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Letter:

HOLY BIBLE



In the Bible, Genesis, Chapter 9, Verses 5 and 6, states:

“For your own lifeblood, too, I will demand an accounting: from every animal I will demand it, and from man in regard to his fellow man I will demand an accounting for human life. If anyone sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; For in the image of God has man been made”.

If Duch has really read The Bible and believes that God will cleanse him of his sins, then he must also understand that God has clearly distinguished between His mercy and the responsibility of individual human beings to humanity for their transgressions.

Duch, former chief of security prison S-21, who had legal responsibility for the lives of more than ten thousand, has been hiding his responsibility behind his assertions of a newfound Christian faith. Duch has been using the word of God to blind the people and sway public opinion. God may forgive and save Duch from his sins, but demand the blood that Duch took from his victims under the Khmer Rouge. I would like to cite a few summarized documents from the more than four hundred thousand Khmer Rouge documents.

Document (I)10773, dated June 21, 1976, relates that with regard to a prisoner named Mut Heng, Duch had ordered cadre members under him to arrest both

father and mother for interrogation.

In a document dated October 1, 1976 (Box 5), which relates to a victim named Ya, Duch had ordered a chief of interrogation named comrade Pon: “With Ya, your comrade can give him a hot and long lesson. In case that he dies of too heavy torture, you will not be a breaker of organizational discipline, since Angkar has decided that it will not be useful to keep the contemptible Ya, who may have hidden his traitorous network elements and his traitorous activities. Angkar has decided to kill him.”

In document (G)1961, dated 30 May, 1978, Duch orders his subordinates to kill a total of seventeen persons, including many children.

I leave it to a tribunal to reason out the magnitude and type of Duch’s crimes against the Cambodian people, including the slaughter of minorities and foreigners, and what laws or conventions may be applicable thereto. The number of documents that relate to Duch’s barbarous acts would barely fit in a classroom. There is nothing he can hide behind, including The Bible. The Bible is the word of God, and Duch has no power to warp God’s word in order to hide his crimes. God knows all that Duch has done, and will not accept Duch into heaven as long as the gravity his acts remain unacknowledged. Rather, God will take him to the abode of all demons.

Youk Chhang





PARTY MEMBERS

(An excerpts from Revolutionary Flags, No.7, July 1976, Chap. 1)

Directives:

1) To grasp firmly the principles of party members, especially ‘the expansion of recruitment of party members and their duties.

2) Must be more aware of party discipline for every party member.

a) Chapter 1 consists of four articles. Articles 1, 2 and 3 are about the principles for expansion of party members. Must absolutely base on this standpoint. Must indoctrinate with these principles. Must educate party members to have a good grasp of these principles.

So far, most inductions into party membership have been correct, except some performed in 1970-1971. As a result, many opportunists have infiltrated into the party. However, the party has maximum screening. Therefore, in the future, before making a decision to induct people into the party, must open statute and check.

Based upon experience, we must have a firm grasp of biographies. Until biographies are clear, don’t induct them into the party. Be vigilant. Don’t allow CIA to infiltrate. CIA agents attack the revolution like the injection of drugs into the revolutionary blood. So have

a good grasp of biographies.

b) Party discipline, Article 4:

The objectives of party discipline are:

1) Must have a clear standpoint regarding party discipline. Grasp discipline, understand the significance and necessity of discipline. Discipline is established for the solidarity and unity of the party. To date, this point of view has not yet been paid much attention to.

Why discipline? What are its advantages?

Solidarity and unity are not possible without discipline. Discipline does not depend on individuals or committees, but on the guidelines.

We want the public to have a better understanding of the guidelines, consciousness, and party’s organizational principles, so as to build and extend the party. Make them understand the party’s discipline for themselves and for making decisions regarding the selection of party members and cadres. The guilty will be found when they carry out consciousness policy inaccurately. Their guilt will be uncovered when they carry out organizational discipline inaccurately, as there is only a single guideline. This will help solidify our party. So far, there

have been minor and serious offenses. If at a high level, it breaks discipline. The public sometimes can see the mistakes, but they dare not speak out. The people can see because they have understood the party’s discipline. Must educate continually.

2) Must impose discipline thoroughly for solidification of party solidarity and unity. The party’s principle is self-criticism for self-renewal. It is basic. However, if he or she fails to change after repeated reeducation, the discipline must be practiced for the sake of public awareness and strong belief in the party’s strength. By doing so, we can improve the party’s principles and guidelines.

Must be vigilant with the “left” and right hand

sides. So far, less attention has been paid to discipline implementation. In this regard, we are in the right side. But be careful with the left side, in which no thorough discipline has been practiced. Meanwhile, there must be thorough implementation of the discipline. Before practicing any discipline, there must have been repeated attempts at reeducation for a period of time. When any discipline is practiced, there must be tough measures to prevent any possible reactions.

Thorough implementation of discipline does not make the party weak, but strong. If the party discipline has been practiced accurately, the public will also be encouraged.

ARTICLES ON THE LAW IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA’S CONSTITUTION

(Officially promulgated on January 5, 1976)

Chapter 6: Law implementing organ

Article 8.- The government is an organ having the duty to implement all laws and political guidelines of the assembly of Kampuchean people. The government shall be elected by the assembly of Kampuchean people, and shall be completely responsible before the assembly for all its processes both in domestic and foreign affairs.

Chapter 7: Tribunal

Article 9.- The tribunal belongs to the people, and is a representative of people’s justice. It shall protect the people’s justice, freedom and democracy. It shall punish any acts against the people’s state laws. Tribunal of all levels shall be elected and appointed by the people’s assembly.

Article 10.- The state’s legal offenses are as follows:

- ◆ Any activities considered as being against and is of vandalism, caused by network elements and harmful to the state and the people shall be punished.
- ◆ Any people with other offenses beside the aforementioned acts shall be reeducated in the

framework of state organization or people’s Angkar.



National Symbol: Democratic Kampuchea



MEETING WITH A STUDENT AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF KAING KEK IEV, ALIAS “COMRADE DUCH”, IN KAMPONG THOM

(Kim Sour was a student of Duch’s in Kampong Chhnang Province. Leam Sarun is a former close friend of Duch’s from the time when Duch was staying in Wat Oudnalaom, Phnom Penh).

Kosal: You know Duch, whose photo has appeared in the newspaper you are reading?

Kim Sour: Yes. We were close. We knew each other during my school days. I just want to make it clear that the original name of Duch is Kaing Kek Iev.

Kosal: Yes, I have learned from historians that Duch’s original name was Kaing Kek Iev. It is true. Even Duch himself has acknowledged his name, and there are a number of documents relating to Duch’s affairs.

Kim Sour: I’d like to say that when I was in the third grade, Duch was my teacher of physics, chemistry, and mathematics.

Leam Sarun: But, he also taught Khmer.

Kim Sour: I studied with him in Skun High School in around

1964-65. He was different from the other teachers at the school.

Kosal: How so?

Kim Sour: He liked being with his students. He had a good relation with his students, and the students also loved him. Some other teachers were very snobbish, which made the students feel scared. Kaing Kek Iev never made the students afraid of him, and the students loved and always hugged him or tried to raise him up and swing him. Most of the students loved him.

Kosal: What were his activities at the school?

Kim Sour: Based on my remembrance, at that time I was staying in Wat Skun (Wat Anu Kun). We didn’t know why there were leaflets being left along the stairs of the Buddhist monks. I didn’t know whether the teachers ordered their students to do such a thing or not. I was not sure. The Khmer Rouge activities began at about this time. One year later, I separated from him.

Dara: Did he get married or have children?

Kim Sour



Kim Sour: No.

Sarun: He was once imprisoned. In 1973, he fled into the jungle. In that year, he was not married yet.

Kosal: When was Duch born?

Sarun: Duch was born in the year of horse, 1942. But, on his ID card, his age was pushed one year back (ie. from 1942 to 1941).

Kosal: How did you learn he was born in that year?

Sarun: Because I was a fortune teller during my monkhood in Wat Oudnalaom, where A Kieu asked me

to tell his fortune. His other given name is Kieu.

Dara: He was imprisoned?

Sarun: Yes. From 1967 to 1970. In 1970, at the time of the coup organized by Lon Nol, all such prisoners were given amnesty and released. A Kieu also used to live in Wat Oudnalaom, Monk House No.3.

Dara: Before staying in Monk House No.3, how long had he been staying in the Wat?

Sarun: Between 1961-1964 and 1970-1973, when he was a teacher.

Dara: During your stay with him, what did you learn from him, especially concerning his character?

Sarun: He seemed to be a useless person, who always joked. He was not a serious person.

Dara: Not serious?

Sarun: No. But, he was very serious with the revolutionary standpoint. Everyone knew Khaing Kech Ieu was a Khmer Rouge element. To speak frankly, at that time I also believed him to be a Khmer Rouge element. Kech Ieu had a close relation with Khieu Samphan. Actually, he was closer to Sokh Thuok, known as Ta Venta. Based on my knowledge, Sok Thuok used to be a customs chief. Then he [Kieu] asked

me to flee into the jungle. I didn't agree. I was in the Buddhist monkhood until 1976, after which I was excommunicated. I knew everything happening in Kampong Thom, including his delivery of leaflets. He had some of his elements in Kampong Thom, where I did know what he had done. I used to warn him when we were living in the Monk House. My teacher and his teacher were very close to Samdech Chuon Nat, Senior Chief of Buddhist monastery, who warned him: "Don't do politics". He replied: "Monks, [I] do politics to liberate the people". He said it like that and laughed. The monks had nothing to add. For his personal characteristics, when he was very angry, he didn't say anything in response to anyone's provocation. He was very patient. When someone wanted to have a fight with him, his voice turned soft, and tried to console them. He was very skinny. (At this point, Sarun pointed to Duch's picture in the newspaper, which shows that his face has changed little over time.) He introduced all of his family members into the Khmer Rouge [revolution], including his three siblings. At the end of 1975, he ordered his rank and file to search for me for fear of death...one of his partners in Sandan was Phalam Sien,

security chief of Kampong Cham Zone. Later, I heard that he (Duch) was the chief of Tuol Sleng prison.

Kosal: In what year?

Sarun: In 1978.

Kosal: How did you learn this?

Sarun: Because Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh came to search for Koy Thuon's network elements, who were all arrested. In Baray District, his students from Phnom Penh told me: "Now Kieu is in Phnom Penh. He works in Tuol Sleng. His name has been changed. But, he works in Mok Veang Zone [in front of the Royal Place]." We later learned that Mam Nai was also working with him.

Leam Sarun



According to my friends in Pailin, Mam Nai, also known as Chann, is still alive (*living in Sampoeu Loun near the border of Thailand*).

Kosal: May I ask you some personal questions. Beside politics, what was Duch's private life? I mean girl friends...?

Sarun: No, no. He did not like "drinking or eating". But at times he smoked two or three packs of cigarettes. He did not gamble, even if he saw people around him gambling. But, he tried to convince people, as Kim Sour has just said. All people around him got along well with him. He did not indulge in girls or wine.

Kosal: The genuine "revolutionist" began at that time?

Sarun: Yes. He would also go to any place where there was an accident and help victims. That was why people in the monastery loved him so much. In Skun, he encouraged students to help replant rice seedlings and then to flee into the jungle with him. When he and his students were arrested and imprisoned, I visited him. At that time I was in the Buddhist monkhood, and Hou Nim also knew me. Hou Nim said: "Well, what is the point of coming here to provoke troubles." I replied: "It will not be a big deal to just go and visit him. It will not be good not to pay a courtesy visit." Then a policeman said: "Ta [grandfather], please don't get involved with the Khmer Rouge." In fact I was not at all a Khmer Rouge element (Sarun laughed while saying this). His [Duch's] house is in Stung. I used to visit the house, but after 1979, when I next visited his house, I didn't see his younger siblings, who were also Khmer Rouge elements. They were all killed (he turned and asked Kim Sour). He (Duch) is Vietnamese-Chinese. That's why he is named Kaing Kek Iev. He was tops in mathematics in Kampong Thom Province. He always stayed first in the provincial and national mathematics competitions.

Dara: In what year?

Sarun: In 1961 he passed his Bac-1 examination, and was then selected as a professor. Finally, he got a bachelor of literature in the Royal University of Phnom Penh, as did I.

Kosal: During your time with him, did you ever hear any other personal stories about Duch?

Sarun: He did not bring up his personal life. He always said, "Don't allow the French and imperialist colonialists to step on the heads of the people."

Kosal: Did his parents ever visit him?

Sarun: Rarely, but other relatives occasionally did. His siblings were very good educators. Many adolescents followed him into the Monk House. They left in 1973. Only I remained in the Buddhist monkhood. He didn't dare try to convince me, because I said to him, "Your head will be broken into pieces if you dare to entice Buddhist monks" (Sarun laughed). If we have a chance to talk together, he will not deny what we did. I once used a psychological trick when I was a fortune teller to warn him when he was about to leave for his teaching in Skun District: "Something will happen to you next year." Then he challenged me to a bet: "If it is true, I will worship you forever." When the next year came, he was arrested. After his arrest and imprisonment, I would bring food for him. He told me not to come any more. In 1970, when he was released, I gave him a fortune telling: "You are the top, but the top of rotten men." I always used this phrase when meeting him. I always tried to dissuade him, but never succeeded. However, he didn't dare look down me. He really loved me....

Kosal: You have just said that Kieu (Duch) seemed to have a close relationship with Khieu Samphan. What made you think that this was true?

Sarun: Because Dr. Chuon Choeun introduced him [Duch] to Khieu Samphan, who in turn introduced me to Chhuon Choeun.

Kosal: When?

Sarun: Between 1965 and 1966. In 1967, he was imprisoned.

Kosal: When Kaing Kek Iev was staying in the Wat, did any Khmer Rouge leaders come to meet him?

Sarun: No. I never saw any. But after he had met them I always confronted him. If it was true, he said 'Yes', if not he said 'No'. He tried to meet them secretly.

Kosal: Were there any written communications?

Sarun: No. Letters were never used. Oral messages were used for secrecy. Once I met Khieu Samphan and Hou Nim, who resided in the vicinity of the Assembly. At that time I asked Kheiu Samphan for intervention, that is, for the Assembly to recognize the equality between Buddhist Dharma Certificates and School Certificates. He agreed, with a condition attached. Khieu Samphan wanted to have a demonstration organized against the American imperialists.

(Continued)

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THIOUNN PRASIT

KHMER ROUGE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. 1975-1992

Translated by Kosal Phat and Sokha Irene



Thiounn Prasith

(Continued)

3. With the Vietnamese:

In late July 1970, I went to Hanoi with Chan Seng as the Vietnamese government had invited us. Before boarding, I was told by a Chinese comrade that someone wanted to see me. It was Vort Samoeun. He was going to fly to Hanoi as well. He told me to keep prudent with Chao Seng and to make sure that he had no reason to suspect me. Comrade Vort Samoeun sat in the captain's room. I asked him if our party policy accorded with the Vietnamese's. He told me that we had mutual trust with the Vietnamese.

Upon my arrival in Hanoi, I again met him in secret and I asked the Vietnamese for a loan to sponsor the Cambodian Student Association in France and to pay back the loan on my house in Paris as well. I really regretted it. Whenever I think of it, I am always angry with myself and feel much pain. I made such mistakes because I did not have national pride and I lacked political experience and I wrongly believed in the standpoint of internationalism. I can not forget this event.

In the first 9 years I misunderstood a lot about the Vietnamese. I mistakenly thought the Vietnamese were loyal and respected us. According to this misunderstanding, I reported openly through the Vietnamese about our internal situation. That is why the Vietnamese knew all our weak points. On February 1971 I met the party again in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese were trying to lure me to work for them because they knew about my weak points—I used to live in France; my grandfather is Vietnamese and a revisionist like him.

I did not know about the Vietnamese nature until

I joined the Front. I thought that the Vietnamese were good revolutionary people. That was a great regret I had while I was working with the Front. Constant education from the party and practical experience on the international arena portrayed to me the tricky mind of the Vietnamese and I saw this as the danger to our revolution and nation. Their new and recent attempt to obliterate our party leadership machine and to destroy our growing revolution reassure me of the life-and-death antagonism between our party and Vietnam. Vietnam never gave up its attempt to swallow our territory. Its new congress reiterated an obvious land-swallowing ambition.

From 1970 to 1971, at an international conference, there was some bilateral cooperation between the two countries but from 1972, our delegation was independent even though the conference was about the three countries.

4. With the Russian

1. I first met the Russian revisionist while I transited in Moscow to continue another flight to Beijing. When I arrived in Moscow, Chea San, our Front Ambassador took me to meet the leader of a mass organization named Russian Liberty Organization, Chan Seng and Chea San explained and thanked them.

2. In September 1970, the Front government assigned me to participate in the meeting in Berlin, East Germany and the meeting of the Executive Committee of Stockholm on Vietnam in order to explain the recent situation in Cambodia, and reply to the invitation. There I met the Russian because the organisation was led by the revisionist. They did not say anything but spied on us.

3. In October, 1970, the Front Government assigned me to participate in a conference which focused on “The investigation of the genocide commitment by America in Indochina”. This conference was held in Stockholm, where I met the Russian but we did not have an opportunity to chat. They spied on me.



4. In November, 1970, the government assigned me to join the conference focusing on “Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia” in Stockholm. On my way via Moscow, I gave a marble sculpture to the Russian Liberty Organisation”. In Stockholm, the Russian Ambassador invited the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian delegations to join a party at the Russian Embassy. The Cambodian delegations comprised Touch Rinn (the traitor), Krin Leang and me. At the banquet I thanked the Russian Embassy for their support. On my return via Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation held a congress supporting the resistance movements of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian. I made a speech and thanked the Russian people for their support for our resistance.

5. While I was waiting in Moscow to attend the November 1970 conference in Paris, a Russian named Akova Longko, who was said to be a Central Committee member responsible for Asian Affairs came to meet me in my room at the hotel. “Russia was a great power nation but does not tend to oppress Cambodia”, he said. He did not acknowledge Sihanouk. He would not acknowledge Sihanouk’s government unless the Cambodian party asked for it. He wanted to meet the Cambodian party. If he could not, he wanted our letter asking his government to acknowledge our Front government.

This is the first time I met with the Russian. I told him that I did not know if there was any party in Cambodia but I would inform the leader.

I informed the party of every single thing that

went on in that conversation after my arrival in Beijing in December.

I gave the fax to the Vietnamese after I had known that the party representatives had arrived in Hanoi. He/she read and then kept it. The next day they told me to give the fax to the party representative personally.

6. After having met the party and being re-educated by the party in February 1972, the party assigned me to participate in the Versailles International Conference for peace in Indochina. This conference focused on liberty in Indochina and was recognised by the revisionist. It was a mass organisation conference. There was an incident between the Russian and Cambodian delegation. The Russian did not agree to include all the Cambodian standpoints in the conference decision. After a long conversation held until 3 am., I told them that if they still did not put up all Cambodian standpoints for discussion at the conference, they should not include any of them at all. In case they discussed about Cambodia and did not state the right point, I would make a protest in a high profile conference. The French newspaper and overseas television forecast this argument. Finally, the Russian agreed. Our standpoint was to solve Cambodian problems on March 23, 1970 and asked them to acknowledge our Front government.

7. In May 1975, the organisation responsible for the conference in Stockholm on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, invited the Cambodian delegation to talk about the Cambodian problem. The party assigned me to lead the delegation and ask for an international conference focusing on Cambodia issues. The Russian tried every measure possible to block the conference from being held. However, after the victory on August 15th 1973, they were obliged to support the conference to show that they supported the Cambodian people

8. The international conference on Cambodia was held in December 1973 in Paris. The party assigned me to lead the Cambodian delegation. This conference gave us a victory. The Russian became isolated. In my speech, I talked about the friendship between the citizens of both nations and the love for liberty and justice, especially among Cambodian, Vietnamese, Laotian, Chinese and Koreans. Two or three days later, the conference came to the end. Akova Longko, the one I met in Moscow in December 1970, asked to meet me

again. I accepted the appointment. I had Front people to take part in the conversation in order to avoid talking about the correspondence within the parties. There was Ieng Kounsaky among us.” You said about the friendship among the 5 countries. Does Cambodia want only these 5 friends? What about those who supported Cambodia? Aren’t they Cambodian friends? If you still keep saying that, it will affect the relationship between Russia and Cambodia “said Akova Longko. It was a threat which interfered in our internal affairs and abused our sovereignty. “I mentioned about the friendship with the 5 countries because these countries have supported us since the beginning, especially China which supported us in every aspect without any condition. Moreover, that country has never interfered with our internal affairs as certain countries have done” I replied. akova Longko was very angry and got red in the face. Then he changed the subject to talked about the success of the conference. Before he said good-bye, he said, “he was very pleased to see me because we have gotten to know each other much better”. I replied, “Yes, we have known each other more.”

On my way back to Beijing via Moscow, the Russian Liberty Organisation men came to greet me at the airport. They invited me for a meal in the airport restaurant because I did not have much time in Moscow, I was only transiting. They gave me a warm welcome. They advised that Cambodia should write a book about the failure of the imperialist America’s coup, for it is a surprise in world history.

It was the last time I talked with the Russian until I went to work at the United Nations office in 1975.

9. Among the revisionists, Cuba was a country which got involved the most with us because it was a revisionist country that had acknowledged us since the beginning. In every conference, its delegations behaved well and in a friendly way toward our delegations. It is just show but in fact, they made very short speeches all the time. I also contacted with them, especially Melba Enandes, the third or fourth woman in the resistance movement with Fedel Castro. A part from this, we did not have any special relationship at all. I think that the Russian and Cubans knew I was a party member because the Vietnamese had introduced me. This was one reason why they behaved in a friendly way towards me. Now they also know about me. Therefore, this

friendship was deteriorating while the party assigned me to lead the delegation to Cuba in May this year they did not give us a warm welcome as before.

10. My theory and standpoint toward Russia. IN 1970-71, I did not know what a revisionist was; nor did I know clearly about Russia. That was why I wanted the revisionist country to acknowledge our country by explaining to them. I thought they had revolutionary quality. It would be beneficial for our resistance movement if they acknowledged us.

The party re-education and the real experiment made me realise about the danger the revisionist may caused to our revolution. I have never bothered them, but I will never let hem influence our internal affairs or affect our sovereignty and integrity.

I still have the revisionist quality because I got the influence from the capitalist. That is why I always keep prudent whenever I am on mission abroad. Both the revisionist and imperialist America knew my background and never reconciled. They did not give up persuading me and it is good for me to return to Cambodia, far away from them. The imperialist is our life and death enemy. I taught the high-ranking Front both in theory and standpoint that this is the last war; so we must resist in order to fulfil all the five essences of the Front. In 1973, I believed that we can succeed without negotiation. The long time resistance did not give me much difficulty because I live abroad. Being apart from my family was the only problem I had. This long time resistance relied a lot on the international arena, I have never forgotten about the absolute resistance standpoint. **(Continued)**



Khieu Samphan



SOEU, A BOY FROM REGION 31, GOES TO TUOL SLENG PRISON

By Meng-Try Ea

During the Khmer Rouge regime, Soeu lived in Region 31, Kampong Chhnang Province. Along with many other children, Soeu was sent by the Khmer Rouge from Region 31 to serve the revolution as a Tuol Sleng security guard. In 1973, when Soeu was twelve, Uong, the chief of Ta Ches Sub-district, and Rin, District Chief of Kampong Tra Lach, tried to convince him to join the army of the Khmer Rouge, guaranteeing that they would take care of his parents and younger siblings and help the family live in happiness. Yeay San, Soeu's mother, didn't want her son to join the Khmer Rouge army. When she realized that her son was being inducted into the army by the sub-district and district chiefs, Yeay San begged the chiefs for the release of her son so that he could help alleviate the family work burden. Soeu recalled his mother words; "Please pity me. There will be no one to help his younger brothers and sisters. Please leave him in the village." However, Yeay San's words could not halt the cycle of history and the plans of the Khmer Rouge revolution. In the end, Soeu joined the Khmer Rouge army under the command of the District Chief with the hope that his mother and younger siblings would live happy lives.

Soeu seemed to have comradeship, because his friends who came from the same village, Moeun Hong, Troeu Siek and Peou, had also joined the revolution in the Central Zone. Soeu was very happy and didn't worry about his mother and younger siblings while he was being equipped with his gun and was about to leave the village for work in the Central Zone. Before being sent to serve as a security guard at Tuol Sleng, Soeu underwent four months of military strategy training in Ta Khmao. "During the training sessions, some died, especially in the mine clearance course." After being trained, Soeu was sent to Division 703, which had the duty of protecting certain main targets in Phnom Penh, namely Tuol Sleng, Tuol Tum Pong, Kbal Thnal (Monivong Bridge) and the city's outskirts. Minor tasks of the Division included cultivating crops and carrying



out "sweeps" for enemies. Soeu said there were duty shifts, with night shifts running from six p.m. to eleven p.m., and then from eleven until the morning. After the completion of his night duty, Soeu would rest. As for the matter of food, Soeu related that he had had enough food to eat—three meals a day.

Soeu described Tuol Sleng Prison under the governance of comrade Duch and Hor. "Each of the buildings had three floors, surrounded by three corrugated iron sheets and electrified barbed wire. Each room held more or less prisoners according to its size. Prisoner were sent into Tuol Sleng by truck from every direction, day and night. Hundreds of soldiers were sent from the Eastern Zone (Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kampong Cham Provinces) to Tuol Sleng for execution under the pretext of various holiday festivities.

Soeu's close friends, Hong and Moeun, were also imprisoned by comrade Hor and executed in June 1977 on the grounds of having been "internal enemies" of the party. Soeu was also interrogated because he was one of

Comrade Hor



MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY DETAINED AND EXECUTED AT S-21

Compiled by Yin Nean

No.	Name	Sex	Occupation	Source	Date of Entry	Date of Execution
1.	Sisowath Putsara	M	First Lieutenant	b.b.k.kh.06	1 March. 1976	3 May 1976
2.	Sisowath Ketararakk	F	Wife of First Lieutenant	b.b.k.kh.06	1 March. 1976	Smashed
3.	Sisowath Duong Dara	M	Businessman	K06509	N/A	N/A
4.	Sisowath Iem Maria	(?)	King's son	TSL0284	10 Oct.1976	14 Oct.1976
5.	Sisowath Ponvirakvong	(?)	King's son	TSL0284	30 Oct.1977	N/A
6.	Sisowath Noraknorin Darith	F	King's son	TSL0204	29 Aug.1978	14 Oct.1976
7.	Mavia known as Mary	M	King's son	b.b.k.kh10	8 Nov.1976	N/A



History of (Prisoner) Sisowath Butsara

Sisowath Butsara, known as Chroeng, a 33-year-old male Khmer, was born in Phsar Sy Nhek, Sangkat 3, Phnom Penh. Before 1975, he served as a First Lieutenant. Now he is an ordinary person. His father's name is Sisowath Duong Leakena. His mother's name is Sokh Suon. His wife's name is Takk Ly Eng. He has four children, including two females. On March 3, 1976 he was detained at Office 15, Koh Thom District, Region 25, House #08, Big Room #6. He was sent to S-21 in March 1976 and smashed on May 3, 1976.

History of (Prisoner) Sisowath Ketarak

Sisowath Ketarak, known as Ket, an 85-year-old Khmer female, was born in Phnom Penh. She was a housewife. Now she is an ordinary person. Her father's name is Khan Narak.

Her mother's name is Neak Moneang Kou. Her husband's name is Khuon Heng. She has four children, including two females. On April 22, 1975, she was detained at Wat Nirot, Big Room#4. She was sent to Office S-21 on March 1, 1976 (smashed).

History of (Prisoner) Sisowath Duong Khara

Sisowath Duong Kara, known as Hut, is a 48-year-old Khmer male, 1.60 m high. He has white skin and walks very fast. He has a round face with normal eyebrows and flat nose. He has no scars. Previously he worked in Phnom Penh as a businessman. Now he works in Sithor Village, Sithor Sub-district, Khsach Kandal District.

In August 1975, he joined a demonstration march into Phnom Penh with an agitator named Kanton, deputy chief of group and in charge of encouraging the involvement of the mass to launch demonstrations in Phnom Penh.

History of (Prisoner) Maria

Maria known as Mari, a king's son, was detained on November 8, 1976 at Office S-21 Kh.

History of (Prisoner) Noraknorin Dararith

Noraknorin Dararith known as Chenda, 36, Khmer female. Was a permanent resident at Lok Sang Hospital, Phnom Penh. Before 1975, she traded things at O Roussei market. Now she is an ordinary person in Anlong Run cooperative, Daun Teav District, Region 3. Her father's name is Sihanouk. Her mother's name is Ket Borei. Her husband's name is Nuon Nirdei (died in 1973). She has six children, one of which is female. On August 29, 1978 she was detained in the Northwest Zone. She was sent to S-21 on August 29, 1978 and smashed on Oct. 14, 1978.

SANTEBAL DOCUMENTS FROM S-21

Views and standpoints against the enemy arrested by the party

1. There are two categories of people arrested:
 - a) Those that have serious activities against everything, such consequent free contacts with outsiders against the organization's order.
 - b) Those implicated by reports made by our chiefs of Santebal already examined by our party.
2. We must not be reluctant or doubtful, which will hinder our tasks, though they be our relatives or those we have trusted.
3. Most importantly, we must absolutely believe in the party.
4. Methods of the enemy's tricks:
 - a) They pretend to supplicate us. They pretend to be

- polite and claim they have not betrayed us.
- b) They react and berate us and complain that we have treated them badly and that they are not traitors. Sometimes, they have major reaction.
 - c) They admit that they are sick, etc. In this case, if we don't investigate them, it will create unfavorable conditions for our interrogation. We will hesitate, because we will wonder if they are enemies. Therefore, it will lead to the loss of self-mastery.
5. Our measures:
- a) Keep them alive for a long period of time to detail more confessions for the party.
 - b) Don't allow them to beg or react.
 - c) Try to propagandize them so that they realize that it is not wrong to arrest them.



The Comrades

- ◆ Keep them alive. Don't kill them [and thereby help] their chiefs. By doing so, they will miss their wives and children.
- ◆ No one help them. Make them believe in the party. Therefore, we try to cause breakup to their forces, chiefs and plans.
- ◆ Santebal is the party's Santebal. Thus, there will not be the only need for arrest and execution.
- ◆ However, we don't be proud of being non-revolutionist, but convince them that we are the party's Santebal.

In short, try to make them doubtful about the matter of survival and death.

d) Must absolutely hold to the position that it is up to the party organizational discipline whether or not they will live, to keep their dossiers, or to smash them. As for us, we must obtain their confessions for the party. This is a major responsibility to our party.

Views and standpoints for interrogation

- 1) Our measures for interrogation:
 - a) Squeeze in term of politics, that is we pinch them constantly and all the time.
 - b) Torture.
- 2) Based on our experience, our interrogators mostly use torture, and when it is too extreme, turn to confess that it is our mistake.
- 3) Enemies never make confession with ease. Having been indoctrinated, they confess to as little as possible. Therefore, torture cannot be avoided. Simultaneously, politics must be used to cut through the propaganda. Furthermore, we must keep the prisoners clear in confessing. Although torture will be needed, politics must also be used. To propagandize is better than to torture, but politics needs more patience. Don't be too anxious.

Illustrations of propaganda:

- a) Try to comfort by giving them

something to eat and convincing them that they will resume their original positions when they stand with the party.

- b) Intimidate, threaten, and crack them with painstaking effort by proceeding in small [political] steps. Make them despair and cease to be stubborn.
- c) Get them involved in joking in noble and advantageous manners.
- d) Make them think of their families, wives, children, and their futures, by convincing them that they have only committed minor offenses. We must indoctrinate them constantly, not dominate them, whether they confess or not. Convince them not to be stubborn or they will be tortured and heavily punished, which may cause negative consequences for their health.
- e) Minor things must be turned into major things. Convince them that if they reveal the thing, their punishment will be less serious.
- f) Trick them by arguing that the revolution is traitorous so that they fall into the trap [and admit their attempts] to destroy the revolutionary forces. Therefore their offenses also remain serious.
- g) If they say that some of their partisans have been arrested, [we] must praise their arrested partisans for having reported to Angkar clearly about themselves as well as their chiefs and constantly accuse them of



Koy Thuon



Yuk Chantha

being disloyal, by raising weak points to oppress them so that they cannot deny.

h) Avoid any propaganda which will reveal to them our weak points; the fact that we want them to confess about someone or some targeted activities.

i) Present them with comprehensible and questions. Don't be too greedy and ask complicated questions that are hard to answer, and where they don't know what they have been asked.

4) Torture:

a) Torture is to get their confessions, not for pleasure. So, we must make them hurt in order to encourage them to answer.

Another proposed plan is to subjugate them. Beat them, but don't make them die. Before practicing torture, their health must be checked in advance. Don't rush to finish up the confession to avoid their death, which makes us lose benefit.

b) Must be aware of the importance and necessity of politics. As for torture, it is just a trivial thing. Thus, politics must play its role all the time, even though torture is employed.

c) At the same time, we must not be reluctant to torture, which may lead to a failure to get the confession and cause delay. In short, [we] must be in an absolute position to convince, torture, question, and accuse them. Don't be reluctant. By so doing, there will be ineffectiveness.

5) Why enemies react:

a) The reason is that enemies have political advantages over us during our propaganda, or our first step of torture. For example, we are very anxious and repeat questions.

b) The disadvantages of reaction are harmful to us and our comrades' work. It is also important to be alert, should there be any further reaction. Sometimes, we are so reluctant or angry that we lose self-control. Sometimes, they repeatedly think of the matter of survival and death or other issues.

c) Our measures:

First, we [have to] indoctrinate and remind them of organizational discipline, and the tricks of those implicated and detained. Our propaganda is aimed at preventing [their possible reaction]. Observe constantly their facial expressions and characteristics. If they change their positions and are ready for reaction, [we] must back away from them and not be aggressive or beat them. Must not let them be ready before us. They wait and respond to our assaults and scolds. So, if we lose control and are not patient, they will be in a good position to react against us. To avoid such reaction, we must be in self-mastery to turn their consciousness to other issues, such as their family, wife, children, their lives, etc.

d) Call an experience meeting. When enemies burrowing within manage to escape, it is a bitter failure for our Ministry of Santebal [Security]. The failure is in two respects:

◆ Secrecy revelation: Our secrecy we have kept for two or three months is revealed. They reveal everything relating to their confession. No secrecy, no Santebal. The ideal of communists is to serve the party. We don't want to cause difficulties for the party. But, this time the party is difficult in resolving the issue. The party is tackling this matter.

◆ The spies who have managed to escape have never been re-arrested by us. This is not a failure, but our weak point, which eventually has to be solved. The reason for the failure is that we had failed in our duty, which permitted the spies to flee from the interrogation cell.

*Please send letters or articles to
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P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23-211-875
Fax: (855) 23-210-358
Email: dccam@bigpond.com.kh
Homepage: <http://welcome.to/dccam>*

PHOK CHHAY BEFORE BECOMING A PRISONER OF THE KHMER ROUGE

By Kalyan Sann

(Continued)

In early 1967, the exhibition was open to the public. A large number of visitors came and bought art exhibits every day. At that time, King Sihanouk scolded the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association and accused the association of looking down on him by displaying the statue of Mao Tse Tung higher and bigger above his statue. Leng Nget, President of the Association, resigned from his position and blamed Hou Nim. Then So Nem, along with some other people, also resigned. Following this event, Hou Nim, after becoming Acting President of the Association, appointed Phok Chhay as Temporary Secretary General of the Association for reorganization of the association. The remaining members of the association were Hou Youn, Vann Tep Sovann, Tiv Ol, Ke Kim Huot, Prum Sam A, Kim Seng (Hou Hun's brother-in-law), and several advisors.

Since his entry into the CIA movement, Phok Chhay always went to Battambang Province with Vann Tep Sovann and Ky Sien Ho during Khmer New Year to examine features in the jungles for positioning. In April 1967, the three went to Battambang again, where they reached Phum Krapeu Py. There, they set the following tasks to be done:

1) Must use Phnom Krapeu as a base when war breaks out.

2) The task must be divided into two: Phok Chhay must be responsible for separate things-politics, youths, and city dwellers. Vann Tep Sovann was assigned to be responsible for the military and farmers. As for Ky Sien Ho, he was put in charge of transportation, supplies and equipment.

On April 24, 1967 the government of King Sihanouk announced that Khieu Samphan and Hou Youn had disappeared. In early May, 1967 many Sihanouk spies surrounded the residence and working place of Phok Chhay, who was always followed. The government of King Sihanouk declared an end to the Student Association on September 14, 1967 and the

Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association on September 30. The students were furious and distributed leaflets against the government of King Sihanouk, accusing him of violating the constitution.

On the evening of October 3, 1967 Phok Chhay joined a party organized by the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association to terminate the association as directed by the King, and express his gratitude to the members of the association for their support. The meeting was held along National Road 1, adjacent to the National Credit Bank, and was participated in by some two hundred guests, including Chinese Ambassador Chhen Sou Leang and all Chinese Embassy staff. Hou Nim delivered a brief speech to welcome the guests. The party started with an art performance and other entertainment, following the Chinese Ambassador's expression of friendly relations [between Cambodia and China]. Outside the gate, there were approximately fifty to sixty spies who viewed the party from outside. On the morning of October 4, the government of King Sihanouk attacked the association: 1) Why was the association still continuing; 2) If the association had already been dismantled, why did Hou Nim makes a speech about the association; 3) The expression of friendship and solidarity interfered with the internal affairs of Cambodia. After that, Phok Chhay dared not go anywhere.

On October 8, 1967, a radio announced that Hou Nim had disappeared. On October 10, Phok Chhay was imprisoned. In early April, 1968 after seven months of imprisonment, Phok Chhay, along with Khieu Samphan, Hou Nim and Hou Youn, was sentenced to death by a Military Court. A month later, Phok Chhay was granted amnesty by the government and sentenced to life imprisonment. In the prison, Phok Chhay was friendly with Norn Suon, a prisoner assigned to serve as a cook. His network element was Ky Sien Ho. Besides cooking, Norn Suon served as a carpenter in the areas surrounding the prison, where he could contact his

family and relatives, as well as network elements of the party in Phnom Penh and rural areas.

On December 15, 1969 the King’s government announced the release of Phok Chhay. In February 1970, Phok Chhay was officially released, but was kept track of until the end of February. Early in March, Phok Chhay met Ky Sien Ho and learned that Vann Tep Sovann had been arrested and had died shortly thereafter. Phok Chhay tried to find a job with Ngoy Kann, a relative of his wife. Ngoy Kann had fled to Hong Kong and returned in 1969 like Sirik Matak.

On March 18, 1970, a coup was launched by Field Marshal Lon Nol against the Sihanouk government. On the evening of April 15, 1970 Phok Chhay was assigned by Ky Sien Ho to leave for liberated areas. Phok Chhay had to avoid being searched. On July 27, 1970 he left the liberated areas guided by Tauch Phoeun, who led him along Oudong

trail to Sre Andong Village, Peam Sub-district, Kampong Chhnang Province, and thence to Phnom Pis, where Phok Chhay had nothing to do but listen to the radio. At the end of December Zone officials decided to move their position to the area around Am Leang. In early January, 1974, Phok Chhay was on a mission with Zone secretaries in Kampong Speu, Ta Keo, and Kampot Provinces, during which he held meetings in pagodas and villages. In June 1974, he returned to Am Leang and became a member of the revolutionary organization under the auspice of zone secretaries.

On the cover page of the confession of Phok Chhay, there is a notation by Duch: “Ch.A. K. [already read and sent to Angkar] 30 March, 1977”. In the second confession, there is another long notation “Already read: 1) He tried to beat around the bush with an aim to lessening his offenses. He no longer talks about contemptible Siri(SP?) Matak and contemptible capitalist Ngoy Kann; 2) However, according to Vann Tep Sovann, we are clear that the following intellectuals are CIA agents: Hou Youn, Hou Nim, Tiv Ol, Pok Deuskomar, Ruos Cheth, Prum Sam A, So Nem, etc. They use the image of “Progressive Men” to: 1) establish a new party in Phnom Penh and throughout the nation; 2) Some of them have pretended to flee into jungle to create bases; 3) Based on his [Phok Chhay] confession, Vann Tep Sovann is a key person of high level. Is [he] CIA agent?”

In the confession, certain names are underlined, namely Hou Nim, Hou Youn, Tuon Sokh Phalla, Chhun Sokh Nguon, Mao Run, Mai Sakhan, Ky Sien Ho, Khut, Ngoy Kann, Siri Matak, Tauch Phoeun. Under the names listed, there is a notation of Duch reading: “All of them are CIA agents.”.... “This contemptible person is also CIA agent.”.... “CIA takes all.”.... “CIA convince all.”

In addition, there appear the following notations:”The text appreciates contemptible Nol [Lon Nol].”.... “Clear.”.... “CIA is linked to revolutionary network through Tauch Phoeun.”.... “[It’s] the trick of CIA.”



DOCUMENTING THE KHMER ROUGE GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA

By Helen Jarvis

The CGP began its work by launching investigations for both known and previously unknown records, and have had to contend with an unexpected plethora of material requiring path-breaking design to enable integration of data in multiple formats (paper records, photographs and film, oral testimony, physical geographic sites, remote sensing images, computer files) and in multiple languages (principally Khmer, French and English, but also in Vietnamese, Thai, Chinese, Russian) and locations (Cambodia, Vietnam, United States, Australia and elsewhere) with the team of well over 50 individuals. Haven in our three location (Phnom Penh, New Haven and Sydney).

Existing international standards (such as machine-readable cataloguing formats and human rights classification codes) have had to be applied and frequently extended to cope with new and challenging tasks (such as displaying Khmer script; linking retrieved records to associated image files, and displaying retrieved records and images on the Internet).

In addition to meeting our research objectives, we have needed to have high regard for the integrity of all our data, its provenance and its security, due to the ever-increasing likelihood of its being used in evidence in a future trial. Needless to say, the continuous media spotlight, the intense political interest in the issue, and the continued presence and threat of the Khmer Rouge (particularly in the early years of the CGP) have demanded constant vigilance regarding the security of both staff and documents, as well as a high degree of responsiveness and sensitivity in presenting our results to the public, particularly as regards respecting the memory of those Killed, and the privacy and integrity of the survivors.

The Cambodian Genocide Data Bases (CGDB)

We have developed a suite of databases, called the Cambodian Genocide Data Bases (CGDB), within which we manage bibliographic, biographic, geographic and image-based material. These databases are referred to as CBIB, CBIO, CGEO and CIMG respectively.

CGP Bibliographic Databases (CBIB)

At the time of its launching in January 1997, CBIB contained 2,000 records covering a wide range of material and by October 1999 it stood at over 3,400, with thousands more currently being created and processed. The documents collected in Phnom Penh by the Documentation Center since the CGP began its work are turning out to be of great significance and the collection is of ever growing dimensions—we are coming across far more numerous and more crucial records than we ever expected to find. These consist of such items as confessions, photographs, prison note book, and personnel records from the central prison at Tuol Sleng in Phnom Penh, as well as from other parts of the Khmer Rouge security apparatus.

a) PRT Records

The first category of material to be included was that of the court documents from the People's Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) of August 1979, the Cambodian government trial in which Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were sentenced to death in absentia for the crime of genocide.

A set of these documents was held in the National Archives of Cambodia in a very sorry state. I was given permission to take a set back to Australia and, with a small grant from the Australian Research Council in 1995, they were catalogued, and the different language versions (presented to the court in Khmer, French and English) were related to each other



and linked to the scanned images of the documents.

b) Renakse Records

We obtained the first major such collection, referred to as ‘the million documents’, in late 1995 from the Renakse (United Front for the Defence and Reconstruction of Kampuchea). It turns out that rather than a million documents the collection consists of over 10,000 documents bearing the signature or fingerprints of perhaps a million people. In 1982/83, following the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal, the government established a Research Committee to go around the country to every province, in some provinces right down to the village level, to gather evidence on what happened from 1975-79. In addition they asked people to support the decision of the Tribunal to condemn the Khmer Rouge, and also to ask the United Nation to seat the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) to represent Cambodia, ousting the Khmer Rouge, which was still holding Cambodia’s seat, although since 1979 no longer in control of the country.

These Renakse documents are very vulnerable and had apparently been stored away in boxes since 1983. To our knowledge these petitions were never presented to the United Nations, and they have until now never been analysed or summarised. Most of them seem to be general statements or petitions appealing for the United Nations to take action. Many then go on to state “in our village or our province so many people were killed and so many Buddhist wats were burned down, schools were burned down,” giving rather general figures, but some of them give specific names, figures and dates, such as “in my family these people were killed on such and such a date in such and such a place”. As a result, there is a huge discrepancy in the importance and significance of the documents and in their value to any court of law. In any event, this is a very important collection that needs careful attention and research.

The complete set of documents from Siem Reap province has been scanned as an example of one province, in order to indicate the nature and depth of the materials in this collection. The documents from other provinces have been categorised as to their district and content, and those documents considered to be more significant, in the sense of providing concrete data, have been scanned and some have also been translated.

One of the documents in the collection is a table that gives figures from each province of the number of reported deaths and the number of petitioners, and this appears to be the source of the “million” appellation for the collection, as it reports that 1,166,307 petitioners had signed all these documents, reporting the deaths of 3,314,000 people. This table, compiled in July 1982 by the Research Committee, appears to be the source for the figure used officially by the government of the PRK for the number of deaths caused by the Khmer Rouge during its period in power. It gives as the source of its figures various telexes and documents from provincial authorities, but these have so far proved elusive.

c) Tuol Sleng Records

The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, the school that was used as the Khmer Rouge central prison and torture centre, has provided a wealth of material. In the early 1990s Cornell University led an effort to microfilm the confessions held there but, in addition to the material then microfilmed, quite a number of other important documents have been recently uncovered, and they are now being included in our bibliographic database. These comprise personnel records and notebooks maintained by the prison staff.

d) Santebal Records

In 1996/7 perhaps the most valuable collection was acquired—over 100,000 pages from the Santebal, or Security Office, the nerve centre of the Khmer Rouge security apparatus. Over 10,000 biographies and 11,000 confessions, letters and other documents are now being catalogued, summarised and copied at DC-Cam, and they are also being microfilmed for preservation purposes through a consortium led by Yale University Sterling Memorial Library, with support from SEAM.

Documents are also being located outside Cambodia for inclusion in the database. This includes both primary and secondary Literature (journal articles, books and films). Most valuably, much primary source material collected by scholars is being included, such as personal autobiographies, transcripts of interviews, collections of photographs, tapes etc, in particular the material that Ben Kiernan has collected over the years, including interview transcripts and a diary from Ieng Sary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in full by the CGP on the Internet in both Khmer and English.

(Continued)



Photo: Hong Hun, female combatant arrested October 1976.

Voices from S-21

Chapter One: Discovering S-21

By David Chandler

(Continued) Secrecy at S-21

S-21’s task of defending the Party Center was given the highest priority by DK’s leaders. Speaking to sympathetic Danish visitors in July 1978, the Deputy Secretary of the CPK, Nuon Chea (“Brother Number Two”), explained: “The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but retain the leadership, we can continue to win victories... There can be no comparison between losing two or three leading cadres and 200-300 members. Rather that latter than the former. Otherwise the Party has no head and cannot lead the struggle.” The Party’s theoretical

journal, *Tung Padevat* (Revolutionary Flags) had taken a similar position earlier in the year when an editorial had asserted, “If there is a damage to the Center, the damage is big... The leading apparati (kbal masin) must be defended absolutely. If we can defend them, we can defend everything else.”

The existence of S-21, the location of the Party Center, and the identity of those inside it were closely guarded secrets. Talking to the Danes, Nuon Chea insisted that “it is secret work that is fundamental. We no longer use the terms ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’; we use the terms ‘secret’ and ‘open’. Secret work is fundamental to all we do...Only through secrecy can we be masters of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who.” Secrecy was always fundamental at S-21. In mid-1976, when a prisoner managed to escape from S-21, a study document prepared at the prison viewed the incident with alarm:

Secrecy was broken. The secrecy we had maintained for the last 3-4 months had been pierced. When there’s no secrecy, there can be no *santabal*, the term has lost its meaning... If they were to escape they would talk about their confessions. The secrecy of *santabal* would be broken at exactly the point where it must not be broken.

Secrecy was maintained at S-21 by keeping outsiders away from the compound, clearing the neighborhood, limiting the distribution of the documents produced, burning papers instead of throwing them away, blindfolding prisoners when they were moved from place to place, and forbidding contact between the interrogation and document groups in the prison on the one hand and less privileged employees on the other. Guards were forbidden to talk to prisoners, and prisoners were forbidden to talk to one another. High-ranking prisoners were held and interrogated in buildings separate from the main complex. Finally, nearly all interrogations took place in buildings to the east of the compound, supposedly out of earshot of prisoners and personnel. An S-21 document from September 1976, setting up day and night guard rosters, noted that guards were not allowed to follow interrogators into interrogation rooms or to “open



windows to look at enemies” being questioned. Most brutally, secrecy about S-21 was maintained by killing nearly all the prisoners.

S-21’s existence was known only to those who worked or were confined there, to a handful of high-ranking Party figures, and to cadres charged with santabal duties in the zones and sectors. When briefing their subordinates, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Ta Mok—by 1978, Brothers One through Four—occasionally named important “enemies” who we know had already been interrogated at S-21 and had confessed to counterrevolutionary crimes. None of those statements, however, ever referred to S-21 or santabal was formally established. Predecessor units existed in the Khmer Rouge army during the Cambodian civil war (1970-1975); S-21’s immediate forebear, it seems, had operated in Sector 25 north of the capital from 1973 to 1975. The two men most intimately concerned with such operations at that time were Son Sen (1930-1997, alias Brother 89 and Khieu), a ranking military commander, and his subordinates, a former schoolteacher named Kaing Kek Iev (c.1942-, alias Duch), charged with security matters. Under DK, Son Sen was the deputy prime minister, responsible for defense and national security. Santabal was one of his responsibilities. Duch, who reported to him, was the commandant of S-21 itself.

Worker at S-21

S-21 had three main units: interrogation, documentation, and defense. A photography subunit operated within the documentation unit. Subunits operating within the defense unit, the largest at S-21, included one that guarded the prisoners, another that brought prisoners in and took them to be executed, a third that provided rudimentary medical services, and the fourth that was responsible for economic support.

A helpful guide to the higher-ranking personnel at S-21 is an internal telephone directory containing forty-six names. It must have been prepared before November 1978, when one of the interrogators listed in it, Chea Mai, was arrested. The directory lists twenty-four names in a “hot” (kdau) section of the interrogation unit, fourteen in “documents,” five in a “separate”

(administrative) category, and six others, probably also interrogators, in an unlabeled group.

The titles that preceded names in the telephone directory paralleled the three-tiered ranking system that operated within the CPK, whereby Party members progressed from belonging to the Communist Youth League through candidate membership (trien) to “full-rights” membership (penh set). The names in the directory proceed in seniority from eight people listed by their full names, with no ranking prefix, through ten whose revolutionary pseudonyms are prefixed with the prefix mit (friend or comrade), to nine whose pseudonyms appear with the prefix bong (older brother). The last category was reserved for people with the greatest authority. An even more respectful classification, ta (grandfather), was used for Duch in a few documents, even though he was only in his thirties.

Freed from the “exploiting classes” of the past, CPK members at the prison followed deferential rules that were as complex, hierarchical, and baffling as those they might have encountered on their first day of school or as Buddhist novice monks. The analogies are appropriate because Duch and his colleagues in the interrogation unit had been schoolteacher for many years, and nearly all the workers at the prison were males in their late teens and early twenties, just the age when many of them, in prerevolutionary times, would have spent some time as monks. Moreover, those in charge of the prison, like Buddhist monks, were accustomed as teachers to unquestioning respect. The discipline of S-21 was based on the memorization of rules; it induced reverence for authority and unquestioning obedience.

The hierarchy of the names in the telephone directory suggests that Duch and his close associates were unwilling or unable to forsake the rankings and the deference that had marked prerevolutionary Khmer society and that the revolution had promised to overturn. Those beneath them might also have been reluctant to see the ranks abolished. The former guard Kok Sros, for example, recalled that on one occasion, “Duch told me I had done a good job, and I felt that he liked me. I was pretty sure from then on that I was

going to survive, because I had been admired from above.”

With the constraints of hierarchy in mind, we can examine the lives and characters of Son Sen and Duch before turning to the people in charge of the various units at the prison.

Son Sen

In 1975 Son Sen was a slender, bespectacled man in his mid-forties. Like DK's foreign minister, Ieng Sary, he had been born into the Cambodian community in southern Vietnam, where his parents were prosperous landowners. After moving to Phnom Penh as a boy, Son Sen soon attracted attention for his academic talent. He received a scholarship for study in France in 1950, shortly after Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot) had been awarded one. As a student of philosophy and history in Paris, Son Sen joined the French Communist Party alongside Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, and several other Khmer. Returning home in 1956, he embarked on a teaching career and became part of the clandestine Cambodian Communist movement. In the early 1960s he was the director of studies of the Pedagogical Institute attached to the University of Phnom Penh. He was dismissed from his post in 1962 for his anti-Sihanouk views but was allowed to continue teaching.

In 1963, after Saloth Sar had been named secretary of a reconstituted Communist Party, Son Sen joined him on the newly formed, concealed central committee. In 1964 he was spirited out of the capital in the trunk of a Chinese diplomatic vehicle and joined Saloth Sar and a handful of others in a Vietnamese Communist military base known as “Office 100,” which moved back and forth across the Cambodian-Vietnamese border in response to battle conditions in Vietnam.

Son Sen did not return to Phnom Penh until April 1975. During his twelve years in the maquis he bonded with the men and women who would later make up the Party Center, several of whom he had known in France. When armed struggle against Sihanouk broke out in 1968, Son Sen became a field commander. He soon revealed a talent for battlefield operations. By early 1972, he was chief of the general staff. His colleagues

in the Party sometimes found him peremptory and his point of view “bourgeois,” but by August 1975 he was given responsibility for Cambodia's security and defense.

His new responsibilities included *santebal*. Son Sen monitored its operations closely. He read and annotated many confessions from the prison and ran study sessions for S-21 cadres in which he discussed its goals, the interrogations, and the use of torture. Three sets of notes by S-21 officials from these sessions have survived. They suggest that Son Sen's interest in history, cultivated in France, persisted into the DK era. Like many Cambodians born in Vietnam, Son Sen also seemed to find it easy (or prudent) to be stridently anti-Vietnamese.

Many documents routed from S-21 to the Party Center passed through Son Sen's hands, and dozens of memoranda addressed to him by Duch have survived. So have many of this replies. These display a schoolmasterish attention to detail and unflinching revolutionary zeal. Son Sen's wife, Yun Yat (alias At), also a former teacher, worked closely with him and had access to some of the confessions.

In 1975 and 1976, Son Sen worked hard to mold the regionally based units that had won the civil war into a national army. In 1977 and 1978, he took charge of the fighting with Vietnam and supervised the purges of “disloyal” cadres in the Eastern Zone. In the closing months of the regime, when the war went badly, he came under suspicion himself. Had the Vietnamese invasion been delayed, he might have been cut down by the upper brothers” and by his own remorseless institution. However, Son Sen retained his balance and in 1979 resumed command of the Khmer Rouge military forces after their defeat. In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 he emerged as the “public face” of the Khmer Rouge, but he faded from view when his superiors decided to stonewall the United Nations-sponsored national elections. He never regained his former status. In a brutal case of poetic justice Son Sen, his wife, Yun Yat, and a dozen of their dependents were murdered on Pol Pot's orders in northern Cambodia in June 1997, accused of being

“spies” for the Phnom Penh regime.

Duch

Kaing Kek Iev (alias Duch), the commandant of S-21 throughout its operation, was born around 1942 into a poor Sino-Cambodian family in Kompong Chen (Kompong Thom). Like Son Sen, he attracted attention as a boy for his intellectual abilities. His mother, interviewed in 1980, said that her son’s head was “always in a book.” Aided by a local entrepreneur he earned a scholarship to the Lycée Sisowath. Specializing in mathematics, he ranked second in the national baccalauréat examinations in 1959. In those days, a classmate has recalled, he was a studious young man with no hobbies or political interests.

For the next few years, he taught mathematics at the Lycée in Kompong Thom. One of his former students later recalled that “he was known for the precision of his lectures as if he were copying texts from his mind onto the board.” One of his colleagues at the school, who taught biology, was an exceptionally tall, almost albino Cambodian named Mam Nay (alias Chan). Years later, when both men were members of the CPK, Duch invited him to head the interrogation unit at the prison. Duch and Chan emerge from the record as strict, fastidious, totally dedicated teachers-characteristics that they carried with them, to altered purposes, when they worked together at the prison.

In 1964, Duch was rewarded with a posting to the Pedagogical Institute. Son Sen had already left. According to Duch’s Lycée Sisowath classmate, Nek Bun An, the young mathematician was drawn toward Communism by a group of Chinese exchange students enrolled to study Khmer at the University of Phnom Penh. Duch was inspired and politicized by these sharply focused, idealistic young men and women, all of whom were to play important roles in Sino-Cambodian relations during the DK era and beyond.

After leaving the Institute, he taught briefly at Chhoeung Prey lycée in Kompong Cham, where he enrolled at least one of his students, Ky Suk Hy, into the revolutionary movement and was soon arrested as a “Communist” by Sihanouk’s police. He was held without trial for several months—a normal procedure for

political prisoners at the time- but he managed to obtain his release through the intervention of his childhood patron. Soon after Sihanouk was overthrown, Kaing Kek Iev had gone into the maquis.

In the early 1970s, known as Duch, he was in charge of security in Sector 33, north of Phnom Penh. A French ethnographer, François Bizot, was arrested by Communist guerrillas there in 1970. Duch interrogated Bizot repeatedly for two months, accusing him of being a CIA agent and making him write several detailed autobiographies before allowing him to go free. Bizot came away chastened by Duch’s fanaticism. In his view, “Duch believed Cambodians of differing viewpoints to be traitors and liars. He personally beat prisoners who would not tell the ‘truth’ .”

In 1973 Duch moved to Sector 25, north of Phnom Penh. His superior there was Sok Thuok (alias Von Vet), a Communist militant since the 1950s who was executed at S-21 in 1978. Sok Thuok’s deputy in 1973, charged with military affairs, was Son Sen, whose favorable attention Duch probably attracted at this time.

Duch picked up his expertise in security matters as he went along; there is no evidence that he ever traveled abroad or received any training from foreign experts. He may well have developed his elaborate notions of treachery involving “strings of traitors” between 1972 and 1973, when a secret operation was set up by the Khmer Rouge to purge the so called Hanoi Khmers-Cambodians who had come south in 1970 after years of self-imposed exile in North Vietnam, ostensibly to help the revolution. Hundreds of them were secretly arrested and put to death in 1973, after the Vietnamese had withdrawn the bulk of their troops from Cambodia. A few managed to escape to Vietnam after detention; and others were arrested after April 1975. Many were arrested in the Special Zone. The stealth and mercilessness of the campaign may have owed something to Duch’s emerging administrative style. The campaign, indeed, foreshadowed the modus operandi of S-21.

(Continued)

THE PERILS OF NEUTRALITY: THE BREAK IN U.S. - CAMBODIAN RELATIONS, 1965

By Kenton J. Clymer

(Continued)

When South Vietnam fell into line after Gordon-Walker “twisted [Prime Minister Phan Huy] Quat’s arm very hard,” and Sarit Thanarat agreed that he would “acquiesce” in a Cambodian conference if the United States thought it important, all seemed poised for an American announcement accepting the conference. But on 24 April Taylor asked for a forty-eight-hour delay so that Quat would have time to persuade elements in his government, including the military, that it was necessary to endorse the conference. Quat did not get his forty-eight hours, for on 25 April Rusk announced that the United States would gladly participate in a conference on Cambodia if one were called. Averell Harriman would represent the United States.

Why, after weeks of foot-dragging, had the United States suddenly moved at his particular time to full support of the conference. The reason lay with Sihanouk. On 23 April, in a speech dedicating USSR Avenue in Phnom Penh, the prince asserted that the United States was considering attending conference only because it might lead to progress on Vietnam. Any conference, he insisted, must deal only with Cambodia. Even more troubling, the next day at a ceremony opening a new grocery store, Sihanouk indicated that he now did not want Thailand, South Vietnam, or the United States to attend a conference. He appeared to be fed up with American stalling. The United States, he stated accurately, “without saying “no,” do not say “yes’ either.” Sihanouk even appeared to be saying that he no longer wanted a conference at all. “This conference interests us today much less than at [the] Anglo-Saxons were obstructing it,” Sihanouk told his audience. “[The] Conference, to tell the truth is outdated... to convene it.”

Sihanouk’s remarkable about-face forced the American action. As Rusk Explained to American diplomats in Bangkok and Vientiane:

By Sunday we were confronted with the fact that Sihanouk’s remarks at a grocery store opening had been

published....Gordon Walker saw no point of leaving Saigon for Phnom Penh. There seemed some reason to hope that, by announcing US and GVN [Government of Vietnam] agreement beforehand, we could forestall official Cambodian response to Gordon Walker that US and GVN attendance at conference unacceptable. It was thought that announcement might equally forestall RKG [Cambodian Government] demand for Liberation Front representation. These factors seemed to us to warrant risks that announcement might, on the contrary, get Sihanouk’s back up, and precipitate official confirmation as well as disadvantage seeming to be unduly anxious about conference.

The day after Rusk’s announcement that the United States intended to send a delegation to the conference, Cambodians attacked the American embassy. Surprisingly, the demonstration did not deter American interest in the conference. For the next several weeks, in fact, the United States—assuming that the demonstration was unrelated to the conference—continued actively to explore the prospects for a conference. The American perception may have been accurate. On 30 April, the Cambodia cabinet reportedly voted unanimously in favor of attending a Geneva conference, though Sihanouk was out of town and might veto the action when he returned. The same day Rusk told Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the United States had never received any official word that it would not be welcome at a conference.

Even the breaking of diplomatic relations on 3 May did not end hopes for a conference (although it was commonly thought that it would). On 11 May Bergesen reported that one might yet be held. Two days later the Cambodian government raised hopes when it informed the British government that it was still interested. But throughout the rest of the month, Sihanouk increasingly made it clear that he no longer wanted a conference, and at the end of June the Soviet Union indicated that there was no longer any point in issuing formal invitations.



Why, at a time when the British and the Americans were finally willing to support a conference, when Thailand and South Vietnam had fallen in line, and when China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and the NLF had also voiced support, did Sihanouk throw a fatal wrench into the works? He may have been convinced, as he stated, that the Americans had simply stalled too long; and in any event, if they were finally interested, it was only to speak with their opponents about Vietnam. Also, he no doubt believed that, as he told the French ambassador, “at least ‘certain circles’ “ in the American government were anti-Sihanouk. They “remained afraid of [the] spread of neutralism” and believed that Sihanouk, as a leading defender of neutralism, “was somehow [a] danger to U.S. policy.”

To the extent that Sihanouk’s perception of American policy explains his decision to sabotage the conference, an early, positive American response might have been productive. But Sihanouk also acted for reasons not directly related to American stalling. In his recent biography of Sihanouk, Milton Osborne asserted that at a conference in Jakarta called to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, China’s premier, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), personally asked Sihanouk not to go ahead with the conference he had so long championed because it might work to the disadvantage of China’s Vietnamese allies. “Faced with this request,” Osborne writes, “Sihanouk, who only the year before had been accorded a place of honour beside Mao Zedong at the celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution in Peking, could only oblige.”

American and Chinese sources substantiate Osborne’s unsupported assertion. As early as 26 April (the day of the demonstration), a CIA report concluded that Chinese support for the conference had always been a facade because they feared it would increase Soviet influence in Hanoi. Thus they engaged in “intensive efforts...to sabotage the conference by convincing the Cambodian premier that negotiations are unnecessary.” Two weeks later the French ambassador in Phnom Penh, Hubert Aymard Argod, made much the same point to Bergesen: “Almost certainly...Chou En-lai told Sihanouk in Djakarta that Chicoms did not wish to have conference at present time, and Sihanouk was willing to oblige his friends.”

The Chinese regarded the proposed conference as an American plot to prevail in Vietnam.

Thus, it appears likely that the immediate reason the conference was not held was the Sihanouk, acting under pressure from China, withdrew his support. Having determined that the conference could no longer be held, Sihanouk allowed the demonstration at the American embassy to take place the result of his long standing anger at alleged American support for the Khmer Serei, continuing cross-border military operations from South Vietnam, American stalling on the conference, his general irritation at what he regarded as a patronizing attitude toward himself and Cambodia, as well as internal political pressures. He used the Krisher article as the excuse.

However important the conference issue may have been in bringing about the demonstration, it was not the most important cause of the break in diplomatic relations. Indeed, it is not even certain that Sihanouk intended the demonstration as a prelude to a break in relations. Almost certainly the most immediate reason for the break was yet another border incident. On 28 April, two days after the demonstration, four planes, thought to be South Vietnamese Skyraiders, bombed the Cambodian village of Phum Chantatep (or Cheam Tatep) and Moream Tick in Kompong Cham province. The villages were about four kilometers from the Vietnamese border. One thirteen-year-old boy was killed, and others were seriously injured. American military attachés who went to the scene the same day confirmed the death and counted thirty-five bomb and rocket craters. Bergesen predicted that Sihanouk would break relations over the border incidents, not the Newsweek article. As a last-ditch attempt to salvage the situation, he suggested an immediate South Vietnamese apology and compensation to the victims.

The situation was actually worse than Bergesen first thought. An investigation quickly determined that the planes in question were American, not South Vietnamese. Consequently, in an effort to prevent a break Bergesen urged that the United States immediately apologize and offer compensation. A note along these lines was prepared and sent to the White House on 1 May. But it was never sent to Sihanouk. Had it been, it might have prevented a break in relations. After the break, and unidentified Cambodian

Foreign Ministry official speculated to a CIA agent that the reason Sihanouk broke relations “was that no acknowledgement [sic] if the error in bombing a Cambodian village on 28 April had come from the GVN.”

When Sihanouk broke relations, an aide told President Johnson that the prince based his action two grounds: the Krisher article and the border bombing. McGeorge Bundy also told him that “the Cambodians have put the burden equally on NEWSWEEK and on the air attacks.” Johnson’s aides had misled the president, for the actual note breaking relations referred only to the attack on the villages (which the Cambodians still assumed had been a South Vietnamese action. No other factors, including the Krisher article, were mentioned.


Any initial confusion about the primacy of the border attacks as the cause of the break soon disappeared, for Cambodian officials made it clear that an end to the cross-border actions was the only condition for restoring relations. Sihanouk himself told French officials that the break resulted from “repeated border incursions,” and “he would be happy to restore relations if [the] US put [a] stop to” them. One Foreign Ministry official indicated that Cambodia could even live with some border incidents, as long as South Vietnam would immediately accept responsibility, apologize, and offer compensation.

Thus, the American bombs and rockers that hit Phum Chantatep and Moream Tick were the immediate cause for the break in relations. The hundreds of such incidents involving South Vietnamese and/or American personnel were the most important underlying cause as well. Alleged American support for Sihanouk’s bitter enemies, the Khmer Serei, also contributed to the break, as did American stalling on the proposed Geneva conference. Less tangible factors, such as patronizing American attitudes toward Cambodia and unflattering stories in the American press, helped produce a general anti-American atmosphere in Cambodia.

At the heart of it was the war in Vietnam,

which seriously exacerbated preexisting tensions between Cambodia and its neighbors and consequently with their ally, the United States. Even more fundamental was the Cold War thinking that deeply affected American policymakers. Though not unaware of the regional character of Cambodia’s problems, they generally viewed developments through a Cold War lens—or more particularly through an anti-Chinese Communist lens, since by 1965 they were well aware of Soviet-Chinese tensions. Even when regional factors were recognized, the United States almost always subordinated them to Cold War considerations. It was too bad that Sihanouk would be angered, but opposing the spread of international communism took first place.

Such an assessment is not meant to suggest that Sihanouk bears no responsibility for the deteriorating relations. But, fundamentally, Sihanouk had no natural inclination to support the Communists. Indeed, he suppressed Communists and other leftists at home. He



understood that they were a threat to the monarchy and feared a Vietnam unified under Communist rule. His overriding goal was to preserve an independent Cambodia, and his own assessment was that a nonaligned policy best served Cambodia's interests. Since his two traditional antagonists were in the Western camp, such an approach was eminently reasonable. Furthermore, he eventually became convinced that the United States would not prevail in Vietnam and that to protect his country's integrity he therefore needed to have good relations with China and other Communist states. As Ambassador Sprouse put it retrospectively, Sihanouk was not pro-Communist. He is not pro-Peking or pro-Hanoi. He's pro-Sihanouk, pro-Cambodia and he is motivated solely by what he thinks will redound to the good of his own country. He wants to save it as an independent entity." Thus, the primary cause of the failure to maintain amicable Cambodian-American relations was the inability of the United States to formulate a policy that was sufficiently flexible to accommodate Cambodian neutralism even as it opposed what it perceived to be dangerous Communist expansionist tendencies in Southeast Asia.

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to

explore in depth the consequences of the break in diplomatic relations, a preliminary assessment is that it was part of a chain of events that ended in tragedy for Cambodia. Diplomatic relations were not restored until 1969, a period during which the United States attempted to destabilize the Sihanouk government. In 1969 the United States began the secret bombing of Cambodia. Then in March 1970 Lon Nol and Sisowath Sirik Matak overthrew Sihanouk in a pro-American (and possibly American-supported) coup. Sihanouk, greatly angered at this turn of events, appealed to the people to support the opposition Khmer Rouge. In April American and South Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, ostensibly to destroy the Communists' Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Both of these actions further destabilized Cambodian society. Five years of civil war followed, with devastating consequences. In 1975 the Khmer Rouge took over the country and ruled so harshly that perhaps two million Cambodians (out of a population of less than eight million) perished. Had the United States and Cambodia been able to resolve their differences constructively, Cambodia might have been spared the holocaust it endured.




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A SAMPLING OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE LINKING THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS

By Steva Heder



(Continued)

Moreover, while both describing their actions on behalf of the CPK and “confessing” to purported activities betraying it, some prisoners whose “confessions” were copied to surviving suspects discuss at some length “instructions” or “plans” received from “the Organization” that involved mass “smashings” or “sweepings”, a CPK term that was often used as an alternative euphemism for executions. These accounts by the prisoners themselves are sometimes corroborated by interrogators’ annotations. These parts or the “confessions” may yield evidence of at least of “guilty knowledge” on the part of the persons to which they are marked for transmission about killings of former Khmer Republic officials and alleged CPK “traitors”. Finally, at the very least, those to whom the “confessions” were transmitted were in a position to become aware through these documents of arrests mentioned in them. Most had appendices giving long lists of names and other details about “traitors” named in the text that also specified whether or not they have already been arrested. Moreover, at least some “confessions” seem to have been sent to specific individuals precisely in order to indicate to them who they should arrest and either send to S-21 or deal with

themselves according to measures to be used against “traitors”.

Nuon Chea

With regard to Nuon Chea, the October 1977 “confessions” of a Central Zone Division 174 battalion cadre named Nheum Sim alias Saut and marked for transmission to the Deputy Party Secretary include a note from Saut’s interrogator explaining that “it was only after I tortured (tearunakam) him that he confessed to the story of having been a police informer and a CIA systematically right up to the time of his arrest.” The “confessions” that same month of Sieng Pauy alias Sean, who served as a combatant in Bak Prea, Daun Tri and other districts of Northwest Zone Sector 4, include a similar interrogator’s note. It explains that initially, the prisoner “did not confess”, but that “once started torture, he was willing to confess about his systematic contacts, activities and plans right up to the time the Organization arrested him.”

The “confessions” of Sean also point to Nuon Chea’s guilty knowledge of executions. Referring to former Khmer Republic military personnel, the interrogator’s note summarizes the parts of Sean’s “confessions” recalling that in “early 1976, the directive of the Organization was to sweep out all those of officer

rank [puok bandasak] in Bak Prea district in order to smash and dispose of them.” The note also mentions that in February 1977, Sean again was assigned “to lead troops to sweep out those of officer rank, this time in “Daun Try District.” According to the note, these troops arrested “a lot of these of officer rank ... and smashed and disposed of them”.

The main text, in which the interrogator presents a full record of Sean’s “confessions”, provides more detail of both operations. It identifies the unit involved in the early 1976 campaign as Company 453 of Sector 4, and says its assignment was “to go and sweep clean those of officer rank in Khpop district, known as Bak Prea (Number 41), in Sector 4.” The February 1977 operation, according to the “confessions”, used “one platoon of troops to sweep clean the enemy in Daun Try district, in according with the Organization’s plan”.

Smashings are also mentioned in the “confessions” of Kung Kien alias Eung Vet, the secretary of a battalion in Central Committee Division 164, which has a note saying it was presented to Nuon Chea “personally”. These “confessions” have several marginal comments in the hand of Duch. One explains that “we have already smashed” someone named as Euan alias Sophâl. Another notes that “according to my information,” a person denigrated as the “contemptible Tan Meng” was smashed “in 1974”. A third comment by Duch adds that “the grassroots have already smashed” someone named Sâm.

The main text of these “confessions” furthermore include an account of a June 1977 conversation between the Vet and another Division 164 battalion secretary, at which the other battalion secretary purportedly declared,

Now some of our forces have already been arrested by the Organization. But not all of them...if we keep on with activities and those whose covers are blown are arrested by the Organization, don’t implicate each other in your responses. Regardless of whether you respond by implicating someone else or not, you’re dead, so it’s better not to respond than to respond, because once you’re arrested by the revolution, no one ever comes back. It’s already certain you’ll vanish.

Finally, all of the above “confessions” mention numerous arrests and give names of purported “traitors”, “CIA links” and the like who were apparently still at large and about to be arrested or were

at least at risk of arrest. As usual, the names of those already arrested and those implicated are interspersed throughout the main texts of the “confessions” and then summed up in lists appended either to the front or the back of that text. The “confessions” of Sean have an appendix entitled “Table of Names of Traitors in the Biography of Sieng Paou alias Sean”. It contains the names of 12 persons noted as arrested and of 29 others named by Sean as “traitors”, but apparently not yet arrested. The “confessions” of Nheum Sim alias Saut include an appendix entitled “Table of Traitors Named in the Biography”, which lists the names of eight people who have already been arrested and gives the names of 19 “traitors” as yet unarrested.

Another document transmitted to Nuon Chea appears to contain information about arrests not just for information, but also for action. These are the July 1977 “confessions” of Khaek Bin alias Sou, a former Northwest Zone sector cadre who had been assigned to head the DK Liaison Committee for the Cambodia-Thailand border. They include a note, apparently addressed Nuon Chea, which reads:

Dear Respected Brother, 1. These responses implicate Comrades Khlaeng, Ren, Khauy, Kou, Muon, etc. At the same time, moreover, they implicate Kreun. 2. The namelist at the end sums up the persons who are implicated by name as traitors.

The appendix, entitled “I would like to report to the Organization about the CIAs that participated in my traitorous activities”, contains the names of some 16 people who are noted in handwritten annotations as having been arrested already”. Some other names have the handwritten annotation “not yet”, while still others have a question mark written in. **(Continued)**



PENAL CODE 1956

(Scanned/Excerpted from 1956 Penal Code)

Art. 21 — Les peines criminelles sont :

- 1 — La mort
- 2 — Les travaux forcés à perpétuité ;
- 3 — Les travaux forcés à temps

Les peines de mort constituent la peine criminelle du maximum degré. Les crimes punis par la peine de mort sont qualifiés du maximum degré.

Les peines des travaux forcés à perpétuité constituent la peine criminelle du deuxième degré. Les crimes punis par la peine des travaux forcés à perpétuité sont qualifiés crimes du deuxième degré.

Les peines des travaux forcés à temps constituent la peine criminelle du premier degré. Les crimes punis par la peine des travaux forcés à temps sont qualifiés crimes du premier degré.

Art. 22 — Les peines criminelles sont :

Les peines correctionnelles sont :

- 1^{re} — L'emprisonnement correctionnel ;
- 2^e — L'amende correctionnelle

L'emprisonnement de moins de quinze ans ou au plus six mois et l'amende de quatre mille ou 4.000 rielles ou plus de quatre mille à quatre mille 400 rielles ou plus ou l'un de ces deux peines seulement constituent les peines correctionnelles du deuxième degré. Les crimes punis par ces peines sont qualifiés crimes du deuxième degré.

L'emprisonnement d'un an ou plus ou moins de six mois et l'amende de mille deux cents ou 1.200 rielles ou plus de mille deux cents à mille quatre cents (1.400) rielles ou plus ou l'un de ces deux peines seulement constituent les peines correctionnelles du troisième degré. Les crimes punis par ces peines sont qualifiés crimes du troisième degré.

L'emprisonnement de six jours ou moins à six mois ou plus et l'amende de cent cinquante et au 150 rielles, ou plus de cent cinquante à mille deux cents (1.200) rielles ou plus ou l'un de ces deux peines seulement constituent les peines correctionnelles du premier degré. Les crimes punis par ces peines sont qualifiés crimes du premier degré.

Art. 23 — Quelque que soit le mode d'intrusion en compte d'annuities.

L'annuities est volontaire ou involontaire, selon que la dette résulte de fait ou par erreur ou sans intention de la punir.



Art 362 — Tout individu qui engage des actes de violence aux les personnes, soit afin d'obtenir d'elles, avec l'aiguillon de la violence la dévotion de témoignages utiles à la perpétration d'un crime ou d'un délit, soit pour esprit de représailles ou par boucherie est passible de la peine criminelle de violences de 1er degré.

Art 363 — L'intention de protéger le secret est présumée lorsque tout qu'il est fait usage d'une arme de guerre meurtrière. Elle peut également se manifester lorsque de la violence contre du sang, gardi, de la confidentialité des données, ou de l'identité matériellement identifiable d'un individu sur le corps de la victime.

Art 364 — Quelconque, par l'usage de la force ou par l'usage de menaces, introduit ou tente d'introduire en public ou dans la partie spéciale d'un bâtiment qui s'y refuse, est coupable de viol.

Si la violence est faite de manière à causer une, la culpabilité est passible de la peine criminelle de premier degré.

Si la violence est faite de plus de quatre ans, la culpabilité est passible de la peine criminelle de violences de 2e degré.

Art 365 — Les actes de violence volontairement commis sur la personne d'un civil sont punissables par l'application des peines dans le degré de gravité visé ci-dessus la gravité d'un crime ou d'un délit présumé être la santé de la victime et sa vie, ainsi que l'infraction est punissable avec un usage d'une arme.

L'usage d'une arme est puni chaque fois que les actes de violence sont destinés à blesser physiquement gravement ou à tuer la victime.

Les tentatives de graves faits de violence et les crimes sont punissables avec la même peine que les crimes, délits, délits.

Art 366 — Quelconque, sans cause de légitime défense en face les cas de 364 ou de crime de 365, puni avec prison, la détention et la peine de la peine criminelle de deuxième degré, si la détention n'a pas duré plus de six mois.

Dans le cas contraire, la peine criminelle de violences de 2e degré est applicable.

Art 367 — L'incitation contre la vie d'un religieux, lequel est un individu par le fait de son statut religieux dans l'histoire ou la tradition ou l'histoire de sa profession, est passible de la peine criminelle de troisième degré.

Art 368 — L'acte criminel consistant dans le fait de porter volontairement atteinte, sans justification légale aux droits de propriété que l'Église ou les autres droits publics, religieux civils ou de travail, commerciaux dans le Royaume ou qui affectent la fonction de l'Église institutionnelle, doit être puni de la peine de prison que dans les cas prévus par le loi.

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Art 17 — Les articles des constitutions d'anciennes et nouvelles provinces qui ne sont pas compatibles avec la constitution nationale sont abrogés.

Art 18 — Les articles des constitutions des provinces qui ne sont pas compatibles avec la constitution nationale sont abrogés.

Art 19 — Toute province de culture et de langue nationale est une province nationale.

Art 20 — Les provinces de culture et de langue nationale sont des provinces nationales qui ont des droits de responsabilité pour une responsabilité juridique de la loi.

Art 21 — Les provinces de culture et de langue nationale.

Art 22 — Toute province participative volontairement, soit directement, soit indirectement, à la population et les autres de son droit, est possible des points applicables à l'histoire nationale.

La participation directe implique la création, la gestion, la production, la construction et le développement.

Art 23 — La participation locale de compétence, n'est possible que si elle est reconnue par le gouvernement, les autorités provinciales, nationales, régionales, et les autres.

Khmer Rouge Telegram 157 (File number: D02063)

Dear respected Mo 81 [Office 81],

In the morning of March 4, an official from the Consulate of the French Embassy in Beijing came and met us [Khmer Rouge Officials] at the embassy and gave us a declaration of the government of France dated January 2, 1978. We attached herewith the declaration in French language.

In the mean time, the official asked about situation of the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, its evolution, and our stance towards settlement of the conflict. Both [Cambodia and France] raised up the subject of friendly relationship between the two countries.

He affirmed that foreign Minister of France permitted him to meet in order to grant this declaration and also ask to confirm on the two subjects.

We informed him of the situation of the conflict, the cause leading to the conflict between the two countries [Cambodia and Vietnam], the evolution of the current situation on the border, and the diplomatic manoeuvres that Vietnam has been staging in distorting international views in regard to the 5 February 1978 declaration of its government. We further stressed that the conflict are not attributed to the unclear border delineation as set forth by the Vietnamese since the resolution with respect to the border issue was stated clearly in the joint declaration between the government of Cambodia and that of Vietnam, in 1966. For our stance toward solving this conflict, we informed him by emphasizing on the same



points as we did to other embassies.

In addition, the official asked us if we would agree to have a third country to help handle the problem in case the situation kept dragging on. He also told us that the government of France did not know of any attitude by Vietnam concerning its declaration on February 5, 1978. He further notified that in the past French foreign Minister planned to pay a visit in Vietnam, but has now postponed it.

As far as the friendly relationship between the two countries Cambodia and France is concerned, the official recalled that France have long had friendly relationship with Cambodia. He explained that in spite of the French diplomatic tie with Lon Nol government between 1970-75, it was not a sincere one because the government was a buffer of America while France preferred existence of the then government of King Sihanouk. After the liberation of Cambodia, however, France also wanted a continued diplomatic relationship. But, the problem has yet to be solved, whereas the Cambodian Embassy in Paris is now closed down.

We stressed in response to him that our government following the liberation of Cambodia has virtually underlined its foreign policy that wants to make good friends and seeks to have friendship relations with both neighboring and remote countries based on the principle provided for in our Constitutions. We will always respect this principle.

The problem [of diplomatic tie] with France that remains unsolved is however not because of Cambodia, rather it is because France still has some problems in which it has not yet showed that it wants a good relationship with Cambodia. We brought up an example for confirmation by mentioning about France protecting Khmer traitors and having them to commit all kinds of prevaricating acts harmful to the politics and grace of Cambodia. This, of course, only results in the two countries having bad relationship. As for the Khmer traitors, the official confirmed to us that France does not allow them to conduct activities detrimental to the benefit of France. As you are already aware, the official said, that in France there are many media and political institutions--some with Mark-Leninist and some other with liberal ideology, and that some of them speak good [of us] and others do not. And yet, they are not assigned and controlled by the government.

Finally, the official stated that he would meet and discuss further with us again in this regard in the future in order to handle the relationship between the two countries. We reaffirmed to him that the government of France will then realize more of the Cambodian politics as mentioned above. The discussion underwent in an agreeable and friendly atmosphere. Once again, the official emphasized that this was his first ever meeting with us after the liberation of Cambodia, and that it was the meeting permitted by the government [of Cambodia].

Through his facial expression and conduct, we see that he seemed to want a good renewed relationship with Cambodia. Please be informed, and please, Angkar, comment on this.

Tho [reporter's name]

4 March 1978

Received on 5 March 1978 at 17:30'

Copied and sent to:

- ◆ Uncle ◆ Uncle Nuon [Nuon Chea]
- ◆ Brother Van [Ieng Sary] ◆ Brother Vorn
- ◆ Office ◆ Documentation

S-21 prisoner



EVIDENCE

By Elizabeth van Schaack

(Continued)



Examination of Witnesses

Each party may call witness to support their version of the facts. Witness testimony represent another source of evidence. This form of evidence, the trier of fact does not have a first-hand impression of the fact; rather she must rely upon the testimony of others. Only witnesses with personal knowledge of the fact at hand may testify. Witnesses traditionally did not testify as to their opinions only to facts. However, in recent times, witnesses have been allowed to testify as to their opinions and the trier of fact has been trusted to determine the distinction between the facts and opinions within a witness' testimony.

1) Direct Examination

The party that called the witness engages in direct examination. Direct examination is used to establish the facts that are essential to the claim of the

party calling the witness.

Leading questions (i.e. questions that suggest an answer) are generally prohibited in direct examination. The rationale for this rule is that courts fear that friendly witnesses will say what that direct examiner wants to hear and will not testify solely based upon their own knowledge. The direct examiner can guide the path of the testimony, but the examiner must allow the witness to present his or her own witness and not in the words of the direct examiner.

Exceptions to the rule against leading questions:

1. If the witness is not a friendly witness, then leading questions are followed.
2. If the questions are used to establish fact not in dispute then leading questions are followed in the interests of efficiency.
3. If the witness is forgetful, then leading questions may be used to spark the witness' memory.
4. Finally, leading questions can be asked if the witness has some kind of handicap which may hinder his or her ability to testify (e.g. young, unable to speak the prevailing language, unintelligent, or timid).

Questions may be specific or narrative. Specific questions may be challenged as leading. Narrative questions allow the witness to use his or her own words, but may include inadmissible evidence or the witness may say too much.

2) Cross-Examination

Once direct examination is finished, the other side may cross-examine the witness. Depending upon the jurisdiction, there may be limits placed upon the scope of the cross-examination. In some jurisdictions, cross may be limited to issues that were brought up during direct examination. Matters relating to the credibility of the witness may be allowed. If the opposing party wants to introduce new issues, it will have to call the witness during its case. Other jurisdictions allow the opposing counsel to explore virtually any testimony during cross.

General rule: never ask a question whose answer is unknown. The examiner should be ensured that the question will produce a favorable response.

3) Re-Direct Examination

The calling side has the opportunity to re-direct questions at the witness. Redirect is generally restricted to rebuilding (challenging) points made during cross.



The victim (1979)

relationships, financial interest, past hostility toward one of the party, or other motives.

4. Sensory or material defect: the witness could not have heard what she claims to have heard or if her description of an event cannot be trusted because she is hearing impaired.

5. Contradiction: the production of other evidence testimony that proves that statements made by the first witness are incorrect. Usually this contradiction is allowed only for material as opposed to irrelevant issues.

An expert witness is a person with specialized knowledge

4) Re-Cross Examination

The cross examining side can then rebut the re-direct.

In cross examination, the examiner attempts to challenge the witness’ testimony. Impeachment involves attacking the witness’ credibility by showing flaws in the witness himself. Five common techniques of impeachment:

1. Character issues: the cross examiner can try and prove that the witness is not truthful by showing that the witness has been convicted of a crime (especially involving a crimes of dishonesty), committed prior bad acts (embezzled an employer, evaded taxes), or that s/he has a bad reputation.

2. Prior inconsistent statement: on a prior occasion that witness made a statement that was inconsistent with his or her present testimony. (For example through depositions). This can occur in two current statement and suggest that the witness is prone to lying.

3. Bias: the witness is biased towards or against one of the parties on the basis of family or other personal

who help resolve the case. The expert witness usually testifies when there is a case with complex facts that require expert interpretation. Experts are not usually called to evaluate ordinary evidence. The expert can testify about what opinions should be drawn from a particular set of facts. There are two requirements that must be met before expert testimony will be admitted:

1. the expert must be qualified.
2. the subject matter of he expert’s testimony should be helpful to resolve the case.



Instruments utilized for Torture



RECLAIMING CAMBODIAN HISTORY

By Jaya Ramji



January 7, 1999, marked the twentieth anniversary of the demise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a genocidal regime that killed an estimated one-third of the Cambodian population in less than four years of rule. Two decades later, the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge have yet to be examined by an impartial authority and Cambodian politics remain turbulent, impeding the peaceful development of Cambodian civil society. These two phenomena arguably are linked; until the Cambodian government and the international community develop a policy to repair the damage inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian people will be unable to live in a peaceful society.

In order for Cambodia society to heal, the full truth about the Khmer Rouge regime must be

examined and disseminated, creating a history that Cambodians can teach to their children. While a strong case can be made for the need to prosecute the members of the Khmer Rouge, an international tribunal for Cambodia may be most effective if limited to the prosecution of top leaders. Structural constraints would render a tribunal incapable of fully addressing the complexities of the Cambodian genocide, and thus necessitate the formation of a truth commission or other investigative body as a supplement. In order to move forward, Cambodia must establish a clear picture of the past so that all Cambodians have a stake in upholding its future.

This article investigates the findings of a survey of Cambodians conducted by the author in June 1997. On the basis of these interviews and taking into

account Buddhist views of justice and reconciliation, the article recommends a trial for top leaders and a truth commission for lesser members of the Khmer Rouge. This study was designed to determine which mode of accountability would be appropriate for the Cambodian people in addressing the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. To discern which of these models would be most responsive to the needs and concerns of the Cambodian people, the author interviewed twenty-five Cambodians from varied socio-economic strata on the subject of whether, and if so how, the Khmer Rouge should be punished.

This composition first provides a brief history of recent Cambodian politics. Next, it outlines the various accountability mechanisms that have been adopted in addressing situations of mass violence in the past. Then it examines themes that arose from interviews. Recurring themes raised by interviewees can offer qualitative insight into the opinions of Cambodians. Taking all of these factors into account, the author presents recommendations on the form that

a Cambodian truth commission should take.

CONTEMPORARY CAMBODIAN POLITICS

In June 1997, Cambodian papers were abuzz with speculation about the possible capture of Pol Pot and his potential prosecution in an international tribunal. On July 5, 1997 Hun Sen, then Second Prime Minister, took power in Cambodia through a coup, killing more than forty members of the FUNCINPEC party of Prince Ranariddh, the First Prime Minister. This power shift sobered the enthusiasm of those who promoted a tribunal, and put the idea of capturing Pol Pot on hiatus. Less than one month later, however, the Khmer Rouge themselves put Pol Pot on trial and sentenced him to life imprisonment for his crimes against the Cambodian people.

Through late 1997 and early 1998, Cambodia was fairly stable politically, albeit ruled undemocratically. On April 15, 1998, the Khmer Rouge reported that Pol Pot was dead. The death of Pol Pot was a clarion call to the Cambodian government and the international community to seek



out the truth before the rest of the top Khmer Rouge officials pass away. On July 26, 1998, the incumbent Hun Sen retained his position in an election fraught with irregularities and intimidation that a gain denied Cambodians a meaningful stake in their country's governance.

Late 1998 and 1999 were characterized by two recurring themes: the arrest and surrender of the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders and extensive negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian government on the issue of an international tribunal. In December 1998, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, two of the most notorious criminals of the Khmer Rouge era, surrendered to the Cambodian government and were allowed to walk free. In February 1999, the last holdouts from the Khmer Rouge army laid down their weapons and joined the Cambodian army. While this was a step toward the unification of Cambodia, the soldiers threatened to return to armed violence if the Khmer Rouge leaders were put on trial. However, Ke Pauk, a high-ranking Khmer Rouge official, pledged to stand trial if the government ordered him to.

In March 1999, United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, presented the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Experts on Cambodia to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The U.N. Experts' report advised the creation of an international tribunal for the Khmer Rouge leaders and a separate truth commission for other cases. On March 12, Hun Sen officially rejected the U.N.'s recommendations of an international tribunal, and instead requested international assistance for a domestic trial of the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian government also refused to accept a truth commission for lesser members of the Khmer Rouge.

A few days after the Group of Experts' report was published, Ta Mok, the last fugitive Khmer Rouge leader, was arrested by the Cambodian military. Hun Sen insisted that a domestic trial would be sufficient for Ta Mok, and that there was no need for an

international tribunal. In May, Kang Kek Ieu, or Duch, the chief interrogator for the Khmer Rouge, who was the commandant of the infamous Tuol Sleng prison, was taken into protective custody by the Cambodian government. Duch proclaimed his willingness to testify against himself and other Khmer Rouge leaders. In September, a Cambodian military court charged Ta Mok and Duch with genocide.

In August, the Cambodian government rejected a second proposal by the United Nations, which would have created a tribunal with a majority of foreign judges and a minority of Cambodian jurists. In October, the United States government proposed a compromise plan consisting of a tribunal composed of three Cambodians and two foreign members which would require a majority of four to uphold a verdict. Hun Sen agreed to this plan, and declared that a tribunal will be convened by early next year, with or without United Nations approval. He has opened up the possibility of a trial for all of the top Khmer Rouge leaders, instead of limiting the defendants to Ta Mok and Duch, who are already in custody.

The insistence of the Cambodian government on a domestic trial, while understandable from the perspective of sovereignty, is also short-sighted. A fair trial for the leaders of the Khmer Rouge requires international intervention due to the current state of the Cambodian judiciary. The case for prosecution of the leaders who commanded the genocide has been made eloquently and convincingly; however, the question remains how to account for crimes committed by lower-ranking members of the Khmer Rouge. Legal proceedings focused on individuals are neither feasible nor appropriate for the thousands of cadre members implicated in the Cambodian genocide, nor could they accurately or sufficiently establish a shared historical memory for the Cambodian people. After almost twenty years of war, Cambodia faces a long road to recovery; a truth commission is a vital component of this healing process. **(Continued)**

TWO MARVELS: SACRED AND PROFANE

By Chhang Song

Tuol Sleng consists of a series of three-floored brick buildings that formerly housed the Tuol Svay Prey High School in Phnom Penh. Houses around the site were also used for detention, interrogation and torture. Approximately twenty thousand people, nearly all Cambodian citizens, are believed to have been executed at Tuol Sleng by Pol Pot's henchmen. Since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, Tuol Sleng has been preserved as a national museum, where displays focus on the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge and include torture instruments and photographs of those killed. Tuol Sleng keeps the world horrifically aware of the massacre of the Cambodian population. Some Khmers have wished to have the victims' remains that are on display cremated. Cremation of these bones, which bear witness to Pol Pot's heinous, inhumane acts against the Cambodian people, would be the equivalent of removing the temples of Angkor Wat, that symbolize the grandeur of the Khmer civilization.

When Khmer civilization reached its peak and dominated mainland Southeast Asia between the 7th and 13th centuries, the Khmer people devoted much of their time to building a number of magnificent temples. Unfortunately, between 1975-1979, having slidden into a world of notorious ignorance where the ray of civilization could not penetrate, Cambodians massacred some three million of their own citizens. In the wake of the mass killings, a symbol of the slaughter was established at Tuol Sleng.

These two accomplishments are genuine "marvels" in the annals of human history. The architecture and decorative art of Angkor Wat cause the world to deeply appreciate those Khmer masterpieces, while Tuol Sleng has aroused the world's disgust at the actions of the dark-livered Khmers who dare trace their descent from the builders of Angkor Wat. These two "marvels" have become the common cultural property of the world. The Cambodian people, who brought about these extraordinary historic events—the Angkorian

Empire and the Khmer Rouge terror—now bear the heavy responsibility of ensuring that evidence of these contrasting accomplishments is preserved as part of humanity's common heritage.

In Cambodia, before the outbreak of the war with Pol Pot, we once heard a legend passed by from one to another. Here it is: "One upon a time, there was a king holding his throne in Nokor Pearean Sei, where his name was as mighty as thunder from the eight directions at the same time. During his eighty-year reign, the King trained his people to have enough energy for warfare, aimed at extending the empire's territory and building fortresses round his great temples and royal palace. After his demise, his successor, a grandchild, took the throne. Witnessing the immense achievements of his grandfather, the newly crowned young king appeared to be in deep thought, meditating quietly in sadness and wondering how to surpass the accomplishments of his predecessor. The new king asked his heir apparent to call a famous hermit from the Himalayas to tell the king's fortune and prescribe ways by which he could make himself more influential and famous than his predecessor. After calculating several times in trembling manner for seven days, the hermit knelt in front of the king suggesting that in order to reach the ambitious goal, forces inside and outside the empire should be mobilized to destroy all evidence of the prior king's achievements.

Following this suggestion, the new king assembled a large number of human forces from everywhere, from inside and outside, to demolish and burn the royal fortresses, temples, palaces, stupas, monasteries, schools, national museum and other valued things. Consequently, it was as if the great empire of the former King had never existed. As for the new King, all kings in all directions, their royal officials and peoples were subjugated. After his death, his name continued to inspire awe, while that of his predecessor was forgotten. He was said to be the only king who ever





had great influence, having managed to turn the kingdom into ruins, like dragging a sacred sword through a pile of dirt.

While this is just fiction, it reflects, in a sense, an idea current in Cambodia, where some are encouraging the demolition of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, and the cremation of the bones of the victims, thus ensuring the the destruction of the physical evidence of the reality of what the Khmer Rouge wrought in Cambodia. Pol Pot thought of being “famous” in the 1950s and 1960s, with the help of a hermit named Khieu Samphan, who used to be famous in truth-speaking and non-corruption, and who held an out-of-date doctoral degree in economics. Angkor Wat was built in the 8th and 11th centuries through the painstaking efforts of a number of Khmer Kings. Every

king had sought all means to gather millions of Khmer people and foreign prisoners of war to move mountains, clear forests, cut stones, and build temples, all while simultaneously mounting offensives against neighboring countries in a ceaseless quest to extend the empire. As a result, foundations of civilization were established.

Since human beings began founding civilizations a long time ago, seven putative marvels of the old and new worlds have been variously identified. Angkor Wat surely ranks as one of these wonders of the world. And like the civilizations that created the other “wonders of the world”, Khmer civilization has also had its ups and downs. Factors which contributed to the exhaustion of the Khmer natural, human, economic, and intellectual resources, and the abandonment of

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everything that Khmers were once proud of in the days of Nokor Phnom, have included wars, both internal and foreign, the seizure of peoples' properties to cover the expense of immense stone-slabs temples, constant internal royal family struggles for power without thought for national defense, and continued reliance upon rice-farming as the major support for the nation's economy. As a consequence, enemies both 'small and big' intruded upon and ruined the empire, and Khmers fell into an attitude of 'defeatism' and scattered into the jungles for 700 years.

Angkor Wat temple had vanished from Khmer consciousness when the French discovered, explored, and placed Cambodia under its control in 1863. Following the great age of Angkor, twenty-two million Khmer people were lost to Cambodia, either through

death, as prisoners of war brought to foreign lands, or through the loss of territory that eventually reduced Cambodia to a pint-sized piece of land named Kampuchea, home to the present Khmer people. The discovery of the Angkor Wat temples made Khmers dazedly aware of the former greatness of Khmer civilization, once the most influential force in Southeast Asia. Then dawned a new hope for national regeneration, and after one hundred years of French domination, Cambodia was reborn as a new, independent state of Southeast Asia with a population of some seven million people.

We Khmers have never admitted our faults against ourselves and our nation. The current intellectuals mostly are confused and do not have a clean understanding of the differences between foreign political theories and Khmer conscience; individual interest and national interest; internal reality and external physical appearance; or between non-conformist beliefs and genuine national religion. It is currently popular to ignore the fact that at one time, Khmers could heinously torture and massacre their own people. Due to the fact that neighboring countries have, over the course of history, captured the greater part of Cambodia's territory, the current Khmers always arouse wrath and put the blame on other nations.

Khmers have always placed great emphasis on gentleness, politeness, the smiling face. But these are only appearances. The eternal smiling faces on the tops of the temples reflect a self-image satisfactory to the Khmer people, who forget that they are but the faces of Ta Prum, and do not reflect the reality of the life of Khmer people in Angorean times. So too, in just a short historical moment, we Khmers were cheated by the "five hundred thieves" of the Khmer Rouge, and paid the price for our lack of vigilance. As a consequence, three million innocent people were massacred. Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Kheu Samphan, Nuon Chea, and Ta Mok were very busy. We have been considering razing Tuol Sleng and placing the blame on a particular foreign country. Later, we will be speaking of the "Khmer Rouge incident", an incident caused by this particular country to defame "Brothers" Saloth Sar and Khieu Samphan, clean heroes, and prevent them from participating in the "great national solidarity and reconciliation". **(Continued)**

WHAT IS KHMER ROUGE?

When I say “Khmer Rouge,” I mean the organization built by Pol Pot, and the people who were part of that organization. Now that Pol Pot is dead and his organization has collapsed, or at least has been transformed into other organizations, I mean the political leaders and soldiers who were part of the Pol Pot organization, specifically, Ieng Sary’s DNUM along with all those people up in Anlong Veng. And anyone who supports them.

(Craig Etcheson)

I try not to use this phrase, which is too broad and meaningless. I prefer DK and CPK. I think party membership is the crucial point of judgement. “KR” confuses things.

(David Chandler)

The word “Khmer Rouge” is an invention of [King Sihanouk.] During the course of an inspired speech, in the mid-60s, he decided to call the Khmer Communists and assorted Khmer Left-wings “Khmers Rouges” which is the French word for “Red Khmers”. At the same time, he referred to the pro-US (you probably would fall in this category!) as being Khmers Blue or “Blue Khmers”. Unfortunately the press, in particular the Anglo-Saxon press keeps referring to the “Khmer Rouge” this is not a valid word to refer to the Cambodian communist movement. Nor is it the word Sihanouk used successively since the mid-60s to refer to them. While I was in China, I often got in trouble both with the Chinese and the Khmers Rouges, if I used the word. They hated it and always referred to themselves as “Democratic Kampuchea”.

(Julio A. Jeldres)

The word “Khmer Rouge” serves equal interest to what is “white” and what is “black” in the history. In the context of legality, the word “Khmer Rouge” should not be used due to the fact that it is not containing official definition and its definite essence. The word “Democratic Kampuchea” or “Communist Party of

Kampuchea”, or “Central Committee of Communist Party of Kampuchea” should be used in substitution of “Khmer Rouge” for legality and official public discussions.

(Youk Chhang)

The Khmer Rouge is a meaningless word the use of which should be avoided whenever possible and replaced either with something much more specific, eg., “member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea”, “combatant” in the army, “cadre” of the party of Democratic Kampuchea, ect. As you know, it was originally coined by Sihanouk to refer to Cambodian leftists (Communists in particular) who in Sihanouk’s view were not subservient to the Vietnamese. These latter were “Khmer Viet Minh”, while opponents to what he considered his “right” (militarists, democrats, ect) were “Khmer Blue”. As you are also aware, Khmer Rouge has become a vague term of abuse, suggesting above all a genocidal or at least murderous nature. As such, it cans a dangerously inaccurate political label. Alas, an international trial might have helped sort out who was truly genocidal and whom not, but I guess it’s not to be.

(Steve Heder)

I understand the term “Khmer Rouge” to be a short hand term that covers different things at different periods of Cambodian history:

a) Initially during the Sangkum period I understand it was used initially by Sihanouk to refer to the “red” revolutionary current fighting against him;

b) During the Lon Nol period it was used to refer to the resistance forces that included Sihanouk (in GRUNK and FUNK);

c) During the period of Democratic Kampuchea it was used to refer to the government in power;

d) Since 1979 it has been used to refer to the remnants of DK who resisted the new government that had overthrown it.

(Helen Jarvis)

THE HAUNTING NIGHTMARE

By Ronnie Yimsut

During Khmer New Year in April 1975, I was a young 13 years old. It was an age too old to forget and too young to deal with what I have witnessed and experienced in Cambodia's recent bitter history. Exactly twenty-five years later, during Khmer New Year 2000, I found myself sitting on the top floor of the Popular Guesthouse in my old neighborhood and reliving the old memories once again. From the top of this popular backpacker's establishment, which sat just across from Siem Reap River and my old home site, I reflected on what had happened to my beloved birthplace, my people, my family, and myself. I suppose I was attempting to understand and make some sense of tragic events that had occurred here in the past 25 years. Twenty-five years may seem to be a long, long time, but it was just "yesterday" for me personally. The memories of the days gone by are still fresh in my mind.

The world, in general, now knows what had happened to Cambodia since April 17, 1975. Most notably, the world now knows about the Khmer Rouge reign of terrors and the Killing Field that followed. It was a nightmare that I would rather forget completely. Unfortunately, it was not possible for me to forget this tragic past in Cambodia's history and my own. It is part of me, the nightmare, like it or not. The Khmer Rouge was back in the news again after 25 years. Perhaps justice (not revenge) for my murdered family members and for my own suffering is near as the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia were negotiating for a tribunal of the last surviving Khmer Rouge leadership, the mass murderers of more than three millions. I am still hopeful for justice because vengeance can be very bitter, I know.

I am not certain why I wanted to be in Siem Reap again at this specific time. Perhaps it was the 25th anniversary of the fall of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge that drove me here. Perhaps it was the great ancient city, which was a good home to me once during my early childhood. Perhaps it was the "stoic" smile of the simple people of Siem Reap that drove me back

here again. Perhaps I was in Siem Reap to reflect on the good and bad memories from my youth, to heal and reconcile. Whatever the reason, I knew that I needed to be back at my birthplace.

New Year 2000 came and went with great fanfares and festivities. People from big and small villages in Cambodia (and around the world) came to take part in the year's biggest celebration. Traditional games were played and crowds of people were celebrating all three days and nights to welcome the New Year's Angels. It was absolutely wonderful, just as I had remembered it was during the old days. It was a tradition that Khmer Rouge tried and failed miserably to take away from these spirited Khmer people during their mad reign. The Khmer still know how to celebrate and live, in both good times and bad times, regardless.

April 17th, the 25th anniversary of the Khmer Rouge victory, came right after Khmer New Year without any noticeable fanfare. The Khmer people have had enough and they would rather forget about the Khmer Rouge even if it continues to haunt them. I sat alone on a concrete bench, holding on to my cold drink and reflecting about my past. I took a long look at my old home site across the Siem Reap River, which is now occupied by distant relatives, and two teardrops rolled down my cheeks. It was very difficult to hold back my tears; no matter how hard I tried. Emotions often run high whenever I am in Siem Reap. This time there was no exception.

My old home site was the last place where good memories still exist in my cluttered mind during New Year in April 1975. It was a time when all my family members and my youth were still in tact. I wanted to again relive the good memories before the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, clad in their black pajama uniforms and Ho Chi Minh sandals, walked into Siem Reap with their AK-47s and B-40 rocket-propelled grenades in 1975. I had to dig deep into my shattered memory bank to be able to go back in time for just a moment. Soon I was back to the old world I left far, far behind for a new

life in America. I am still very much of a lost Khmer generation during the day, as I learned, and the Khmer Rouge nightmare still haunts in my dreams during the night.

The terrifying nightmare came once again in my deep sleep during the night of April 17, 2000. I clearly saw Pol Pot and a few others, clad in their infamous black pajama uniform, walked toward me. Pol Pot has an American made Colt-45 in his right hand. He was the leader of the pack. He was waving, showing his gun around, but somehow he did not make an attempt to fire a shot as I expected. I instinctively ducked behind a tree for cover, hoping to avoid being seen. Unfortunately, my eyes and his met and locked in. I was absolutely terrified. Pol Pot came closer and closer, showing his aggressiveness and anger. He continued to wave his Colt-45, but for some reason he did not fire.

“Come on, get it over with!” Pol Pot clearly yelled to me, while he lowered his weapon. “What do you want from me?” I wasn’t sure what to do and hesitated for a moment. “Go ahead, finish me off. Get your revenge. Kill me!” He leaned his head forward toward me.

I grabbed Pol Pot’s head and did my best to choke his neck with my right arm with all my strength. I was ready to kill Pol Pot who appeared very much alive, if not well. I could hear the man was choking and dying, but the smile on his face was wicked. So evil was the smile for a dying man that I was wondering why Pol Pot was so eager for me to kill him. The more I choked and tried to kill Pol Pot the more he smiled at me with a sense of satisfaction. He was mocking me. It was like he was saying “Oh yeah, that is good. Do it! Do it! Do it now!”

I ended up releasing Pol Pot from my death grip. I do not want to be a killer of this old man—even if he was Pol Pot, the murderer of my family members and millions others. I do not want to be like Pol Pot, a cold-blooded murderer. Killing another human being was not in my nature. I am not a killer like Pol Pot was, no matter how much I hate and fear the evil Khmer Rouge leader.

“Please, you have to kill me! You have to do it. You must kill me so that I may be released,” Pol Pot was pleading with me now. I suddenly realized clearly what Pol Pot was really after. He wanted me, one of his

victims, to kill him so that he may be released from burning hell. Pol Pot has to allow the more than 3 millions of his victims to take revenge on himself so that he can escape burning hell where he is currently residing.

“No! I do not want to go to hell with you by killing you. I refuse to take revenge on you,” I told Pol Pot bluntly.

“Please, you have to do it. You can help save me from more suffering. Please help me, I beg of you! Just kill me! Pol Pot was so pathetic as he handed me his Colt-45 pistol.

I just ignored the old man’s sorrowful plea for mercy and turned my face away from the sorrowful old man. When I looked back at Pol Pot’s agonizing scream, his pistol was melting in his hand. His image faded away, but his agony continued. I was no longer fearful of the Khmer Rouge leader who was no more than a paper tiger at that moment. I felt a sense of relief knowing the fact that Pol Pot, my boogiemane and my nightmare, was still burning in hell where he belongs for the next three million lifetimes or more.

I woke up from the realistic dream shaking and sweating profusely. My back was flat against the wall. I was still scared. It was so very real. I can still remember every detail as though the nightmare was actually happening in real life. It was 2 AM in the morning and sleep would not return to me until the following night.


This much I know: Pol Pot and the other dead Khmer Rouge are now suffering severely in burning hell for every single Khmer life they had destroyed during their reign of terror. They will be there for millions of lifetimes yet to come, one lifetime for every life they took. I felt avenged knowing this simple fact. Other Khmer Rouge, such as Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ta Mok, Duch, Ke Pauk, and a few hundreds other Khmer Rouge leaders and commanders, can still redeem themselves before they cross over from this world to the next. They can still beg for mercy and forgiveness from their victims, while they are still alive in this world. They must do it now. Once they have crossed over to the other world (as Pol Pot, Son Sen, and Yun Yat did), it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to redeem themselves. Now is the time for the aging Khmer Rouge to make the wrong that they did into right. Come out with the truth and beg the

Khmer people for forgiveness now so that these Khmer Rouge don't have to burn in hell as long as Pol Pot, Son Sen, Yun Yat, and a few others. All of them are now suffering in burning hell for their past evil deeds. They all have to pay sooner or later.

Personally, I am not even sure how these surviving Khmer Rouge, whose hands are still stained with innocent people's blood, can live with themselves after knowing full well that what they did was pure evil, very wrong, and inhumane. This bunch of cowards shouldn't be allowed to hide behind the "national

reconciliation" any longer. They must come out with the truth now before it is too late for them. Pol Pot found out about this the hard way and his victims cannot release him from the millions of lifetimes in burning hell. Only the surviving Khmer Rouge can save their own souls, if not their lives in this world. Come out with the truth and beg for forgiveness from the Khmer people now! The Khmer people cannot forgive them until they admit that what they did to their own kind was very wrong.





THE EVENTS THAT PASSED ON 17 APRIL 1975

By Vannak Sok

17 April 1975 is an historical day that all people throughout the country must remember. At that time I was probably about nine years old, but I cannot remember clearly the events that passed on that day. 17 April 1975 is the day in which the soldiers dressed in black and rubber tire shoes and wearing khaki Chinese caps achieved victory over the Lon Nol soldiers.

At that time, in Koh Praak Village, Phum Thom Sub-District, Kien Svay District, Kandal Province, the soldiers dressed in black shot the Lon Nol soldiers while they were guarding near the groves of bamboo, at the end of the village. They ought to be pitied. It wasn't certain whose children or husbands they were. They had come to die in such suffering and pain. It was also uncertain what village or sub-district they came from, because the people in the district did not know them. None of the villagers were willing to take the Lon Nol soldiers to be buried, because they were afraid the soldiers dressed in black would misunderstand. These soldiers walked back and forth carrying guns in each hand. They ought to be feared, but some of the villagers were not very scared. They even came out and welcomed them with congratulations, yelling, "Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!" Perhaps the villagers believed this new regime would be more prosperous and happy than the previous regimes. No one could imagine that in the near future some thing horrible would happen.

If you glanced at the situation at that time, there were thousands of people wandering into the

village. According to what I was able to observe at that time, many more people were walking from the west to the east. While people were travelling, some carried their belongings on their heads, some carried their things in their arms and their backs and others had a Peta car, a motorcycle, or a cart to push the elderly. In the afternoon, some people stopped to rest underneath the tree and cook rice. Some asked the villagers for a place to cook. Others just kept moving forward. At that time, there was one girl about six-years-old, standing there alone, without anyone asking her what was wrong. She was probably separated from her mother and father because when she cried she kept screaming for her mother. I did not see anyone come to get her. This girl kept walking without knowing where she was going. At that moment, the villagers also saw a new, black car. They didn't know where the owners had gone. I only heard the villagers say that the car belonged to a movie star. Some said the car belonged to a high-ranking official. They saw four people walking past the stream to the island. Afterwards they took a boat across to the far bank and disappeared into Lvea Em District.

Among the hundreds of people, I saw my uncle, named Ma Kum Hean, coming from Phnom Penh. He was a professor in the Reas Niyum period. He brought his wife and all of his children with him. He stayed at my parent's house for a short while, before he would leave to find his native district. At that time, the soldiers dressed in black had evacuated everyone outside of the city for three days. If anyone was stubborn or was unwilling to leave they would be

shot and killed. My uncle was very scared. Another group of people were forced to leave quickly even though they had not yet united with their families and were therefore separated from each other. Some were separated from their husbands and some were separated from their beloved children. No matter how much everyone cried and pleaded with them, it did not matter. Therefore, in tears, each family had to force themselves to leave their homes. They could not imagine that a city that was once filled with people could be evacuated entirely by the soldiers dressed in black. The city that was once filled with people became silent. These are the words my uncle told me.

On the other hand, in my village, the people dressed in black were not as brutal as my uncle had described them. When they saw older people, they called them "nhorm." (this is a word of respect used as a substitute for mother or father.) "Please, nhorm, quickly leave to find your native village. Angkar will not harm you." They only told the people who had recently arrived from Phnom Penh, "Angkar only want you to leave the city for three days so that they can clean up the city. When Angkar has finished reorganizing it, brothers and sisters can return and live there. Our Angkar will only kill the enemies. If they see the Lon Nol soldiers they will kill them immediately. They will not keep them."

In the evening, around 5:00 on the 17th of April, the people who were evacuated from Phnom Penh, remained silent during their journey. I could only see smoke from the fire. Along the road no one spoke to each other about anything. Perhaps they were tired from their travels. Around 8:00 at night, none of the villagers or the people who had just arrived from the city asked each other about anything. It was completely quiet. I only saw the groups of soldiers dressed in black walking to and fro and a dog howling. That night, I believe most of the people were not able to fall asleep. Everyone was thinking

about the problems that they might face the next day.

17 April 1975 is the most horrific day for the people throughout Cambodia. Every person recognizes this day as a day that forced families and relatives to endure much pain and suffering. There is nothing that can be compared. Some died, some were separated from their husbands and children and their parents. Almost all of my mother's family died. It is because of this that I, Sok Vannak, representing all the people in Cambodia, would like to ask that a just tribunal be established so that all the people in Cambodia can be appeased and so that the souls of those who have died can also rest in peace. If there is no trial, all the people will certainly never be satisfied, because the things that have happened are too brutal. We must have a trial and keep this as a model for the future.

LETTER FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

I would like to express my profound gratitude to Mr. Director, who has contributed every issue of "Searching for the truth" to the Center for Social Development, which in turn always forwards them to participants of the Public Forum campaign. The 'Truth', published by the Documentation Center of Cambodia, reflects real insight into the exact nature of Democratic Kampuchea, and is a resource of history for both true justice and research documents for future generations.

Honestly, I would like to express my appreciation to you and your colleagues, who have exerted yourselves mentally and physically in placing the national interest first and ensuring the publication of every edition of the magazine. Once again, I would like to convey my best wishes to you and all your colleagues: happiness and cleverness for the continuation of these activities in the national interest.

Best regards,
May 29, 2000
Acting President, *Heav Veasna*

“...we will not forget [our] obligation to seek justice for the Cambodian people severely victimized by [the] genocidal regime....A consensus between Cambodian government and the United Nations Secretary General has been accomplished just a week ago, and the legal procedure is to be



processed in the near future”.



An excerpt from Samdech Hun Sen’s speech delivered during the CG meeting in Paris held on May 25-26, 2000.

ដើម្បីទប់ស្កាត់ការបោះពុម្ពនិងចែកចាយដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃ ដល់មន្ទីរស្រុក និងឃុំ ពេទ្ធាងព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា ទស្សនាវដ្តីចំនួន១០០០ក្បាលជារៀងរាល់លេខ និងដាក់លក់តាមបណ្តាទីរួមខេត្តនិងក្រុង មួយច្បាប់ក្នុងតម្លៃ ៧០០០រៀល

ថវិកាខេត្តបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទប់ស្កាត់ដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃកសិកម្មនិងជំនួយមនុស្សធម៌នៃក្រសួងការបរទេសនៃរាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលនៃវៀតណាម មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាអំពីការរំលោភបំពាន មូលនិធិពន និង សាធារណជនគ្រប់រូប សូមជួយទប់ស្កាត់ការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទស្សនាវដ្តីនេះទៅតាមលទ្ធភាពដែលអាចធ្វើបាន ។ ព័ត៌មានបន្ថែមចំពោះការបោះពុម្ពផ្សាយទស្សនាវដ្តីស្នើសុំការពិភាក្សាសូមមេត្តាទាក់ទងមកតាមមជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាតាមទូរស័ព្ទលេខ (៨៥៥) ២៣ ២១១ ៨៧៥ ឬ (៨៥៥) ១២ ៩០៥ ៥៥៥ ។ សូមអរគុណ ។

Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support of the publication of *Searching for the truth*. For contribution, please contact (855) 23 211 875 or (855) 12 90 55 95. Thank you.