it was imperative to remove them and put them in one place. And then assess and investigate them clearly. If any were found to be officers, then smash them one by one.

Later,

The Party ... made a second instruction. The Party had us search out and seek to arrest every last one of those of officer rank who had gone undercover in the people’s villages and subdistricts, and arrest them and put them in the Security Office, where they were to be detained for a clear assessment to learn which were officers and which were not, and then gradually sort them out as per the concrete reality.

Saen’s “confessions” also mention that all the members of a “dacoit group that went to live undercover in Koki Thom subdistrict, Baray district, Sector 42 in December 1976 were later “smashed by the Party.”


According to Saen’s “confessions”, he and fellow “traitors” in his district had violated Party policy as of April 1975 by sending “some” evacuees of officer rank whom they had identified as such to live like other “new people” in district cooperatives. After the second Party instruction, Saen and other “CIA links” had again

supposedly violated Party policy. They “came out overtly to seize and tie up those of officer rank who had gone undercover in the villages and subdistricts of the people,” and had thus openly ... made arrests without maintaining secrecy, contrary to the Party’s policy; that is, we arrested those of officer rank in the rice fields and other fields, in the worksites and in the villages and subdistricts. This let the people, new and veteran, see our activities

The result was supposedly that a “number of those with officer rank” got scared and were able to survive at least temporarily by fleeing into the jungle. Then, some 40 persons who were “were arrested and brought in to be detained at the Baray district Security Office, Sector 42” on suspicion of having had officer rank” were treasonously released after two months of assessment and investigation that in many cases confirmed the suspicions. According to Saen’s “confessions”, this happened because the “traitorous” then Secretary of Baray district, Chân, gave instructions “to go easy on some of the prisoners,” saying “these prisoners were nobody other than our own flesh and blood, so we had to be lenient with them, release them and let them go to work, and if they were then to flee, let them go ahead and flee.”

As for arrests, Saen’s “confessions” have an appendix entitled “Table of the Names of Traitors Entangled in the History of Aem Min alias Saen”. It lists 68 names, ten of whom are said already to have been arrested. Among the remainder are not only Saen’s fellow “CIA links” within the Party, but also the former Khmer Republic military officers he “confesses” they had traitorously allowed to live.

As with Nuon Chea, so for Kae Pok, there are also examples of other “confessions” with information about arrests that seems action-oriented. These include those made in May 1977 by Li Hak, the Chairman of a Technical School on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, which have a notation of 8 May that not only reads “one copy sent to Comrade Pok”, but adds: “implicates



Comrade Dan, spouse of Comrade Sin [?] and the names of a lot of others in the North”. The appendix lists 85 names, of whom ten are indicated as arrested. In addition, a number of names have an “X” next to them, box drawn around them, or a line under them, perhaps suggesting they are to be arrested. Five of these are cadre in the North Zone or the neighbouring Sector 106. There is also a notation on the appendix, which reads, “This list does not excerpt all names: please also read the document.”

Ta Mok

Examples of “confessions” pointing to guilty knowledge of executions and arrests on the part of Ta Mok include those of Teum San alias Sit, the Secretary of a district in Southwest Zone Sector 25, which are marked as having been “Sent to Brother Mok Already, 12 November 1977”, and also have a the cover notation: “Southwest”. They describe peasant demonstration in the sector that was suppressed “by arresting the demonstrators and taking them to be killed and disposed of.” Local armed forces arrested 50 demonstrators “and then took ten of them out and killed them”.

The March 1978 “confessions” of Saom Chea alias Sdaoeng, until his arrest the Secretary of Southwest Zone Sector 25, are marked “Comrade Mok Has Read Already; Handed over on 18 April 1978”. Chea describes a May 1975 meeting between his

arrested predecessor as Sector 25 Secretary, Chey Suon (alias Ta Chey alias Seng), and the then Secretary of Sector 24 of the neighbouring East Zone, Suoh Nôv alias Chhouk, also already arrested, at which

Ta Chey stressed that nowadays there were powerful contradictions within the ranks between the line according to which it was necessary from then on to proceed and most of the leading cadre, who were not in unity with the Party over its contents, because the new road of making socialist revolution that was being travelled was repressive, dogmatic and constricted the rights and freedoms of every human being, and particularly of veteran cadre who had stuck with the struggle for a long time already, who had to be purged because this category was being labelled as having outmoded ideas, as carrying lots of old baggage, as being unable to keep up with those who were making socialist revolution, who had to be swept cleanly away.

According to these “confessions”, Ta Chey was in favour of a movement “to oppose a Communist Party that was unjustly oppressing and slaughtering [kapsâmlap] the people,” a movement that “had a correct line, namely, to liberation the nation and people from a Communist regime that was oppressing and slaughtering the people by compelling the people to work like draught animals, without any rights or freedoms whatsoever.” However, according to this account, those who hoped for such a movement both in



the grassroots and in the army were constantly being purged and swept cleanly away. The level of the Organization's clean sweeps was always constantly on the rise starting in early 1976 right through to 1977. Therefore all that anybody could think of was their worries and fears.

The "confessions" of Kung Kien alias Eung Vet, described above because they implicate Nuon in guilty knowledge of executions, also have the cover sheet notion, "excerpts presented to Comrade Mok already, [??] May 1977". Moreover, the marginal note on them in the hand of Duch declaring that the "contemptible Tan Meng was ... already smashed" specifies that he was smashed "by Brother 15," which is an alias for Ta Mok. In addition, the cover sheet notations also draw attention to the fact that some of the people that the "confessions" allege were "involved" in treasonous activities "are from [Sectors] 33 and 35", both of which were part of the Southwest Zone. The implication that these "confessions" were sent to Ta Mok for follow-up action is heightened by numerous instances of marginal notes, underlining, "X"-ing and boxing of names scattered throughout the text.

Thus, a marginal note specifying that "Sâm" has already been smashed by the grassroots is juxtaposed with another note next to a list of the names of 16 persons described as "links of Sâm" who were purportedly involved in "agitating the people so that they would have contradictions with the Revolutionary Organization". The note reads: "Please locate". Further down, next to names of four more people implicated as "traitors", a marginal note reads: "Find". Where Vet's "confessions" write of one cadre who he says "the Organization has already arrested" and another cadre who he says is "currently in S-21", they then list another four persons who "conducted activities contrary to the line", and an "X" is placed next to one of the four. Then comes a passage where Vet lists six more persons who he "confesses" ignored the Party line, and next to the last two there is again the instruction, "Please Find". Further down, Vet mentions another cadre, "Sângkum, formerly the Srae Cham district committee", who was supposedly involved in an anti-Party conspiracy, and here a box is drawn around the name Sângkum. Vet also "confesses" that shortly after April 1975, someone named "Srâh assigned Run

and me to take a letter to Chhaom, District Committee in Sector 35, at Kah Tauch." A box is drawn around the name Chhaom and his location. Vet then "confesses" to being one of seven persons present at another conspiratorial meeting. The names of all six others are underlined. After several more passages where names of people implicated in Vet's "confessions" are underlined or have boxes placed around them, he writes of attending a meeting of military cadre in Phnom Penh in October to November 1975 at which time I met with Seuan (Battalion at Kah Kong) and Phat (Battalion at Kah Kong) These two [said] that a link who had come to live in Kah Kong was Thi (battalion) who was with them, too.

Here there is the marginal note: "Kah Kong" with an "X", and boxes are drawn around all three names, which had appeared higher up in the text with the instruction, "please locate". Then, again after several passages in which certain names are variously underlined or boxed, Vet's "confessions" implicate as traitors "Sâm nang (Secretary, Company, gone to study in China)," who Vet "confesses" he told to "liaise" with two other supposedly treasonous links, "Hân and Uoch". Here a marginal note reads "important", and the names Hân and Uoch are boxed.

Finally, Vet's "confessions" end with an appendix entitled: "On the List of Traitorous Forces Within My Network". It lists a total of 65 names; four noted as "arrested"; 12 noted as "removed by the Organization"; and three noted as "removed abroad by the Organization". Twenty-six of the remainder either have an "X" by them or the name is underlined.

Another example of "confessions" marked for transmission to Ta Mok that both mention arrests and seem to indicate that he may have been being asked to carry out more are those of Thou Hai, dated February 1978.

They marked "hold for Sending to Comrade Mok, Relations to Sectors 25 and 33, Southwest", and have the additional notation, "Contacted 28 March 1978". They conclude with a section entitled "Names Mixed Up in the Biography of Thou Hai", which gives the names of four people who have already been arrested. Each of the names of 14 other people, all residing in Southwest Zone Sector 25, has an "X" beside.

(Continued)

many people’s understanding, the Rwandan genocide was a simple case of Hutu killing Tutsi. And in fact, the overwhelming majority of killers, and those who orchestrated the killing were Hutu, while the majority of victims were Tutsi. It is nevertheless problematic to label this a case of “ethnic genocide”.

If the definition of ethnic difference is having a distinct language, culture, or religion, then the boundary between Hutu and Tutsi is unclear. Members of both groups speak Kinyarwanda as their first language. Likewise, they share the same culture and religion. Indeed there is evidence that in the pre-colonial era, people could easily shift between the two categories, and the designation “Hutu” or “Tutsi” referred more to socio-economic status than to inborn traits. Over time, though, these categories became fixed, and membership in one group or the other was required. (That is, although mixed marriages are common, children cannot claim to be Hutu-Tutsi.) From the 1930s on, all Rwandans were required to carry identity cards indicating their ethnicity. Ethnicity defines the boundaries between “us” and “them,” or “insiders” and “outsiders”. These ideas were exploited to the maximum in 1994, and those who were considered “them” were hunted down and murdered.

It is important to note that Tutsi were not the only targets during the genocide, but also politically moderate Hutu who were considered threatening or unreliable by the genocidal regime. This points to the overtly political nature of the killing. In addition, ethnic Twa were involved on both sides of the genocide; they killed, and they were killed. Whichside they participated on depended on their political allegiances at that time. Those associated with powerful Hutu became killers. Those associated with Tutsi or persecuted Hutu were killed. Thus the picture of Rwandan genocide as a clear case of ethnic murder is accurate. Power and politics were at least as important in determining the victims of the genocide as were any primordial ethnic attachments.

The role of ethnicity in genocide is misunderstood for a variety of reasons. In a case of “ethnic genocide” like Rwanda, it is more convenient for outsiders to see

the tragedy in terms of “tribal hatreds” than as the result of decades of history and complex political motives. Ethnic/tribal hatred seems ancient, enduring, and in the case of Africa, natural. There is not much outsiders feel they can (or should) do to change this. When the situation is portrayed as a modern attempt to exterminate defenseless political enemies, however, the world bears more responsibility to intervene and stop the killing.

The reasons why the role of ethnicity in the Cambodian genocide is often underestimated are



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different. It is socially and politically difficult to label the crime inflicted upon 80% of the victims as “crimes against humanity” while the relatively smaller group of monks, Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese, etc. seem to have a monopoly on the more serious crime of “genocide.” Especially in Cambodia, where racist sentiment against certain ethnic minorities such as Vietnamese remains prevalent, the ethnic dimension of the genocide, and its legal implications, is very uncomfortable. It may be the case too that in the Cold

War, and post-Cold War periods, communism is seen as the ultimate political evil by many in the West. Therefore, where tragedies of such dimensions as the cultural revolution in China or the collectivization schemes in Russia can be blamed on socialist economics or communist regimes, they are. Perhaps the Cambodian genocide is another political tragedy that Western analysts cannot persist blaming solely on communism, to the exclusion of any other case or ideology.



PRESS STATEMENT BY HANS CORELL

Pochentong Airport, Phnom Penh, June 7, 2000

Ladies and gentlemen of the press,

Thank you very much for coming today. I am pleased to report that I depart from Cambodia with a sense that I and my delegation have accomplished, together with my counterpart, Minister Sok An and his delegation, the goals we set out to achieve. After two intensive days of frank, comprehensive and positive discussion, Minister Sok An and I achieved an understanding on the basic parameters of the relationship between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia in this unprecedented endeavor: the proposed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. To memorialise our understanding, I presented to Minister Sok An a draft Memorandum of Understanding that would govern our cooperation in the establishment and operation of the court. I made it clear to him that the United Nations would be unable to proceed if the law establishing the court, as passed by the Cambodian Parliament, differs from the Memorandum of Understanding. I know that this matter is of particular concern to the Secretary-General.

The United Nations has fulfilled its tasks of drafting and negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the Government of Cambodia and, at the request of Minister Sok An, of providing advice on the provisions of the draft law. It is now the

Hans Corell



responsibility of the Government to ensure that the Parliament passes the law in a timely fashion in a form that is in keeping with the understanding we have reached as a result of our talks. That task, as Minister Sok An confirmed yesterday, rests solely with Government, and is essential to move the process towards completion.

I would like to thank Minister Sok An and his delegation for working with my delegation in a spirit of cooperation. I wish the Government success in its crucial task of informing the National Assembly of the contents of our understanding and the draft law. The United Nations remains ready, if the necessary conditions are met, to continue to work with the Government of Cambodia to bring the perpetrators of the terrible crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea to justice.

Washington D.C., in the U.S.A., to preserve the memory of this inhumanity.

Probably the greatest mass killings of modern times took place in China and Russia. In ancient Chinese history, Chinese emperors ordered the killing of millions of their own people for various reasons. However, Mao Tse Tung was China's most infamous murderer. In the name of either "cultural revolution" or "movement of great leaps forward", Mao Tse Tung was responsible for the murder of many millions of people in the 1960s and 1970s. In Russia, Stalin once asserted, "It would be a horrific tragedy to have few people slaughtered. On the other hand, if the number of people executed rises up to the millions, it is then considered only a statistic". In a move that Pol Pot would emulate, Stalin had at least 15 million peasants killed on account of his policies of forced collectivization in the 1930s. Then he began a campaign for the "Party 's Internal Purification", which resulted in the death of 20 millions more.

Earlier in the 1970s, the President of Uganda, Idi Amin, had 20 percent of his own people killed. Some were sliced open and their livers used for food. Still worse, Bou Kassa, who considered himself the Napoleon of Central Africa, killed hundreds of thousands of people by pushing them from the top of a mountain into tiger pits. It is also worth remembering that the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan have prevented the release of food supplies to starving people victimized by drought, resulting in the deaths of some two million people.

In the Iraq and Iran war between 1980-1985, the two governments ordered their military troops to shoot innocent people if they refused to cross minefields. As a result, more than one million people were slain, while Serbs in Yugoslavia killed hundreds of thousands of Muslims. In Middle-East countries, Turkey executed one million Armenian people in 1924. In South America, the power-grasping war of the governments intensified gradually after 1974. As a consequence, the death toll from three countries: Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala, reached one million. It also should not be forgotten that in North America, when the "white people" were founding their colony-derived nation, the United States of America, between 1700 and 1880, the new settlers killed more than one million of the native

inhabitants, who they used to call the "red race", people who the United States today recognizes as the "original Americans". While discussing the killing of people for power, it should be noted that the great temples of the world have resulted from the innumerable lives of people who were mobilized as prisoners of war. These marvels include the Pyramids of Egypt, the ruins of Machu Picchu in Peru, the ornate religious architecture in Mexico, the Taj Mahal at Agra, in northern India, the magnificent Shwegadon pagoda in Burma, and our own Angkor Wat temples in Cambodia.

In the Cambodian political context the word 'genocide' has been used to refer to the killing committed by the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese and Cham minorities. "Genocide" means the "killing and eradication of an ethnic or national group". On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge executions were also aimed at their own people without discrimination. The individuals targeted for execution included government workers, intellectuals, ranking military officers who had already laid down their arms and surrendered, workers, peasants; all sorts of people from adults to innocent infants. In the end, the Khmer Rouge practiced their "Party Internal Purge" by slaying the party's leading cadre and the very 'base people' who were the basis of their movement. The vast majority of victims held at Tuol Sleng were Khmer Rouge cadre networks who had been loyal to Pol Pot. Eventually, they were accused of "disloyalty" or "revisionism". Those so accused were sent to Tuol Sleng to be tortured for detailed confessions and executed in horrible ways. In the Khmer Rouge revolutionary context, killing was for the sake of killing. The Khmer Rouge movement destroyed itself as well as Cambodia. What the Khmer Rouge Angkar created in the name of revolution in Kampuchea had its own "explosive trigger" for destroying itself. Water reservoirs, dikes, bridges and roads were built without regard to engineering principles.

Recently, an intellectual who has significant political influence in Cambodia has explained to me absolutely that the bones being kept at Tuol Sleng have to be cremated to liberate the souls of the victims for reincarnation. If we fail to do so, he asserted, the souls would remain haunting around without real destination. The intellectual went on to say that it was a Khmer

RECLAIMING CAMBODIAN HISTORY

By Jaya Ramji

(Continued)

Accountability Mechanisms

This project was created to determine which mode of accountability would be appropriate for the Cambodian people in bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice. In the words of Jose Zalaquett, “A policy to deal with past human rights abuses should have two overall objectives: Preventing the recurrence of such abuses and, to the extent possible, repairing the damage they have caused.” In responding to past instances of human rights abuses, responses have been along one of three lines: international trials, domestic trials, and truth commissions. To discern which of these models would be most responsive to the needs and concerns of the Cambodian people, I interviewed twenty-five Cambodians from varied socio-economic strata as to whether or not and how the Khmer Rouge should be punished.

On the basis of these interviews, I determined that Cambodians lack a shared picture of their history, which is necessary for social consensus and peace (i.e. to repair the harms perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge and to prevent, through education, such atrocities from recurring in the future). A tribunal for Cambodia currently appears imminent; while genocide should not go unpunished, the limitations imposed by the structure of a trial may deny Cambodians access to the full truth about the Khmer Rouge regime. A truth commission could paint a broader picture of Cambodian history from 1975 to 1979, and is therefore

a necessary complement to a tribunal. Every one of the interviewees agreed, however, that a domestic trial in Cambodia would not be a sufficient exercise of justice.

International tribunals prosecute those accused of serious crimes under international law and memorialize episodes of mass violence. The hallmarks of international trials are individual accountability and punishment. That is, such trials focus exclusively on the deeds of individual perpetrators, often military and political leaders (under a chain-of-command theory), and impose traditional criminal sanctions on those found guilty. Perhaps most importantly, international tribunals promote international criminal norms such as the prohibitions on genocide and crimes against humanity, which become diluted if every violation is not punished. The Nuremberg trials, the Tokyo tribunal, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are all examples of international trials. The main functions of an international trial are deterrence of future crimes and



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commission. Truth commissions record and disseminate a full and unbiased historical record of human rights abuses in a specific country, performing a broader fact-finding function than a tribunal. This record is intended to perform both a preventative and a corrective goal by aiding a society to learn from their past mistakes and disallowing the revision of history and the denial of past crimes. Truth commissions are generally victim-focused; that is, they center around the stories of the victims rather than the testimony of the perpetrators. The psychological aim of the truth commission is the official acknowledgment of the truth and thus its entry into the public cognitive domain.

Truth commissions do not possess prosecutorial powers and do not act as judicial bodies in terms of declaring guilt. Truth commissions are more difficult to define than domestic and international trials, since they are flexible and adapt to the needs and requirements of each country. There are, however, four characteristics that are common to all truth commissions: a focus on the past, an attempt to provide a larger picture of abuses rather than an emphasis on a discrete event, a finite and pre-defined time span, and the possession of some authority allowing greater access to information and security. The reports published by truth commissions rarely lead to prosecutions, which can be both positive in increasing participation and detrimental in the lack of enforcement. Truth commissions can be established by the new government, an NGO, a regional organization, or the United Nations.

The most obvious criticism of truth commissions is that they lack the power to punish. This, however, depends upon the truth commission, and the definition of punishment. Truth commissions use non-traditional sanctions such as shame and ostracization that can be as powerful as criminal punishments in advancing the rule of law. Truth commissions also pose due process problems in that they name and punish those found guilty, but do not always meet the procedural requirements of a court of law.

My interviews, although limited in number and in scope, establish that a truth commission or an international tribunal would be the most appropriate accountability mechanisms for Cambodia. It is clear

that the heinous human rights violations of the Khmer Rouge must be examined and exposed. However, the tension between the “duty to prosecute” to vindicate the victims and uphold international criminal law and the need to balance accountability with the fragility of a new democracy is extremely complex. While numerous international scholars assert that genocide must be legally punished, it is important to remember that a trial and a truth commission are not mutually exclusive. In the case of Cambodia, a truth commission is necessary to paint a larger picture of Cambodian history, 1975-1979, that a tribunal will by necessity ignore. A truth commission in combination with limited prosecutions may be the most effective method of accounting for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge.

Themes

In addition to general trends highlighted by the numerical breakdown of the survey, I found several recurring themes arising from the interviews. First, Cambodians want peace. After decades of war, many of those interviewed would not support a tribunal if it led to further instability and unrest. Second, the interviewees want to know the full truth about the Khmer Rouge era. The Khmer Rouge regime was so secretive that many Cambodians do not know who was ultimately responsible for the genocidal acts; these facts must be established so that Cambodians can put the past behind them. In this context, the question of command responsibility surfaced repeatedly. Third, the interviewees want to know who exactly was behind the Khmer Rouge—that is, who or which countries supported the regime both directly and indirectly. Fourth, in regard to the question of amnesty, the interviewees held vastly different opinions. On the one hand, Buddhism and national reconciliation point to leniency. On the other hand, the crimes committed were so heinous that many interviewees believe that the Khmer Rouge do not deserve to be pardoned. Fifth, a state of law must be established in Cambodia. Finally, education is absolutely vital for Cambodia to move toward its purported goals, and thus a priority.

(Continued)

CHEY SOPHEARA TELLS HISTORY OF THE MASS GRAVES BEHIND TUOL SLENG

By Pongrasy Pheng

Mr. Chey Sopheara, aged 51, is currently Director of the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Sopheara said that the mass grave uncovered very recently in the front yard of the resident, a stone throw from behind the Museum fence of the Museum, is in fact related to what had happened at the Museum after the liberation.

Sopheara was one of the guides at Tuol Sleng between 1979-80, when the State (the People's Revolutionary of Kampuchea) established a people's court to try the Khmer Rouge regime, in which many delegates from the socialist nations. During that period of the 1979's Khmer Rouge trial, his team was told to exhume the above grave to show the delegations that the Khmer Rouge killed actually people everywhere in the compound of S-21 Office during their rule between 1975-79.

Sopheara knew there were graves behind Tuol Sleng because he had been told by a soldier not long after the liberation day. However, he forgot the name of the soldier. "In 1979-80, wherever his team dug the earth, we saw human bones", he recalled. His team chose to dig the grave, which was now in the front yard of Mr. Ay Siphah, who is a shoe maker. At that time, there was no peoples' residence behind the Museum like now. There was actually debris of a ruined house next to the grave and there were many banana trees behind the infamous S-21. The grave was located at a cluster of the banana trees. When his team dug it, he saw strings, bones, and skulls.... The Ministry of Health and the competent authorities came and joined Sopheara's team in the exhumation process. The exhumation was stopped after a while due to the very bad smell from the bodies in the grave. He said that the bones were boiled in a big pot and hairs remained to be seen on some of the skulls. Some of the skulls after being boiled and cleaned were put together to shape like a map and some were kept there for an exhibition. He said his team kept suspecting that the big skulls and long sight bones were the remains of some foreigners.

Sopheara said he himself was told to bring some

of the bones from Svay Rieng province and some from Tuol Kok gravesite (Radio Station situated north of the city). He estimated at 10 bodies in that grave. After that, his team took a large piece of glass to cover the grave and a fence was made around the grave for other foreign delegates or journalists to come and see. His team believed that the glass could also protect the remains from being eaten by animals and from being covered up with earth.

In 1993, the political trend changed, the grave was covered up with earth (over the glass) and the fence was destroyed. Just recently, as Ay Siphah was preparing to build an extension to his house, he dug up the grave and intended to take the bones to a pagoda. Sopheara asserted that some of the houses built behind Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum must have been standing on the graves. House owners knew about this but they kept building and living there. The glass that we saw broken into pieces now was the old glass his team put to cover the bones in the late 1979, it was not the frame of the grave.

Sopheara referred to the recent finding of the grave behind Tuol Sleng as being merely an old story. "Mr. Ay Siphah actually knew of the grave beneath where he lives and he did not do anything to the bones until he was prepared to build an extension to his house. He had to first dig the grave and took the bones to the pagoda for a religious ceremony according to the Khmer tradition. So, do not be so surprised.", said Chey Sopheara, "It is an old story."



MY TRUE LIFE UNDER DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

By Osman Ysa

Svay Klang is my native village and is situated in Kroch Chhmar District, Kampong Cham Province. In 1973, there were 1,200 families living there. But, it is unfortunate that starting from 1973 this village endured terrible destruction, because of the policies of one group that invaded, controlled and affected the peace of the villagers. At that time all the villagers knew them as the “National Liberation Front.” Afterwards, they were known as “the Khmer Rouge.” In order to serve the policies of this group, hundreds of villagers were forced to suffer and die. Hundreds of homes were abandoned. At the two large temples, only their foundations remained and on phtah ga in the front. One sourav school was abandoned completely.

Now, when we rest or during different holidays, I return to visit my native village and I travel past the temple with the one phtah ga remaining, I usually remember the past stories of my native village. Everyone knows that Svay Klang is a village filled with happiness and has many knowledgeable people and is so busy anyone would want to live there.

In 1986, one event shocked me. It was while I was digging dirt to build a new temple. I saw many bones of the dead buried in the dirt. There was not one person who knew this place served as a burial ground. Suddenly I remembered the words of my mother and father who use to tell me that they didn’t know where my grandmother, my grandfather, or my aunts and

uncles died, when the village was evacuated. I wondered if these bones were the bones of my grandfather, my grandmother, or my aunts and uncles, or if they were the bones of someone else. Not one person could tell me, but I only thought to myself, the persons who died and left their bones here during the evacuation could not be anyone outside of my village. The act of endurance and the act of challenging the Khmer Rouge in Svay Klang Village are historical events that every villager in Svay Klang has either remembered or has heard about. The villagers always tell me about these events. I know that this is not the only place where bones of the dead are buried. They are probably buried everywhere through out the entire village of Svay Klang. It is filled with the graves of people who suffered and were shot and killed by the Khmer Rouge soldiers. At this time I felt profound pride that I am able to work at the Documentation Center of Cambodia as a collector of information and



Osman

began to feel a little better, because after we stayed there for about half a month, they sent us to other villages. In one village, they added on 2 Cham families. My family walked to a distant village, perhaps 7km away. This village I remember as Kamboa Village. We lived there for a short period until we discovered that the people who lived in this village were also evacuees from Phnom Penh.

In Kamboa Village my father was sent to a fishery called Peam Tey near the border of Kratie. My two older brothers were placed in a mobile work brigade. My mother had to work in the fields day and night. I had to go cut down kuntreang khet plants and carry cow dung. My younger sister who was not even one year old was kept with the old grandmothers in the mess halls. At that time, it was the very first time in my life when I was completely separated from my family. Before that I had never been far from them. This was also a time that helped me to understand how much I loved my parents. When we rested once in a while I ran to check on my younger sister. When she cried and was hungry for breast milk, I saw the grandmothers feed her rice porridge soup as a substitute for my mother's breast milk. Sometimes there was not even rice porridge soup. I felt very sorry for my younger sister. At that time I knew that I lost all of my protection and security, because I love and trust my parents more than anything, and they were both separated from me. I always waited for my mother to return from work. I always stared at the fields that she walked towards in the morning. But I only saw groups of small children like myself quickly carrying shovels back and forth. Every silent night when heavy rains fell, I secretly watched my mother cry. She felt my head and told me that, "When it rains heavily, at this time your brother is in the mobile work brigade raising the dam in the rain. Your father is risking an accident in the waves, with the rain and winds blowing in the middle of the lake." In the end, my youngest sister died because she lacked her mother's breast milk. My second older brother died from internal bleeding from overstraining and exhaustive work. This is my true life under the Democratic Kampuchea regime.

Dear Director of DC-Cam,

On behalf of the leaders of the Cambodian People's Party, I would like to express my profound gratitude for the copies of "Searching for the Truth" that have been delivered to the party and to me personally.

I highly appreciate the DC-Cam's outstanding effort to document these significant matters and hope that Mr. Director will continue to deliver these important publications to me.

Finally, I would like to wish you and your colleagues good health and success in your mission.

Sincerely yours,
Chief of the (CPP) Standing Committee,
Central Committee
Say Chhum

Letter from Ms. Soeng Sy Yuth to Youk Chhang

Thanks for everything you have given to me. I am always with you. I really appreciate this historical work. Those who died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge may rest in peace if a trial is achieved.

In response to the accomplishment, I would like to give you and your colleagues an amended constitution for consideration and understanding.

Wishing you and colleagues success.

June 5, 2000

Please send letters or articles to
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Homepage: <http://welcome.to/dccam>

Dear Mr. Director of DC-Cam,

Special thanks for your five copies of "Searching For The Truth". Although I am very busy with my work, I still spend some time reading several articles in the magazine. Every time I open it, it seems to recall the era of suffering I endured under the Pol Pot leadership. I arrived at Pochentong Airport on May 23, 1976. My passport was taken and I myself was sent by bus to Institut Technique Khmè-Soviétique. Some time later, I was assigned to prepare a re-education camp in Boeng Trabek known as "B-3". I was once sent by Angkar to do farming in Ta Lei Village next to Cheoung Ek and in an area north of Chrang Cham Res. Besides, Angkar asked me to design a DK map, as they knew I was a Ingénieur des Géomètres. Some of your articles remind me of the past, because after the 1970 coup, I became a member of FUNK. I undertook several political sessions with Angkar's leading cadre when I lived in Phnom Penh between 1976-1979. In 1982, I was an ambassador and ambassador-at-large to Latin America and Africa, where I also explained to the world about the genocide in Cambodia. Once again, I would like to thank you for leading my feelings through your magazine's articles, which reflect my real life during that time. It seems to have happened just recently.

Yours sincerely,

Long Visalo, State Secretary for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

June 15, 2000

S-21 Prisoner



