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Letter :

THE SURVIVORS

Many times when we meet an affable, smiling Cambodian, it is easy to forget that here is a person who may have suffered incalculably under the Khmer Rouge regime and that inside, he or she may be “broken.” A foreign friend of mine once related how, when he asked his normally smiling and reserved housekeeper if she had any children, her eyes opened with a flood of tears. She then exclaimed, “Dead! My children and husband died in the Pol Pot time.”

The upcoming Khmer Rouge tribunal must not only render justice, it must also be seen as doing so through the eyes of both the victims and the perpetrators. Those who, with open eyes and thirst for power, led Cambodia and its people into the Killing Fields must finally be brought to justice. In a democratic society you are punished when you kill someone. The leaders of the Khmer Rouge who took it upon themselves to reform Cambodian society over the corpses of the Cambodian people remain responsible for their actions. Because of its creators’ success in making it appear omnipotent, the Angkar was very useful to these persons in their efforts to exercise total control over the Cambodian people, many of whom

(no doubt including low-ranking cadres) believed that this “super being” could see them wherever they went, and knew whatever they were doing, thinking, or trying to hide. Angkar could be the little kids in the village, who would report you if they observed the slightest deviation from the dictates of the Organization.

When death was near, the desire to live doubtless made willing instruments of many of those who carried out the killing plans of the leaders. They were themselves simply hoping to stay alive by doing whatever they were told to do. This would perhaps be the argument from many of the low-ranking Khmer Rouge cadre. But for those who devised, established, understood and enforced the policies of Angkar, such an excuse is unavailable.

Like it or not, it’s all part of your country. It’s part of Cambodia. It’s part of our parents. And for these reasons, it is important for people to know the truth and their history. I think that in their hearts, most of the perpetrators are in support of the tribunal if it will present the truth, for after that process is complete, they will be free.

Youk Chhang





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Cyan Magenta Yellow Black



**MEETINGS OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE:
DEFENSE AFFAIRS**

Sophearith Chuong

Democratic Kampuchea’s Standing Committee held at least two meetings in 1976, which focused primarily on defense affairs.

The February 22, 1976 Meeting

This meeting’s participants were Comrade Secretary (Pol Pot), Comrade Deputy Secretary (Nuon Chea), Comrade Van (Ieng Sary), Comrade Vorn (Vorn Vet), Comrade Khieu (Son Sen), Comrade Thuch (Koy Thuon), Comrade Hem (Khieu Samphan), Comrade Doeun, and Comrade Touch. The meeting focused on defending the country, which included two important points: 1) the report on the situation relating to defending the country, and 2) Angkar’s advice on the issues.

1. The Report on the Situation of Defense Affairs

a. The Situation at Cambodia’s Eastern Border. The document reveals: “Comrade Khieu (Son Sen) reported that since the beginning of February the Vietnamese were very active along the eastern border, especially at Rattanak Kiri, Svay Rieng, and Ka-am Samna.”

b. Chinese Aid to the Airforce and Navy. “Comrade Khieu Samphan presented some issues relating to the Air Force and the Navy, and he requested advice from Angkar, particularly about pilot training, learning to make explosives, and constructing a weapons factory, naval bases, airports, and battleships. There were 64 technicians who have just arrived.”

c. Transporting Ammunition from Vietnam. “The Vietnamese requested that new units receive equipment left from 1975. The equipment could be transferred through Svay Rieng or Memot. The Vietnamese mentioned that the waterway is inaccessible.”

d. Military Hospitals. “Comrade Khieu made a request to Angkar to build a hospital for the army by renovating Ketomealea Hospital.”

2. Angkar’s Advice

a. The Situation at Cambodia’s Eastern



Border. Addressing the problems along the border, the meeting mentioned, “the encroachment of the Vietnamese is done for two reasons: stealing our land is one of the objectives of the Vietnamese, and its leader was ordered to do so, or that was the direct activity of people who immigrated from Kampuchea and the patrolling units along the border.”

In order to solve problems occurring along the border, the meeting decided on three measures: “a. In principle, we both negotiate with Vietnam, and most importantly, prepare armed forces to defend the border. By using diplomatic policy without military action, [the problem] would be very difficult to solve if the Vietnamese come in large numbers. Thus, we have to be aware of our strengths and weaknesses, and be on the alert to fight. If the Vietnamese cross the border, attack them immediately. b. Cooperation is the most important factor; soldiers report to their bases and to Staff for information. At Mondul Kiri we have comrade Laing, while at Rattanak Kiri we have comrade Ya. Most importantly, the army and the bases must be unified and work jointly. c. Avoid the total destruction of our armed forces by Vietnam and give priority to secrecy. Military personnel should stick to the discipline, and also, it is necessary that when communicating with one another, they must be stealthy.”

b. Chinese Aid to the Air Force and Navy. The document discussed learning to fly, learning how to make gunpowder, building a weapons factory, setting up defense ships, airport construction, and warehouse renovation.

Regarding Chinese aid, the meeting concluded, “a. In learning to fly, we should negotiate the tuition fee for two years with China. A strict commission has to be set up to lead the trainees. b. Learn all sorts of expertise in making gunpowder. Trainees

should be recruited from bases, significantly large zones. c. A weapons factory should be built. d. Use Ream harbor as a shipyard to repair ships (of the Vedet model). Anchor a maximum of two ships at Ream, and the rest at Rung Sanloem island. We are not ready to buy large defense ships and anti-submarine ships; we must first send some cadres and youths to study overseas. e. Examine a new location to construct the airport, deeper into the countryside, such as at Tmart Porn or Kampong Chhnang. f. Warehouses should also be built deep in the countryside.

c. Transporting Ammunition from Vietnam.

The document states, “This task has to be accomplished. The ammunition should be transported through one of the three paths - Snuol, Smach, or Memot. We

Khmer Rouge soldiers



receive the goods at the border, so that the Vietnamese won't be able to cross to our land."

d. Military Hospitals. It was noted at the meeting that, "Angkar has given permission to organize a military hospital, as requested by the Staff."

The May 15, 1976 Meeting

Participants were Comrade Secretary (Pol Pot), Comrade Deputy Secretary (Nuon Chea), Comrade Khieu (Son Sen), Comrade Hem (Khieu Samphan), Comrade Doeun, and Comrade Touch (note taker). This meeting also discussed defense affairs, concentrating on two main points: 1) building a weapons factory and 2) constructing an airport.

1. Building a Weapons Factory

The document stated, "For the factory, Comrade Khieu reported that he had met with Chinese delegates, embassies, and technicians in order to inform them about the opinion of the standing committee on the purpose of constructing a weapons factory. He already had support for this purpose. After that the Chinese requested us to specify our experience in constructing buildings in the middle of the woods. The Chinese also informed us that the factory needs 20,000 square meters of land, 500-600 meters, and a location with a constant 20° temperature. Also the vapor pipe cannot be built underground and 2,000 workers had to be trained. They said that they had some experience in handling this job, but many of their meter devices were damaged as a result of moisture in the soil. They have modern equipment. They also stated that many technical problems may arise. The political and diplomatic sectors are favorable, but the technical one presents possible obstacles. Moreover, they said that they had been in Cambodia for three months, but little had been done. In summary: The Chinese do not want to face difficulties caused by wet soil and vapor pipe problems."

2. Building an Airport

The meeting notes state, "For the airport, Comrade reported: At Pungro we need to lay a large

amount of gravel. He asked what kind of roof tile should be used in order to prevent heat. Workers have arrived."

The meeting decided that, "The airport is to be built near Phnom Penh, and the work site shall be called a repair workshop. Provide ideological education to cadres and youths. Samrong is the only transportation route for the construction. Keep secret."

3. General Defense Affairs

Defending the country was a fundamental task for Democratic Kampuchea and was prioritized as such. Nuon Chea, deputy secretary of the CPK, spoke on behalf of the party to the people of Denmark in July 1978, "If we can guard safely the interests of our country, we will also contribute to the struggle in the whole world." He added, "In this period, after liberation, it is secret work that is fundamental. We no longer use the terms 'legal' and 'illegal'; we use the terms 'secret' and 'open.' Secret work is fundamental in all that we do. For example, the elections of comrades to leading work are secret. The places where our leaders live are secret.

We keep meeting times and places secret, and so on. On the one hand, this is a matter of general principle, and on the other, it is a way to defend ourselves from the danger of enemy infiltration. As long as there is class struggle or imperialism, secret work will remain fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be masters of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who."

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KILLING FIELDS IN O REANG OV

Rasy Pheng Pong

O Reang Ov is one of 18 districts located northeast of the provincial town of Kampong Cham. During Democratic Kampuchea, this district was under the administrative authority of the Eastern Zone. A Documentation Center of Cambodia mapping team conducted research on 12 killing fields and security offices in six O Reang Ov subdistricts, specifying the geographical locations and altitudes of each site using a Geographical Positioning System (GPS).

Preah Theat Subdistrict

1. Dangkhao Sien's Well (Geographic code number: 031104, latitude: 11°50'58:19" north, longitude: 105°29'38:80"east)

Dangkhao Sien well belonged to a rich man named Sien, who was a distinguished landlord in Preah Theat subdistrict during the 1960s. He died in 1983 from a chronic disease he had contracted during the Khmer Rouge regime. During the People's Republic of Kampuchea regime, a large part of his farmland was confiscated by the government and distributed to poor people. He decided to give his only remaining plot of land to his two children so they could grow crops. During Khmer Rouge regime, his house was used as security office. One of his plots of land was chosen as an execution site, for it had two wells that were ideal for disposing of victims' bodies.

Sien Sokha, age 54, is one of Dangkhao Sien's sons. He resides in Thnal Keng village, Preah Theat subdistrict. Sokha said: "The two wells are 30 meters apart. They were full of corpses." He also revealed that Preah Theat pagoda was destroyed by the Khmer Rouge, and the area around it was used as a temporary camp site to house people evacuated from Phnom Penh. Also many buildings in the area of the pagoda were used as dining halls for those evacuees. Villagers from Trapeang Neang and Thnal Keng were forced to

pull the pagoda down. Tuy, a villager in Thnal Keng village, said that he had joined in the task of knocking the pagoda down. He continued that many Buddhist holy books and documents written on palm leaves had been burnt. Many monks had been defrocked and evicted from the pagoda by force.

A monk called Ruos Heng, who is now the top assistant to the chief of a Buddhist monastery, said, "Approximately twenty Buddhist monks were expelled. One, two, or three monks were excommunicated at a time. I myself was forced to leave the pagoda on August 7, 1975." He continued that he had to do so, or else he would be punished. Another monk, named Yi was defrocked by the Khmer Rouge because he determined not to leave the pagoda. The excommunication were eventually completed successfully, for all monks were threatened with detention in "P-2" prison in O Reang Ov district.

Pich, an army chief in the Eastern Zone, closely supervised the process of eradicating monks. This man had a close relationship with Sao Phim, the Eastern Zone secretary. Religions were abolished. All religious worship was banned. But on holy days or festival days, some people covertly burnt incense to pray to god at their homes.

Livelihood meetings were held once a week, and were presided over by the subdistrict or cooperative chief. The meetings focused on enhancing working ability and accomplishing plans to produce three to four tons of paddy per hectare. All citizens worked relentlessly and dared not talk to each another at night, not only because they were exhausted but also because they were afraid of militiamen, who normally eavesdropped on their conversations. Sien Sokha described the roles of the militiamen in cooperatives in Preah Theat subdistrict: "During the day they slept; at

night they set off to investigate.” Preah Theat pagoda became a place the Khmer Rouge used to house people, about 150 families, traveling from Phnom Penh and other locations. Sruy Bun Sie, age 59, who lives in Tuol Phneou village, Preah Theat subdistrict, related that he was evacuated to Kampong Thom province at the end of 1978, after Southwest Zone Khmer Rouge accused him of having “a Vietnamese head and Khmer body.” He continued that many people, both young and old, stayed in Preah Theat pagoda. These “April 17” people struggled to achieve the heavy tasks set for them in exchange for an insufficient food allowance. Unlike base people, their diet and journey were strictly monitored and controlled by the chiefs of the unit.

The killing, though, was carried out without a thorough investigation. Lines of new people were brought to be slaughtered at Dangkhao Sien wells. Sien Sokha witnessed four or five people being killed at a time almost every day, when he was working in a crop field a hundred meters away from the wells. The Khmer Rouge did not kill the victims immediately after reaching the wells. They waited for more prisoners to arrive and then killed them all at one time. Each execution was accompanied by revolutionary songs. The songs were played through loudspeakers, producing a deafening sound through the forest. This sound made people who were working close by think that it might be their turn in the coming days. Most killings were carried out at 3 a.m. The songs ended when the executions were completed. Guns were not used as execution tools.

The people killed at the two wells were brought from other places in Preah Theat subdistrict, and were

also new people staying in Preah Theat pagoda. Base people were also killed, but only if they had done something wrong. They were first told to dig the holes in which they would later be buried. None of the base people killed at a banana field close to Dangkhao Sien wells knew what their crimes were.

Thuch Tuy, age 64, had a daughter who worked as a medical staff and was killed by the Khmer Rouge. “My daughter was innocent; she did not do anything, not even discuss things relating to the revolution. She worked vigorously in the hospital.” In addition, Sien Sokha’s 18-year-old niece was killed without a real reason. Although she thought she was being ordered to take additional medical training, she was instead forced



Damrel pagoda, a former security office



to dig her own grave in a banana field in Dangkhao Sien, after which the Khmer Rouge killed her with a wooden stick.

According to Sruy Bunsie, a relative of the royal family called “Trung Kantol” died in the pagoda area from disease. Most prisoners brought to this pagoda were the wives of soldiers, and were accused of having a “tendency toward” (sympathy for) the previous regime. Their husbands were sent to Damrel pagoda to work. Thuch Tuy explained that after gathering people together at Preah Theat pagoda in 1976, the Khmer Rouge began to separate husbands and wives. At the end of 1978, all of the women there had been killed at the two wells. Sruy Bunsie related that the soldiers who escorted and killed those people were Khmer Rouge from Northeastern Zone. He added that the massacre was completed in just half a month, and that the corpses were drenched with an acidic solution to prevent them from smelling as they decomposed. All three witnesses - Thuch Tuy, Sruy Bunsie, and Sien Sokha - made similar estimates of the number of victims killed at Dangkhao Sien: 700 to 800 people.

Damrel Subdistrict

2. Damrel Pagoda Security Office and Killing Field (Geographic code number: 031105, latitude: 11°49'15:29” north, longitude: 105°37'40:88” east)

A large building in the Damrel pagoda cluster, which was made from concrete and covered with a brick roof tile, was used as a security office. Most victims were killed rather than being detained in this building. This security office was established in 1973, and the killing began there immediately.

Suos Sim, age 67, resides in Damrel Muoy village, Damrel subdistrict, and worked as a blacksmith near Damrel pagoda. He observed that the Khmer Rouge were using that large building to hold prisoners before putting them to death. An elderly man, Khuon Sim, confirmed that this pagoda was used as both a prison and dining area for the entire subdistrict. He added that the pagoda held two prisons, one in the large building and the other in the Pali hall. Prisoners were

ordinary people and those accused of having a tendency toward the Khmer Republic. “There was no torture used on the prisoners,” he noted. Prisoners were brought to be killed at 1) an area near the fence on the southwestern side, 2) Ta Krai mound, 150 meters from the pagoda, 3) Tuol Trapeang Chhouk, approximately 100 meters north of the pagoda, and 4) an area just north of the pagoda.

A site near the pagoda’s fence was used to execute subdistrict chiefs and those having some relationship with them. Khuon Sim noted that many of those executed were Khmer Rouge chiefs, but he was not sure what crimes they had committed. According to witnesses, there were about fifteen individuals killed and buried in one grave at this site alone.

3. Tuol Takrai Execution Site (Geographic code number: 031106, latitude: 11°49'158:29” north, longitude: 105°37'36:99” east)

Tuol Takrai is a mound located in the middle of a rice field, 100-150 meters north of Damrel pagoda. This mound has four graves. Two witnesses said that this mound was originally trenches used by soldiers during the war, and when the Khmer Rouge took over the area the trenches were used for disposing of bodies. Suos Sim noted that this had been a killing site since 1973; the victims were former Lon Nol soldiers. He also mentioned that wounded soldiers who hid in the houses of villagers or their relatives were beaten to death here immediately after being arrested.

Khuon Sim, age 74, described the killings, “I could only peer at the killing from a distant place of concealment.” Normally the Khmer Rouge carried out the executions from 7 to 8 p.m., a quiet period in which few people walked past the area. A member of the royal family, Rithivong, was killed here. Khuon Sim stated that Rithivong was a direct relative of Truong Kantol, who died of natural causes in the pagoda in 1975. He added that Rithivong groaned with pain during torture, and his voice could be heard far off in the village.

4. Trapeang Chhouk and Trapeang Kdam Execution Sites (Geographic code number: 031107,

latitude: 11°49'20:80" north, longitude: 105°37'42:51" east)

Trapeang Chhouk is 100 meters northeast of Damrel pagoda. Today this site is a dry pond. It contains five graves, each of which was filled with corpses and then covered over.

Trapeang Kdam holds two graves. This site lies 100 meters to the northeast of Trapeang Chhouk. According to Khuon Soem, these two mass graves are the largest in the area of the pagoda. He stated that the victims ranged in age from infants to very old people, and were both base and new people; they were beaten to death with wooden sticks. He also mentioned that when he worked in the pagoda, he saw the Khmer Rouge pull down several of its buildings, except for a large hall which they used as a prison. Buddhist worship, he said, did not take place, and no one dared worship in front of the Buddhist statues in the pagoda. All monks in this pagoda were excommunicated under an absolute order.

Saing Sien, age 52, of Chan Andet village, Tuol Sophy subdistrict, stated that monks were discharged at gunpoint. He added that the Khmer Rouge used immoral language in the presence of the monks. Some Buddhist statues were buried in the ground. The pagoda was closed and silent; only a few soldiers dressed in black could be seen walking on the terrace. In total, there are about 50 bodies at Trapeang Chhouk and 35 at Trapeang Kdam.

Chak Subdistrict

5. Kantuot Mound Execution Site (Geographic code number: 031108, latitude: 11°47'00:22" north, longitude: 105°35'42:29" east)

Chruol pagoda lies 5 km north on national road 73 (rural development road) from Damrel pagoda. The killing field of Tuol (Mount) Kantuot lies about 1 km west of Chruol pagoda on the edge of Chruol village. It holds two mass graves that are 30 meters apart. In Ien said that he saw a woman killed and thrown on top of many other dead bodies there. "This atrocity," he exclaimed, "inflicted on the victims was barbaric." He

related the story of a woman whom the Khmer Rouge stabbed to death with a tree branch. After they had gone, In Ien saw the branch protruding from the woman's genitals and she was lying in a pool of blood.

Chhai Hai, age 65, of Pring village, said that the woman was his aunt. At the beginning he saw a basket of betel nuts on the grass close to an unidentifiable body. Then he quickly realized that the basket was his aunt's, since he had seen her use it every day. He continued that the wives, children, and other relatives of cadres who had betrayed the Angkar were killed here, but the cadres themselves would be killed at other places. All of these acts were committed in late 1978.

Chhai Hai added that he saw decomposing corpses piled up on top of each other, and noted that the smell was so unbearable that he could not get close. He had been able to inspect the site because the Khmer Rouge were away for a meeting at O Reang Ov, and he was ordered to plow in a nearby field. He was outraged at the death of his aunt, but he could do nothing. Altogether, around 43 people were killed at Tuol Kantuot.

6. Chamkar Tasan Execution Site (Geographic code number: 031109, latitude: 11°46'50:11" north, longitude: 105°35'40:45" east)

This isolated site is 1 km from Tuol Kantuot. Sou Chun, age 68, indicated that Chamkar Tasan contained a 10 meter-long hole, stretching from east to west. It served as a ready-dug grave for the Khmer Rouge, whose S-204 army had excavated it in order to hide themselves from bombers. He continued that a woman messenger named Sa was executed here for her betrayal of Angkar. Many others who were accused of serving the CIA were also killed at the site. Before being brought here, all victims were detained in a rice mill not far from the site. Another man murdered at this site was Siet, who had completed many missions for the Khmer Rouge, but in the end came to Chamkar Tasan. The site contains six mass graves with some eighteen bodies.

(Continued in the December 2001 issue)





A mass grave

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MASTER GENOCIDE SITE DATA

MAPPING THE KILLING FIELDS OF CAMBODIA 1995-2000

No.	Site No.	Site Name	Data of Pits and Victims by SITE FORM		Data of Pits and Victims by FIELD REPORT		YEAR Report
			Estimated Pits	Estimated Victims	Estimated Pits	Estimated Victims	Report Set/Year
(Continued from the October 2001 issue)							
156	050101	Prey Thnung	8	300	more than 8	300	1997
157	050102	Tuol Ta Loap	100	3,000	more than 100	about 3,000	1997
158	050103	Phoum Khnoep	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
159	050104	Phoum Khnoep	120	400-500	100-150	400-500	1997
160	050105	Wat Baset Chass	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
161	050201	Ampe Phnom	150	4,000	N/A	4,000	1997
162	050202	Wat Ampe Phnom	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
163	050203	Banteay Rong Ko	9	5,400	more than 80	2,400-3,000	1997
164	050204	Ampe Phnom	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
165	050301	Sala Udong Meanchey	80-100	3500-4,000	80-150	3,500-5,000	1997
166	050302	Wat Udong Meanchey	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
167	060101	Wat Baray Choan Dek	200	15,000	150-200	15,000-20,000	1997
168	060102	Wat Baray Choan Dek	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
169	060103	Wat Baray Choan Dek	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
170	060104	Wat Tuol	4	600	4	600	1997
171	060105	Wat Tuol	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
172	060106	Wat Tuol	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
173	060201	Wat Sra Nge	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
174	060202	Prey Khleang Moeung	50	1,500	50	1,500	1997
175	060203	Prey Dang Veng	400	3,500	400-500	3,500	1997
176	060301	Wat Kdei Daung	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997



177	060302	Kdei Daung	4	608	more than 3	608	1997
178	060701	Ak Chhak	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
179	060702	Prey Uk Nha	100	400-500	100	400-500	1997
180	060703	Chhouk Kuoy	15	900-1,000	10-15	900-1,000	1997
181	060704	Chhouk Kuoy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
182	060705	Wat Taing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
		Krasaing					
183	060706	Prey Mum Thlork	10	150	10-15	about 150	1997
184	070102	Munty Ta Man	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
185	070103	Munty Ta Man	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
186	070104	Prey Ta Koy	136	32,047	136	about 32,047	1997
187	070105	Prey Cheung Wat	25	400	25	about 400	1997
188	070106	Wat Sre Chea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
189	070107	Munty Ta Man	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
190	070601	Phnom Kampong Trach		1	200-300	N/A	300 1997
191	070602	Prey Koh Lok	30	2,100	20-30	about 2,100	1997
192	070603	Phoum Chen	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
		Mean					
193	080601	Wat Svay Andet	N/A	N/A	N/A	15,000-30,000	1997
194	080602	Wat Svay Andet	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
195	080603	Kbal Koh	1	60-70	N/A	N/A	1997
196	080604	Phoum Phlaur	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	1997
		Trei					
197	080605	Wat Sampong	1	60-70	N/A	50	1997
198	090401	Chota-nhean	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
199	140301	Trapeang Tnaot	73	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
200	140302	Tuol Mrenh	N/A	N/A	about 72	about 4,000	1997
201	140401	Sala Svay	93	1,716	92-93	1,716	1997
		Rormiet					
202	140402	Prey Tuol Chakk	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
		Chrass					
203	140403	Prey Tuol Chakk	30	500	20-30	100-200	1997
		Chrass					
204	140404	Sala Svay	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1997
		Rormiet					

(Continued in the December 2001 issue)

A FORMER SECOND SECRETARY OF THE KAMPUCHEAN EMBASSY IN CUBA

Sophearith Chuong

Between 1971 and 1976, Hai Kimseang was second secretary of the National United Front of Kampuchea's embassy in Cuba. His case proves that even those in high positions were not immune to the wrath of Angkar. Like many others who had left Cambodia to study or work in the Soviet Union during the 1960s, Hai Kimseang was accused of being a KGB (the secret service agency of the Soviet Union) agent, and subsequently arrested, tortured and killed.

Brief Biography

Several facts can be pieced together about Hai Kimseang from his confessions. He was born in Tonle Bet village, Tonle Bet subdistrict, Tbong Khmum district, Kampong Cham province. In 1963, he began his studies in the Soviet Union. From 1964 to 1970, he was a student at the College of Energy Engineering in Moscow. On April 18, 1970, he traveled to China. On July 10 of that year, he married Sambath Kiriwatt. From February 1971 to May 1976, Hai Kimseang worked at the Kampuchean Embassy in Cuba, and returned to Phnom Penh on June 25, 1976. On December 8, 1976, Kimseang was arrested and dispatched to S-21 (Tuol Sleng Prison).

Moscow, 1973

In September 1963, Hai Kimseang won a scholarship in pedagogy from the Soviet Union along with five other Kampuchean students: Tann Chai Heng, Krin Lean, Ty Yav, Chann Ben, and Tech Chhai Iem Chour. In October, all six began studying Russian in the Faculty of Foreign Student Preparation of the University of Moscow. These students possessed different political ideologies and personal beliefs. Tann Chai Heng, Krin Lean, and Hai Kimseang were aligned in one group and Ty Yav, Chann Ben, and

Tech Chhai Iem Chuor in another.

In late 1963, Hai Kimseang became a member of The Union of Khmer Students, the only Cambodian student union in the USSR at that time. A couple of days later, Tann Chhai Heng introduced him to Hakk Seang Layny, Ieng Seiha, and Pen Thaong An. These people persuaded him to participate in The Group of Progressive Students of the Union of Khmer Students. This 15-member, generally pro-Soviet group was led by Pen Thaong An, who was also the president of the Union of Khmer Students. The union's vice president was Hakk Seang Layny. Pen Thaong An's strength lay in leadership, while Hakk Layny was good at theory.

Moscow, 1964-1970

In 1964, Hai Kimseang began studying in the Faculty of Energy Engineering in Moscow. While there, he and other members of the Union were introduced to Marxist-Leninist theories through a course held once every two to four weeks. The presenters in each session were Hakk Seanlayny and Pen Taongan. To avoid conflicts within The Group of Progressive Students, they did not argue over political conflicts between China and the Soviet Union.

Studying these theories enabled Hai Kimseang to realize that "the Soviet Union is a vital ally of the people who are fighting against old and new imperialism and colonialism." He wanted Kampuchea to become a prosperous socialist country, but he had no specific plans for how to achieve this.

Hai Kimseang was selected as a commissioner of social affairs, culture and sports within the Union of Khmer Students. There, he was responsible for organizing musical performances and events related to important public ceremonies, such as the ceremony

on National Independence Day, November 9.

In 1965, a man named Siegfried Vasilovich appointed Hai Kimseang as a brother in a group of 13 foreign students, in order to observe the level of reverence these students held toward the Soviet Union. He had to report once a week or a month to this group, as did many other appointed brothers.

Hai Kimseang's study of Marxist-Leninist theories continued until 1969. At first, the course was conducted frequently, but the intervals between classes gradually lengthened until the course was almost dissolved. In addition, each student was busy with his or her own studies and the participants gradually decreased in number. Even though it had few members and no specific statutes, the group had a strict disciplinary code and was organized like a political party. Secrets were preserved, and they held frequent discussions in order to find a political guideline and program. The results, however, were disappointing. Hai Kimseang only understood that everyone agreed about constructing an industrial socialist country.

Before Lon Nol took power in Cambodia through a March 18, 1970 coup, Hai Kimseang resigned from his position in the Union of Khmer Students. He then joined the Association of Students and Kampuchean Foreign Residents in the Soviet Union, and the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party (Popular Socialist Community Party) so that he could return home.

The Post-coup Period

After the coup, Hai Kimseang and thirty other Khmer students made a motion supporting King Norodom Sihanouk's statement of March 23, 1970. At the end of March, the Khmer ambassador to the Soviet Union, Chea San, asked Heng Pich and Hai Kimseang to go to Beijing. Their air tickets were paid by the University of Moscow. Before departing, Hai Kimseang received advice from Siegfried Vasilovich: "Hakk Sieng Layny will be with you; work cooperatively."

Beijing, China, 1970

On April 18, 1970, Hai Kimseang and two other Khmer residents, Chuon Mom and Seng Chongkal, arrived in Beijing. Once there, Hai Kimseang's views changed. His impression upon arriving in the capital city caused a disagreement over technological developments and the spirit of politics. It was then that he came to value the spirit of politics more than technical advances.

He visited the Soviet Embassy in Beijing occasionally with Hakk Sieng Layny in order to meet the cultural attaché and brought a letter from the Soviet Embassy to the Kampuchean Embassy in Beijing. Seizing this opportunity, Hakk Sieng Layny met with the attaché alone, making Hai Kimseang wait outside. Hakk Sieng Layny often met with this Soviet attaché, but he never shared the information with Hai Kimseang, for he did not trust him. Besides, Hakk Sieng Layny was not happy with Hai Kimseang, who had refused to work in such key positions as direct secretary of Samed Pen Nut.

Hai Kimseang's political activities in Beijing declined after his 1970 marriage. At about the same time, he became an accountant in the Ministry of Economics and Finance under the supervision of Chuon Mom. At the end of 1970, Sean An, the Kampuchean Ambassador in Hanoi, told him, "The Soviet Union is trying to work with former Khmer students and asked people about the National United Front of Kampuchea. You have to be careful."

Havana, Cuba, 1971-1976

Hai Kimseang wanted to work in Cuba for three reasons: 1) the situation among Khmer people in Beijing was chaotic, and there were allegations that his wife was causing internal conflicts between Khmer people in Beijing; 2) his wife would not be able to receive an education in Beijing; and 3) other than foreign affairs, many Khmer people in other ministries had few tasks to do. For these reasons, he decided to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry accepted and sent him to work in the

Kampuchean Embassy in Cuba.

In Havana, he worked as the second secretary from February 1971 to May 1976. During the war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the National United Front of Kampuchea played two important roles. They utilized every strategy to convince 1) the Cuban government to give diplomatic support to the struggle of the Kampuchean people against the invasion of the U.S. imperialists; and 2) South American countries to provide support to the struggle.

Hai Kimseang tried his best to accomplish these two tasks. He put a lot of effort into working with journalists, organizations, the public, and especially with the Committee of Cooperation between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, the Communist Party, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until Liberation Day (April 17, 1975).

During 1971, the Soviet Union had less influence on Cuba, and the Kampuchean Embassy worked more closely with the Cuban government. But Hai Kimseang was not as active, since he lacked experience in diplomacy and spoke very little Spanish.

In 1972, all sectors of Cuba were influenced deeply by Vietnam. Therefore, Cuba's support for Kampuchea decreased gradually. Starting in 1972, Hai Kimseang strengthened his activities with the media in order to publicize the victory of the Kampuchean people in their war to liberate their nation and people. He knew the director of the *Rebellious Youths* newspaper and other directors working on Asian issues very well.

In addition, he had some relationship with the Communist Party and the Committee for Cooperation between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. In general, the Kampuchean Embassy did not have good relations with the Communist Party of Cuba, who favored the Soviet Union. In the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hai Kimseang forged good relations with those working on Asian issues. Although his activities were not strenuous, he managed to maintain

good friendships with those who he had worked with, particularly journalists.

While in Cuba, Hai Kimseang communicated with Lasarev Sesinko, a consultant to the Soviet Embassy; Yury, the third secretary; and Timosenko, the first secretary. His discussions with the Soviet Embassy were conducted openly at the embassy.

The relationship between Hai Kimseang and Raul Valdesvivo, a former Cuban ambassador in Kampuchea in the period before the coup, was not a close one. However, after he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba in December 1975, this ambassador quickly changed his attitude and began to work with Hai Kimseang.

In 1976, Raul Valdesvivo informed Hai Kimseang that, "The party decided to change the name the Committee for Cooperation between Cuba and Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos to the Cuba-Vietnam, Cuba-Kampuchea, and Cuba-Laos Friendship Association." Hai Kimseang then reported on this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only later did he realize that he was cheated.

In April 1976, before leaving Cuba, Hai Kimseang met with Raul Valdesvivo to talk about the \$1500 he had borrowed. Valdesvivo said that if Hai Kimseang did not pay him back, Valdesvivo would ruin his reputation and stop him from leaving Cuba. Valdesvivo gave him an alternative: if Hai Kimseang agreed to carry out his task, he would not need to pay back the money. Eventually, Hai Kimseang complied.

On May 10, 1976, Hai Kimseang met with Valdesvivo and explained, "The current situation in Kampuchea is like a sealed can. Even though you try to look at it from different angles, you can't see what is inside. Every step the foreign embassies in Phnom Penh take is watched; they can't do anything." Valdesvivo continued, "I have considered this for a long time. This is a good chance for me. Your task is not going to be hard, except that you have to be careful, since the situation in the country has changed, and you've been away from Kampuchea for almost

thirteen years. Moreover, you have diplomatic experience and used to work with various ministries. For these reasons, we have decided to choose you as our agent. Your job will be to work with embassies in Phnom Penh, particularly the Cuban one, and other institutions. I don't know how good you are, but I have no choice. Your first job is to obtain information relating to the summit in Colombo half a month before it is conducted."

Kampuchea, 1976-1977

Raul Valdesvivo had given Hai Kimseang six tasks to complete when he returned to Kampuchea. These were: 1) Thoroughly observe what happens. 2) If you work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you should contact Hakk Seang Layny, but you must be careful with him. For he has returned to Kampuchea after a long time and may have changed his attitude. Otherwise, you can work with him. 3) If you don't meet Hakk Seang Layny or there are some changes inside the Cuban embassy, please wait for new orders, and at the same time make contact with other Kampuchean people. 4) If you are not permitted to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adapt to the real situation. 5) Spend some time to accomplish urgent tasks. 6) Work carefully, and recruit more

members. (Hai Kimseang's confession stated that he had joined the KGB in 1965.)

Hai Kimseang's first task was to find out what percentage of the people in villages or ministries needed foreign aid during this time of hardship, especially Soviet aid, and to determine when the Khmer Rouge would reintroduce the use of currency. He was scheduled to complete this task in one to one-and-a-half months, by choosing ten or fifteen villages or ministries. After sending the results to the Third Secretary, he was to wait for feedback.

In addition to the six tasks were some urgent assignments, such as reporting clearly about the work with villages and ministries, the plan to achieve "three tons per hectare" by December; food allowances, when the administrative system changed, the number of Chinese technicians in the country, top leaders and their brief biographies, information relating to the life of Hou Yuon, the reason for his arrest and his workplace, the real First Prime Minister, the number of factories in each sector, the lifestyle meetings within the factories or cooperatives, and water shortage resolution. The information he obtained was to be sent to the Third Secretary.

In order to maintain secrecy, detailed plans were to be sent to him in 1977 through the Third Secretary. He was told to maintain a spirit of alertness in order to devise a detailed plan. These plans aimed to put Kampuchea under the influence of the Soviet Union in politics, economics, and the military, within five to ten years. And this was to be done in peaceful ways, such as politics and economics. In practice, there were three major points.

(Continued in the December 2001 issue)



CHRONOLOGY FROM THE VIETNAMESE COURIER

(Hanoi, 1978)

(Continued from the October 2001 issue)

1977

December 31: The Government of Democratic Kampuchea published a declaration slandering the RSV and accusing her of having long had aggressive designs against Kampuchea and wanting to compel Kampuchea to join a so-called Indochinese Federation controlled by Vietnam.

On the same day, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea declared a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations with the SRV and a suspension of the Phnom Penh- Hanoi air route.

Statement by the SRV Government refuting the false accusations of the Kampuchean Government, denouncing the encroachments made by Kampuchean armed forces on Vietnamese territory and proposing that the two sides meet as early as possible at whatever level, so as together to solve the border issue between the two countries. The statement emphasized that the SRV Government's stand on this issue was to settle the problem with Democratic Kampuchea on the basis of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty parallel with the consolidation and strengthening of solidarity and relations of brotherly cooperation between the two countries, so as to establish a border of lasting friendship between Vietnam and Kampuchea in a fair and logical manner.

1978

January 2: The World Peace Council unreservedly supported the December 31 statement by the SRV Government and called on all governments in the world to use their influence to bring about talks between Vietnam and Kampuchea as soon as possible.

January 3: The Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of India said that he hoped the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea would be settled peacefully without resorting to armed conflict.

January 4: Statement by the Foreign Ministry of Cuba, supporting the SRV Government's and the Party's position on the border issue between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

In an interview granted to VNA (the Vietnam News

Agency), Prime Minister Pham Vandong of the SRV stated: "The more the people of Vietnam cherish their independence and freedom, the more they respect the independence and freedom of Kampuchea. We clearly understand that having shed so much blood to regain independence, the Kampuchean people cherish their independence, will certainly safeguard the solidarity between the two fraternal nations, and will not allow any imperialist or reactionary whatsoever to sow discord and undermine this solidarity."

January 5: The Federation of Latin-American Journalists declared: "We side with the Vietnamese Government and people and welcome the willingness of the SRV to limit the hostilities and to put an end to them through negotiations."

January 14: According to VNA, from January 1, 1978 on, Kampuchean armed forces continually pounded the territory of Vietnam in An Giang, Gien Giang, Long An, Dong Thap, Tay Ninh...provinces. Moreover, they carried out encroachment operations. Especially serious were the attacks mounted on January 11, 1975, at 5 a.m. by two Kampuchean regiments against areas along the Vinh Te canal (An Giang province) and the Binh Di river (Kien Giang province), 4 km inside Vietnamese territory.

January 15: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea issued a statement on territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of Kampuchea. Article 6 stipulated that the Government of Democratic Kampuchea would settle questions with the countries concerned taking into account the actual situation.

January 17: In a speech on the occasion of the founding anniversary of the Kampuchean armed forces, Pol Pot, Secretary of the CC of the CPK, again slandered Vietnam and accused her of "nourishing chauvinistic designs against Kampuchea and contemplating the establishment of an Indochinese Federation in which only one Party, one State and one people will exist."

January 19: Kampuchean long-range heavy artillery went into action for the first time and fired hundreds of shells on Chau Doc township and the outskirts

of Tay Ninh. A large number of civilians were killed and many houses destroyed.

January 27: A press conference was organized in Ho Chi Minh City by the Press Department of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry about the situation on the border between Vietnam and Kampuchea. Vietnamese and foreign journalists were shown documents on crimes perpetrated by the Kampuchean side and what their provocation of hostilities had led to. After the conference, the journalists made an on-the-spot inspection tour of crimes committed by the Kampuchean armed forces in An Giang and Tay Ninh provinces.

January 28: Three French newspapers, *L'Humanité*, *Le Monde* and *Le Quotidien de Paris*, published reports by their special correspondents on evidence of crimes perpetrated by Kampuchean troops at An Cu commune (An Giang province).

February 1: Statement by the International Federation of Democratic Women in support of the SRV Government's correct stand regarding the settlement of the border issue between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

February 5: Statement by the SRV Government and a three-point proposal for the settlement of all problems concerning relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea:

1. An immediate end shall be put to all hostile military activities in the border region; the armed forces of each side shall be stationed within their respective territory five km from the border.

2. The two sides shall meet at once in Hanoi, or Phnom Penh, or at a place on the border, to discuss and conclude a treaty on mutual respect and a border treaty between the two countries.

3. The two sides shall reach an agreement on an appropriate form of international guarantee and supervision.

February 6: Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh of the SRV forwarded the February 5, 1978 statement of the Vietnamese Government to the Secretary General of the UNO and to government members of the Coordinating Committee of Non-Aligned Countries.

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, N.P. Firiubin, in acknowledging receipt of the Feb. 5, 1978 statement by the SRV Government, expressed his support for the reasonable proposals

put forth by the Vietnamese side with a view to settling the problem of relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea through negotiations.

February 8: Prime Minister Ali Nasser Mohamet of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen said that his government and people fully approved of and supported the February 5, 1978 statement of the SRV Government.

February 9 and 11: Kampuchean armed forces used 122 and 130mm cannons to pound the urban centers of Tay Ninh, Moc Hoa (Long An), Chau Doc (An Giang), and Hong Ngu (Dong Thap). In the provincial capital of Tay Ninh alone, 10 people were killed and 50 wounded.

Night of February 13-14: 4 battalions of Kampuchean armed forces attacked Nhan Hoi, Khanh Binh, Khan An, Phu Huu and Vinh Xuong communes in An Giang province, massacring a large number of civilians.

February 16: Kampuchean armed forces encroached upon Vietnamese territory north of Ca Tum (Tay Ninh).

March 3-5: A statement published by the International Conference of Parliamentarians from 14 countries held in Helsinki said: "We deeply regret that the leaders of Kampuchea have refused to enter into negotiations with the Vietnamese side to put an end to hostilities as soon as possible. This refusal is detrimental to the friendship between those two nations and to peace in this part of Asia, and benefits only the divisive maneuvers of the imperialists and reactionaries in the world. We fully subscribe to the stand of the SRV Government as defined in its December 31, 1977 and February 5, 1978 Statements..."

Phnom Penh: January 7, 1979



A FEMALE MUSLIM-KHMER COMRADE

“I’ve never regretted about the efforts I made for the revolution, but I am disappointed with my present life”

Bun Sou Sour

Sun Sokha, aka Mousa Sokha, is 43 years old. During Democratic Kampuchea, she was president of a women’s association. Earlier, she had been a chief of children in the performing arts sector. She was born in Chymoan, Krek subdistrict, Ponhea Krek district, Kampong Cham province. Her mother was Matt Chao and her father Sun Chea (a Khmer who converted to Islam). Her husband Noh Loas, is 45, and was an ammunition carrier during the regime. They had thirteen children and were expecting another at the time of this interview. Three of their children are married, six are living at home, and four died within a month of their birth.

Today, Sokha earns her meager living by growing corn, beans and other crops on two hectares of land. Her husband is a rubber plantation worker in Snuol. Sokha possess a enough medical knowledge to provide basic medical assistance to her neighborhood. This minor expertise is one of the two legacies she inherited from the Khmer Rouge regime. The other is her political, ideological and organizational concepts.

Education

Sokha was born in 1959. Her parents sent her away to live in the care of her grandmother in Po En village, Kaong Kang subdistrict, Ponhea Krek district. Then, her grandmother enrolled her in a school to study Khmer literature and culture. When she reached the third grade, her education was interrupted by a strike in 1965. Her first ambition was to become a doctor, since she thought that this knowledge would be indispensable for her and her family. Next, she wished to become a tailor. Neither wish was realized.

Consequently, Sokha began to study Islamic traditions and customs. In 1972, she decided to join the Khmer Rouge revolution. She was a sociable and capable person in her village. She recalled her past, “Upon entering the period of coup d’état of the Revolutionary National United Front, villagers, like elderly Kin, thought that I was a the most educated adolescent in Khmer language. So they appointed me as a chief of the child unit.” Sokha, like all the old and young people in her village, was happy to serve the revolution. When asked why they believed so deeply in the revolution, Sokha replied, “There were some

campaigns, carried out by a Khmer Rouge cadre (Elder Salatt). He persuaded all people to join the revolution through district, subdistrict and village chiefs. For instance, fifty children of my village enlisted in the revolution, and I became their leader. No one forced us; they just launched a simple campaign, and we believed that it was good, so we joined.”

Marriage

In 1974, Sokha was married to Noh Loas. She did not want to marry too young because she still loved working. She told me, “I regretted marrying...I’ve still regret



Sun Sokha, 1973



Sun Sokha, 2000



it today...If I had not married, nothing would have happened. As a wife, I had to think about my family - living conditions and the kids - so I paid very little attention to working.” When she was single, many men had admired her beauty, and plenty of them were broken-hearted when she got married. One of them was Sen, who lived in her village and had been a close friend of Noh Loas. He had climbed up to Sokha’s house in the middle of the wedding day and uttered, “I don’t care about the wedding, since we are not a predestined couple! However, I’ll be waiting for you forever, no matter how many children you have.” Sokha continued, “At that time, I was young and bright; I am not proud about this...there were many people in the village who adored my beauty, even Elder Matly’s nephew. His family also asked my family for my hand in marriage.”

When both of them had grown up, Noh Loas became engaged to another woman. However, Sokha revealed, “The elderly reconsidered our past relationship. My husband was going to marry his fiancée; but most people disapproved of it, so he broke the engagement with her. When his mother inquired about me, he was silent. So his parents proposed the marriage to my family in a traditional way, and he abandoned his fiancée.”

Sokha was 15 and Noh Laos was 17 (he had completed grade 7) when the two were married. Their marriage had been arranged since they were young. The parents of the two worked together in the village. Noh Loas’s father was a squad chief, while Sokha’s was a village chief. Sokha and her husband had always played together when they were children, and the villagers had teased them about their relationship. Sokha’s mother-in-law had usually said to Sokha’s parents, “When they grow up, I’ll marry them.”

At their wedding, Sokha had been accompanied by bridesmaids and wore necklaces and rings, but dressed in black clothes with tire sandals. The party was even entertained by a performance of the local art club. She remembered that a singer named Dam Pheng (who

was chief of the art club in Ttnaot subdistrict) sang a song at the wedding. A revolutionary novel called *The Courage of Kampuchea’s Revolutionary Citizens and Army* was widely quoted at the time and gave a detailed account of Dam Pheng’s life. Born into a poor peasant family, he was an outstanding revolutionary of the time and a published poet. One poem he wrote contained the following lines: “I caress my delicate, red heart and I make it stronger day-by-day, so that it is ready to serve our priceless revolution and help the poverty-stricken proletariat. And now the time has come; Kampuchean people are in desperate need for it to relieve their suffering.” About ten days after singing at the wedding, he was imprisoned.

Only three days after their marriage, Sokha was separated from her husband because Angkar needed more forces to overthrow Phnom Penh. The order letter written to Sokha’s husband was “comrade Loas, you have to go to the battlefield.” Sokha then beseeched the subdistrict chief in vain to let her husband stay. In reply, the chief reminded her about her pledge when she requested permission to marry from the authorities: “Comrade, you have to devote yourself, for when you came here to fill in the forms to get permission to marry, you are promised to us already.”

Just a night after Sokha’s husband had gone, Phnom Penh was captured. So Loas returned to live with Sokha.

Sokha and Noh Loas seemed to be luckier than their fellow villagers, for a month after their wedding a new law was passed banning people from decorating their bodies with imperialists’ jewelry. Sokha recalled, “It was barely a month after my wedding that the new law was put into effect. Even false jewelry was banned. Everything used for bodily decoration was considered as imperialist.”

In addition, forced marriages became the norm during this time. Sokha recalled that if a couple rejected each other, they would be summoned for reeducation. Newly married couples were separated. They could meet their spouses once a month by bribing village

chiefs and the women's unit.

Life During the Revolution

After being a chief of a child unit in the arts sector, Sokha was chosen as a chief of an elderly unit. As a leader, she had to attend a meeting every day. The meetings were held for people to present their faults, and included criticism and self-criticism. Sokha was an adviser. Those who made too many mistakes would face difficulties. Sokha expressed that if they did not change after four or five mistakes, they would be called up to be reeducated. "The word 'reeducation' was very serious," she exclaimed.

As a Khmer Rouge cadre, Sokha understood this word as clearly as others. "Reeducation, I thought, was a measure taken against those who continued to make the same mistakes. After four or five times, he or she would be taken away to unknown destinations - imprisoned or whatever - you could not guess. This word meant a lot. Probably, they were not reeducated. They were killed. The internal regulation stated one could only make five moral mistakes." Sokha meant that those who did not improve would be imprisoned or perhaps executed.

Sokha recounted: "They set a formal regulation. The morality of living consisted of fifteen points. They wrote like that. After work, we met in a meeting to assess the progress of the jobs. Comrades who failed to achieve their tasks had to present their reasons. As a chief, I had to write a summary of the meeting's discussion. Say, for example, this comrade has done this much today and spoke in a polite way, so he or she was given a score. Furthermore, the meeting set new tasks for everyone - harvesting rice or other tasks. We did only that much everyday and nothing else."

Sokha also recalled, "In the morning the Khmer Rouge rang a bell to wake everyone up. People had to be very punctual, unlike today. Their regulations were strictly enforced. After everyone was in line, the old were told to sing a song entitled 'Wake up every slave.'" Sokha stated that she would never forget this national song of Democratic Kampuchea, because she

monitored the women's sector every single day:

"Wake up, servants, impoverished people! We are enraged and unable to express our feelings so that our chests almost burst open. This time we won't be afraid of death. The old regime will soon be overthrown, servants please stand up! Tomorrow we'll be under a new regime, in which we do everything for ourselves. This struggle is the last. Together we'll join with the world."

Talking about the policies of the Khmer Rouge, Sokha seemed to think that everything was good, except for two shortcomings - slaughtering people and forcing Muslim-Khmers to eat pork. In avoiding this anti-religious act, Sokha and her family requested permission from Angkar to cook food at home, by saying that her husband, who was an ammunition carrier, was having some colleagues come to their home. Her pretext worked very well. Later, after the Vietnamese invaded two or three times, the Khmer Rouge began to ban Muslim-Khmers from cooking privately. They had to eat with the army and cooperatives. Sokha disapproved of this order, "Never, never had it been like that. Their reason was always the same - for the revolutionary front. No one dared to talk about religion. They banned worship, ordered us to eat pork and cut our hair. No pagodas. Monks were forcibly excommunicated."

Regarding executions, Sokha asserted that one day when she was transplanting rice at Svay Chreah subdistrict, she saw a Khmer Rouge cadre named Ski, a chief of the youth unit, undress a woman and cut off her two breasts to fry for food. (He is still alive; however, his address is unknown.) Sokha was frightened by the sight and began to worry about her mother, Mat Chao, who had suffered a heart attack and could not undergo heavy work. Due to her absence, the Khmer Rouge arrested her right at her home. Sokha worried that her mother's life was in danger. Luckily, Sokha's husband rode out on his ox cart and took her back home.

A Double Life

After returning home in 1979, Sokha and her




husband lived comfortably, and even owned a house with a tile roof. But their prosperity was short lived. They were cheated by a friend working in the Ministry of Interior. Troubles began to creep into their family. Sokha's husband became despondent due to the complete loss of the wealth they had saved over the years. Sokha was responsible for the debts. Their remaining property was sold to pay those debts. With no money, they built a small hut in Krasaing Sre Veng village, Dambe subdistrict, Kampong Cham province, and ran a small business earning just enough for their daily needs.

In 1985, Sokha decided to act as a “double-faced person.” In her area, former Khmer Rouge and ordinary people lived together. The people living there learned to adapt themselves to the environment; otherwise, they would have troubles. Sokha said that a provincial police superintendent named Ly employed her as his spy. At the same time, she helped to sell the equipment of the Khmer Rouge, such as radios and walkie-talkies, and sometimes helped them exchange riel into dollars. The Khmer Rouge used the money to pay the salaries of their rank and file. Sokha also worked with Nuon Pet (aka Khann Soeun) in Division 920 and Long Yin in Division 1003. Acting as a spy for the State of Kampuchea and as a trader for the Khmer Rouge, Sokha went in and out of the forest and Phnom Penh in order to observe the Khmer Rouge and to buy and sell goods for them. She said that she used to report to the State of Kampuchea so they could raid the Khmer Rouge positions in the forest. Sokha also claimed that she sold dollars for riel at O Reusey Market, at the

house of a former managing director of a rubber plantation. Her life as a spy and trader was full of danger. One day, she brought into her house two Khmer Rouge soldiers. She said that before doing so, she had informed the national police.

These Khmer Rouge wanted to meet their colleagues in Phnom Penh. However, this attempt was aborted. They were all arrested and jailed. Sokha asserted that they arrested even her because they wanted to earn a good reputation. Relevant to the documents relating to Nuon Chea, which she took from the Khmer Rouge, Sokha confirmed that she had already offered them to the provincial authorities.

When Sokha was a chief of an elderly unit, she seemed happy and proud. However, due to her current difficult living conditions, she has stopped thinking about the revolution and spends much more time caring for her family. While she confided that she'll never regret the efforts she made for the revolution, she is disappointed with her present life: “I have never been remorseful about my life in the revolution. But for some reason, I just have a bad feeling. I struggled in the past... and now I am poor. Now, I need a job to better my family's living conditions.”



Sun Sokha and her children

A LIVING PHOTOGRAPH LONG FORGOTTEN

Rasy Pheng Pong

The black and white photograph on this page shows two female Muslim Khmer Rouge comrades holding each other's hands against the painted backdrop of a mountain. On the left is comrade Mousa Sokha (see the story on page 19 of this issue). On the right is comrade Mat Rorkeyas, aka Rorkei, the daughter of H.E. Matly and granddaughter of Sos Marn Rorkei.

Today, Sokha is living in Thporng Leu Krom (Sauba Village), Snuol Subdistrict, Snuol District, Kratie Province. She and her husband, who live in severely reduced circumstances, have thirteen children.

Sokha related that this picture was taken in 1973 by a man named Kvai. The photograph was arranged by Sos Marn, who was then a representative cadre of the Cham people living in the Eastern Zone. Sokha mentioned that she had abandoned her prosperous family to join the revolution through her grandmother Mass. At the time, she was just sixteen years old.

From 1970 to 1973, the Khmer Rouge, which was called Liberation Khmer at that time, began launching campaigns in remote areas of Cambodia, seeking support from all classes of people, both Khmer and other races, without discrimination. It created and implemented various educational programs to teach people the correct political way to make revolution. Many such teaching sessions were held at Sokha's birthplace, Ponhea Krek district, Kampong Cham province, to teach people a new political ideology. This ideology, the Khmer Rouge felt, would attract them to participate in the revolution against reactionary capitalist, feudalism regimes, particularly the U.S imperialists, and help them build a brand-new society, free of oppression of the poor. Sokha studied these sessions well from beginning to end.

Rorkei was just the same. Even though she had less education than Sokha, she was more proficient in political theory. While studying under their teacher, Set Tollah, the two always sat close to each other. High-ranking cadres were interested in their in-class activities.

Sokha said that she and Rorkei met when they were studying in the same class. Since they first met and with the encouragement of such village elders as Sos Marn and Sokha's parents, Sun and Matt Chao, the two became intimate friends. "We even slept in a



Mousa Sokha and Math Rorkeiyah

single bed,” asserted Sokha.

With education and strong determination, the two were selected to be photographed as a model for other Muslim Khmer, and as a sign of their commitment to successfully complete the course. The two considered this opportunity to be both a joy and an honor. Everything they did and the photograph of the two of them together showed other people that they were model youths and prominent nationalists. However Sokha confessed, “I joined the revolution for no reason; I thought it was fun.”

That these two young women would serve as models of the revolution reflected the political situation of the time (1973). Dressed in the uniform of a Khmer Rouge cadre with caps, tire-sandals and cotton scarves folded around their necks, they were real comrades from the worker and farmer class.

Sokha explained that she loved this uniform very much, since it was given to her by Angkar. Her sandals were expensive and bought with about 30 dollars worth of gold. Also she wore gem earrings, a Citizen-brand watch, and a valuable gold necklace. Rorkei also wore some valuable jewelry.

Sokha stated that this jewelry was not removed because there was not yet any prohibition against wearing jewelry. However, there were strict rules about the clothes one could wear. She explained that if someone wore colorful dresses, they would be quickly reprimanded and reeducated, because the person was then regarded as an imperialist or a capitalist or someone who had not been completely ready for the revolution. She continued, “At that time everyone developed an obsession for black dresses; if they had clothes with other colors, they dipped them into the mud in order to give them a black appearance.”

This photograph also expressed cooperation and interpersonal respect, especially between Muslims and Khmers. In the picture, both young women raised a hand up in the soldier’s posture of salutation. Sokha explained that this posture expressed respect between the government and the people and between her and Rorkei. She continued that Sous Marn, Rorkei’s grandfather, arranged this the photograph. He had clear goal of educating his granddaughter and Sokha to

become model cadres who were ready to carry out the party’s tasks.

She stared hard at her picture and said, “I loved this picture very much, since it was the first photograph of my life.” The image reflects very precisely the lively activities of two female revolutionaries, cooperating, heading toward a bright future. This picture also made Sokha think back to the past and reflect that she should not have joined the revolution without understanding anything.

Sokha related that she joined the revolution in 1972, and worked as a singer. She sang most revolutionary songs, including *Brave Youth*, *Our Homestead*, and *Our Parents*. Later, she became a supervisor in the art sector. She married Noh Loas in the middle of her revolutionary life in 1974. After the regional 22nd assembly, she changed her job and became a regional campaigner, assisting other Muslim-Khmers to get a grip on the policy of the socialist revolution.

Rorkei conducted the same education campaigns in various regions in Eastern Zone. The two separated in 1974. Rorkei did not attend Sokha’s wedding because she was busy with her campaign in Region 2, Eastern Zone.

Between 1975 and 1979, Sokha was evacuated to Kratie, where she met Rorkei. She said that before departing she gave the clothes she wore in the picture to Rorkei as a souvenir, while Rorkei gave her the photograph. Rorkei was executed in 1978 following the revolts of Sao Phim’s men, who were then accused of being traitors. Many Eastern Zone cadres were killed during this period.

Sokha never received any news of Rorkei until after 1979. She noted that she never knew about Rorkei’s death at all until 1984, when she was pregnant. She said that her second child looks exactly like Rorkei and she believes that her child was Rorkei’s incarnation. During her pregnancy, she always saw Rorkei in her dreams, giving her rings and watches. To this day, she still thinks about what she did with Rorkei. A day before I met her, Sokha had taken the picture out to see. She stated that “I and Rorkei do not deserve separation at all.”

(Continued from the October 2001 issue)

Once the “guilty people” had been brought to S-21, none of their previous actions, real or concocted, significant or not, was considered accidental. How could they be, if the Party’s leaders were following the laws of history? The prisoners’ counterrevolutionary frame of mind, evidenced by their arrest, had from the interrogators’ standpoint influenced everything they did, including what might appear to others as loyal service to the Party. “Offenses” that were hardly punishable under a code of law were ratcheted up to the level of “treason” by adducing treasonous motives to everything the prisoners had done.

Terrified into creativity but constrained by their unpracticed imaginations, prisoners struggled to “remember” the kinds of crimes that the relentless and similarly terrified interrogators wanted them to confess. Some of the prisoners came up with revelations so bizarre as to cast doubt on the whole archiving exercise at S-21. Noeun Moeun, a soldier in Regiment 171, for example, confessed:

“In 1. 1977 I shot three bullets at the Vietnamese Embassy. After I had done so I reported to [my patron] Sovanna.

“In 2.77 Sovanna ordered me to shoot at the Chinese Embassy. I fired three bullets at the Chinese Embassy and then I fired two more bullets at the hostel for Chinese workers so as to disable the policies of Cambodia and China. Afterwards I reported to Sovanna about the problems I had in gathering forces.... After I had informed Sovanna in 3.1977, Chut and I went to fire three bullets at the Albanian Embassy, three bullets at the Korean Embassy, and one bullet to the west of the Independence Monument. When that was done I went to inform Sovanna about the difficulty I was having in

firing these shots. When I told him, Sovanna said, “Comrade, you should take on some secret characteristics.

You mustn’t let them know that you are involved in the shootings. We should plan some strong activities in the future and use the forces that you have gathered. We need to shoot at embassies, at the Organization’s place, at factories and at various ministries in Phnom Penh.” After receiving this guidance I returned home, and on 27.3.77 I was arrested.

None of the macabre “offenses” described in

this and many other confessions would have been punishable by death in prerevolutionary times. Some would not have even have attracted the attention of the offender’s family or neighbors. Yet it was crucial for the staff of S-21 to extract confessions that admitted something. Oeur Iep, for example, confessed to having a “narrow attitude,” forgetting to water plants, and failing to respect communal living. Mol Moeun confessed to the offense of “eating too much, like cadres,” and Peou Chhim admitted that he was “lazy and incorrect and talked about women.”



VOICES FROM S-21

CHAPTER FOUR: FRAMING THE QUESTIONS

David Chandler

Most post-1976 confessions include a section labeled “plans” (*phaenka*), which enumerated counterrevolutionary activities that the prisoners had hoped to carry out but that had been foiled by their incarceration. For many prisoners, “plans” proved impossible to remember or imagine. As a result, interrogators frequently complained in their notes to confessions that the prisoners’ “plans” were “confused,” “lacking,” or “unclear.” Some of them were “revealed” only after extensive torture. The exigencies of the interrogation format were such, however, that no prisoner interrogated at length could be documented without a “plan.” It was important for the Party’s history and for

the well-being of those in the Party center that the “plans” be simultaneously numerous and ineffective. Many of the “plans,” as recounted in the confessions, are absurd, and in many cases they probably reflect what the interrogators believed would fit the bill. Thus, soldiers from the countryside confessed to plotting to assassinate “the Organization” or “Brother Number One,” whom they had never seen, or sought to “overthrow the revolution” with a handful of unarmed associates. A former guard at S-21, Tum Thun, claimed to have plotted with some associates to loosen prisoners’ shackles and handcuffs, to leave prison doors open, to fall asleep at the gate of the prison so that prisoners could escape, and also to beat prisoners to death. Interestingly, he did not confess to committing any of these offenses, which constitute a kind of wish list. Another S-21 guard, An Hot, confessed that he “planned to fall asleep on duty.” A film projectionist, Khim Yu, planned to “cause contradictions among foreign guests” by bungling film presentations. Chuon of Division 450 confessed that he planned to “alter the consciousness” of thirty colleagues, without specifying how this would be accomplished, and another prisoner planned to urge his friends to flee to Thailand or Vietnam. By and large, the “plans” sections of the confessions seem in many cases to have been slapped together by workers at S-21. They are the least revealing and probably the most consistently concocted portions in the texts:

The autobiographical pamphlets close with the names and addresses of family members who might be called on to vouch for the person writing the life story. In the confessions, these names are usually replaced at the end of the text by “strings of traitors” and “secret networks” (*khsae somngat*). The lists seem to have been relatively easy for the interrogators to obtain, and the data they contained were also usually easy to confirm from other sources. In many cases, prisoners provided the names of people already captured or purged by the Organization, and these names were then annotated with the word “caught” (*chap*), while others were marked with an X, perhaps to indicate that they had been put to death. Names listed in the “strings” were

used as the bases for additional arrests. They were also consolidated into typewritten summaries, bringing together the names of people affiliated with certain military units, sectors, offices, factories, or work sites.

Why go to such trouble to compile and concoct these mountains of material? One plausible rationale, as I suggest in chapter 3, was that the Party’s leaders wanted the confessions on file as raw material for an ongoing, triumphant history of the Party. Another is that the confessions and mug shots objectified the leaders’ paranoid fantasies and were used to convince them that their innumerable enemies were being found, questioned, and put to death. However, other possible explanations have their roots in Cambodia’s historiography and traditions.

In prerevolutionary Cambodia, centralized power and control over historical documents were intimately linked. Historical chronicles were prepared at court to celebrate and legitimize the genealogy of a ruler and his accession to power. Held in the palace, these heroic documents became parts of a dynasty’s regalia.

Throughout Cambodian history writing itself was highly valued, in part because literacy was a skill closely guarded by priests and their students and in part because so many written texts had intrinsic (and therefore secret) religious content or power. In a broader Buddhist context, history was perceived as proceeding in an inexorable decline over the five thousand years following the Buddha’s death and enlightenment in 543 B.C. Inside this *longue durée*, history was dynastic, anecdotal, and cyclical, focusing on the actions of those in power and incorporating anecdotes (often imparted, with the proper names altered, from other chronicles) that gave pleasing accounts of battles, ceremonies, and intrigues.

Under Pol Pot, historical texts were also composed, controlled, and held by the “ruling apparatus” (*kbal masin*), and historical narratives still described the defeat of enemies. At the same time, the writing of history began to be conceived in a different way. While both genres related events that reflected favorably on a given ruler, Marxist-leninist history was teleological, dialectical, and collective, a modern genre

that supposedly followed scientific laws. By mastering these laws, it was thought, a Marxist-leninist party like the CPK could seize power and maintain itself thereafter. Thus when a Party spokesman declared in 1976 that “two thousand years of history” had ended, he probably meant not only that past practices were dead but also that progressively oriented, Party-centered history could now replace the chronicles and everything they stood for. Cambodia’s history-writing, as well as its social relations, had been overturned.

In an undated document titled “Characteristics of the CPK,” a Party spokesman made these points after outlining the Party’s history:

“The exploiting group wrote history so as to exploit the people even more. When we write the history of our country we write about the struggle of our Party and our people for independence and not to be the slaves of others any more. For example, when we write the history of Angkor we write that the people made it, and that is the truth: the people made it, not the kings.”

Several Party histories from the 1970s reflect this altered focus and new approach. With what Timothy Carney has called its “unexpected victory” in April 1975, the CPK achieved the closure that had been lacking in these earlier texts and grasped the “wheel of history” (*kong pravatt’sas*). With victory, Cambodia’s “two-thousand-year” history became coterminous with the Party’s rise to power. Put another way, the Communists’ victory in 1975 illuminated the Party’s past. Alternative readings of the past, along with the Party’s flesh-and-blood opponents, were unthinkable and had to be “swept clean.”

The involvement of S-21 in the historiography of the Party became important after April 1976, when, as we have seen, a military disturbance in Phnom Penh was interpreted by the CPK’s leaders as a revolt that threatened the hegemony of the Party and undermined its hitherto triumphal history. Thanks to the voluminous “evidence” about the conspiracy reaching the Party Center from S-21, the Party’s history from then on was conceived largely in terms of an open-ended struggle against internal enemies. S-21 became the regime’s cutting edge. As I suggested earlier, the confessions

extracted at S-21 also served a psychological purpose by objectifying the paranoid fantasies of the Party’s leaders. In this regard, the resemblances between the interrogators’ methods and objectives and Freud’s notions of therapeutic “archaeology,” while fortuitous, are striking. Interrogators at S-21, like psychoanalysts, excavated the memories of each “guilty person” who was assumed to be hiding a history (which is to say, a memory) of counterrevolutionary activities, plans, and associates. Like many psychoanalysts, the interrogators pretended to know what they were looking for and had some idea of the “memories” that they wanted the prisoners to “recover.” They also knew the format that a completed confession had to take, whereas the prisoners, like many psychiatric patients, did not.

In several other respects, of course, comparisons between what happened at S-21 and what sometimes takes place in psychoanalysis are invalid. Analysts, to begin with, seldom resort to violence, whereas S-21 was steeped in it. Analysis patients are usually free to get up and leave, thereby abandoning the procedure or seeking a more sympathetic interlocutor; all the prisoners at S-21 were killed, and their confessions were in effect their wills, last letters from the death house. Another aspect of the interrogations at S-21 that sets them apart from their psychoanalytic counterparts is that the fantasies being excavated, objectified, and spoken about in Pol Pot’s secret prison were not those of the prisoners but those projected onto them by the interrogators on behalf of their patrons (and, in a sense, their patients) in the Party Center. Perhaps the major difference between analysis and interrogation, of



course, is that analysis is aimed, in theory, at the betterment of the patient, whereas interrogations aim to extract evidence from a prisoner for use in a legal proceeding. Insofar as interrogations at S-21 had a heuristic purpose, in line with the Maoist theory of reeducation, the two forms of questioning tended to overlap. With these reservations, however, there are still uncanny resemblances between the two kinds of conversation and between the lopsided power relationships that they display. In a disturbing passage, Freud himself once suggested:

“We must not believe what they say, we must always assume, and tell them, too, that they have kept something back....We must insist on this, we must repeat the pressure and represent ourselves as infallible, until at last we are really told something.”

The S-21 interrogator’s manual, even more chillingly than Freud, when we recall the prisoners’ fates, makes a similar point:

“They must write confessions in their own voice, clearly, using their own sentences, their own ideas. We should avoid telling them what to write. When they have finished telling their story or writing it down, only then can we raise their weak points, press them to explain why they did things, why they are lying, concealing, abbreviating things.”

A third reason why the S-21 archives were maintained has been suggested, in another context, by Peter Holquist, writing about the amassing of “all encompassing information” about “political moods” in the USSR and the relationship between information-gathering and surveillance by police services on the one hand and what Holquist calls the Bolshevik notion of “sculpting” twentieth-century society on the other. Seen in this way, the information collected at S-21 could be used by the Party Center to gauge the “political moods” of the people, so as to forestall opposition and reconstruct those who were not yet imprisoned along proper revolutionary lines. Collecting everyone’s biography, so as to “know” everyone in the country, fits into such a scheme. Indeed, DK seems to have been seduced by the notion that gathering masses of information per se increased its capacity to influence events. Unfortunately

for the regime but fortunately for many survivors, information at the regime’s disposal was often incomplete or falsified, and hundreds of thousands of “enemies” were never found.

If for argument’s sake we assume the S-21 confessions to be “true,” an ungenerous reading is that the Party’s leaders, in the dark for so long about so many conspiracies and betrayals, displayed colossal naïveté, misplaced trust, and a consistent misreading of people’s priorities and motives. Indeed, this is the line that Pol Pot took, somewhat plaintively, after 1979 in talking about his time in power. What went wrong, Pol Pot told some followers in 1981, was that he had “trusted people too much.” In 1995, he said that the deaths that occurred under DK could be traced to the fact that “we were like babies, learning to walk.” Pol Pot’s evasion of responsibility is easy to understand, and so is his self-pity, but the comparison between DK and a gigantic baby stumbling across the Cambodian landscape, inflicting colossal damage, defies analysis.

When they were extracted, of course, the confessions were not intended as demonstrations of the Party Center’s naïveté but as evidence of the CPK’s knowledge of everything that went on, however tardily obtained, and its leaders’ consummate ability to grasp the wheel of history and thereby create and control the Party’s triumphant narrative. Just as multiple “national” and personal stories flowed together into the governing narrative of the CPK’s triumph over what it called “the United States” in April 1975, the records of “treasonous activities,” “plans,” and the “strings of traitors” being unmasked were also absorbed into that history, and the “enemies” neutralized, before their treasonous acts or any of their “plans” could take effect. Seen in this way, the confessions are mantras protecting the Party Center not only from its enemies but also from any genuine effort to understand what was going on. Duch, Pon, Chan, and their associates were simultaneously priests, therapists, miners, vivisectionists, and historians. In concocting history out of their leaders’ fantasies, which were probably also their own, they served their masters well.

(Continued in the December 2001 issue)

THE REASONS BEHIND PRISONER KANG'S SUICIDE

Sophearith Chuong

When someone was accused of “treason” by Angkar, he or she was perhaps sent to S-21 prison. Once there, prisoners had no chance to avoid interrogation, torture and murder under that facility’s strict regulations. Every order from Angkar had to be accomplished perfectly. Because of the prison’s strict rules and the discipline of its cadre, committing suicide, which might have been a mercy for most prisoners, was nearly impossible. Of the more than 20,000 prisoners killed at S-21 only a handful were able to commit suicide. The others died as a result of torture, starvation, disease or execution.

The Santebal rules, written down on a blackboard for the inmates to read and their guards to practice during interrogation, were as follows:

1. Answer what is asked, don’t evade my questions.
2. Absolutely do not try using this or that pretext with the idea of concealing, arguing or lying.
3. Do not play stupid and pretend you don’t

understand orders, because you dared to oppose the revolution.

4. Answer questions immediately. Don’t delay even for a minute.

5. Deficiencies, small mistakes, immorality, this or that bad characteristic, don’t speak of those things. Don’t speak about the essence of the revolution.

6. When beaten or given electric shocks, absolutely do not scream.

7. Do nothing at all. Sit quietly and await your orders. If it is not ordered, do not do it. When ordered to do something, immediately do just that. Do not hesitate.

8. Do not ever use the Kampuchea Krom pretext to mask your counter-revolutionary face.

9. For every order disobeyed each day you will receive lashes and electric shocks. Oppose a single rule and you will get ten lashes of the whip or five electric shocks.

In addition, a document found in S-21 contained



Comrade Kang



an instruction: “Please all comrades stick to this circular.” This circular consisted of three main points:

1. About guarding the prison: While guarding the prison, do not sit or lie against the wall, and do not write anything. Do not ask the names of the prisoners. Do not walk away from the spot assigned to you. Do not enter or open the doors or windows to peer at the prisoners inside. Do not ask any prisoner inside the cells, even knowing who they are. Do not threaten or beat prisoners. If the prisoners disobey the rules or ignore a warning, report it to your supervisor, either in written or oral form. If the prisoners try to break a lock, hang themselves, cut their wrists, or swallow screws, shackle their hands to their back and report immediately to your supervisor, do not delay. If a prisoner manages to escape, inform the supervisor at once and assign soldiers to bring them back; do not talk about any problem of having no soldiers. When patrolling or guarding, comrades, groups, or fifty-member units must be present at the locations and assigned by the party. Do not sleep or sit down. Walk back and forth constantly. Cadres and youths have to check thoroughly at all four designated times. In other words, four examinations are conducted in twenty-four hours, at 6 a.m., 11 a.m., 6 p.m., and 11 p.m. Strip-search the prisoners and let them dress before leaving the rooms. Prisoners are not allowed to take off their clothes. If they do, punish them by taking away all their clothes. During patrols, cadres have to keep the keys to themselves, do not be careless and leave them around. A key is not to be lost. If they are lost, do not cut the lock, instead try to look for them until they are found. If a prisoner escapes from the room where the key has been lost, the comrade who kept it has to take all responsibility in front of the collective. Guards must wear their soldier’s uniform on duty; you must always wear pants and a shirt.

2. Shackling: Before unlocking the handcuffs and taking off the blindfold, the guards have to check the shackle’s lock thoroughly first. The sprockets and iron bars must be taken out. Stay close to the prisoners when they dispose of their feces. A hand and a leg must be chained. Check through the prisoners’ body, when they return from the interrogation room. The

length of the chain must be no longer than half a meter; for other lengths, just ask your supervisors.

3. Other Measures: Prisoners are not allowed to talk to each other. Guards who guard inside the building are not permitted to come out, because the prisoners might do something bad unnoticed. Each building has its own list of prisoners and room numbers. No bullets are loaded in the magazines attached to the guns, except the ones worn on the body. Those who guard inside are not allowed to be armed with guns, but they can have batons. Guns must not be kept carelessly; do not leave or carry them near the prisoners. Tasks to be done should be noted clearly when a guard’s replacement arrives. Inform the next guards about the prisoners’ situation and other important matters. After prisoners dispose of their feces and urine, their bodies should be checked by the next shift of guards. Guards from the earlier shift are not allowed to go anywhere until the new guards have done their initial tasks.

A document written on August 4, 1976 mentioned a plan the party had. This plan focused on the schedule for guarding the prison, specifically stating that: “At night nine persons guard a building - three people guard the upper stairs, and six guard the ground floor. The guards are not allowed to have guns inside the building, but they can have batons. During the daytime, only two guards take the job on each floor. 1) from 6:30 to 7:30; 2) from 10:30 to 11:30; 3) from 1:30 to 2:30; 4) from 4:30 to 5:30; 5) from 6:30 to 7: 30; and 5) from 10:30 to 11:30, there must be four people in each building and two must remain on duty on each floor. After this period, a guard had to do labor tasks. [As for] The measures on August 2, 1976: Interrogators who fetch prisoners to the interrogation room are not allowed to open the window to peer in or go into the rooms.”

A document written on November 16, 1976, signed by comrade Duch, is related to the suicide of prisoner Kang, whose death photograph is shown on the first page of this article. It mentions a prisoner who took control of a gun and killed himself. The document reads, “The unit guarding on that day was a new unit of the secret ones. The old unit was busy

studying. There were three pistols stored there. Comrade Ly Sreang received guns from a platoon. He gave one pistol to comrade Ton and another one to comrade Ry. A gun remained, and so we kept it inside a cabinet and informed comrade Nob Nat. When we were telling the comrade about that, prisoner Kang saw the gun too. Between 10 and 12, most comrades are away for lunch.

“Comrade Nob Nat stood by at prisoner Kang’s cell, while Comrade Yann was at Keo Muny’s cell, which was on the ground floor where important prisoners are detained. At that time Nob Nat was disposing of the prisoners’ body waste without telling Muong Yan. After hearing a loud sound, Muong Yan looked and saw prisoner Kang, who had taken control of the gun. Without delay he ran to get help.”

The guards’ lack of experience was evident from the following note: “Mostly, from the top to bottom they did not study their experiences thoroughly both in working and in various techniques, so as to strengthen the attitude towards working of the youths, squad chiefs, group chiefs and platoons. The fault was that we had a gun without a monitor, and the place where the gun was kept was not secret. Our comrades walked away from responsibility, from the gun, and from the prisoner. When the guards’ shifts changed, they did not hand over responsibility clearly. The lack of attitude towards the enemies was that the chain was too long, enough for the prisoner to reach the cabinet. The interrogators who had normally walked past the place saw it, but they did not give a suggestion or raise a proposal to change it.”

The viewpoint of leading comrades, Nat, Duch and Hor was: “For comrade Ly Sreang, who did not assign this gun to a real holder; he kept it close to the prisoner and the prisoner saw it.”


According to an in-depth investigation conducted at the crime scene, “The gun was fired three times. The gun used by the prisoner was a single gun. [The conditions of his] chain and shackle allowed the prisoner to reach the cabinet with ease and quickly, and the prisoner had plenty of time to do it when

Nob Nat was away. Prisoner Kang shot himself one time by putting the barrel into his mouth and firing. The bullet penetrated from the inner part of his mouth on the left side to the back of his head. Two bullets were fired from the outside and close to the door. Some traces of gunpowder were still seen. One bullet pierced through the door from the outside to the back wall and to the outdoors. The last bullet was fired from an unknown position; there is no trace. We can see a hole at the back of the wooden cabinet. We can conclude that the bullet was fired from the outside of the cell to the inside. Clearly, prisoner Kang fired the three bullets with a single gun, and he was hit by only one of them.

“He wanted us to have quarrels with one another on our shortcomings. He fired at comrade Nat who was taking feces and urine to dispose. These failures, whether they are by internal enemies or among our youths, happened with a humiliating cause - the leaders of S-21 have not yet cooperated and worked smoothly. We pledge to eliminate this weakness gradually.”

The exact number of prisoners who Angkar considered to be “traitors” and committed suicide is unknown. However, it can be assumed that the death toll from suicide was small because the prison’s regulations also focused on preventing prisoner suicides. In addition to the case of prisoner Kang, there were a handful of prisoners who killed themselves using other methods, as shown in the photograph below.

Another case of suicide in S-21



THE KHMER ROUGE DID COMMIT GENOCIDE

Gregory H. Stanton

Prof. Schabas is wrong when he says that the Khmer Rouge did not commit genocide as it is defined in the Genocide Convention. He is also wrong about when crimes against humanity became defined in international law as including mass murder in domestic settings.

Khmer Rouge mass murder of the Cham Muslim minority was not mere assimilation, as Schabas argues. He simply has the facts wrong. The surveys that Ben Kiernan and I and the Cambodian Genocide Program have carried out in Cham villages showed a mortality rate of over 50 percent, double the national average. There are also many instances of mass murder of entire Cham villages. Over 5000 Chams were murdered and thrown into a deep ravine on one day in Kampong Cham province in 1977. Cham eyewitness survivors also testified to us of roundups of all Chams in their area, followed by mass murder, including such atrocities as burning victims alive. Besides the evidence of systematic results of mass murder, very good proof of genocidal intent, there is also strong evidence that the destruction of the Chams was official Communist Party Central Committee policy, including the famous edict, “The Cham shall no longer exist as a group in Kampuchea.” Craig Etcheson has already noted the strong evidence that the Khmer Rouge also committed genocide against the Vietnamese ethnic group. Heder’s claim that all Vietnamese were “resident aliens” is irrelevant under the Genocide Convention. Even if they were, they would be a national group, and destruction of them would be genocide.

Hannum’s claim that the destruction of the population of the Kampuchea’s Eastern Zone is also genocide because it is destruction in part of a national group (Cambodians), may stretch the Genocide Convention, because it was the murder of Khmers of one region by Khmers from another region. The mass

murder of the population of Eastern Zone was Communist Party Central Committee policy.

It was systematically carried out and members of the victims’ group were marked (with blue and white checked scarves, as Ben Kiernan and I discovered in 1986) as they passed through Phnom Penh during their deportation out of the Eastern Zone. Schabas is wrong to dismiss this as genocide simply because it is a case of Khmers killing Khmers. To do so requires that Schabas decide what constitutes a national or ethnic group without regard to the ethnological view of Kampuchea as defined by the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge defined the Eastern Zone population as ethnically different than the rest of the population of Kampuchea: they had “Khmer bodies, but Vietnamese heads.”

The definition of ethnic or national groups by the perpetrators is a common feature of genocide. The Genocide Convention does not rule it out, nor does it say that foreign legal scholars should define what are ethnic or national groups - it is a matter for the court trying a case of genocide. That is why Ratner and Abrams were right in the UN Commission of Inquiry Report to leave this up to a Tribunal.

Schabas is also wrong to say that “crimes against humanity” still required a nexus to international armed conflict by 1979. The Nuremberg Tribunal and later UN Resolutions stating its principles, defined crimes against humanity. But by 1977, Optional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions had extended the applicability of crimes against humanity to civil conflicts, and in doing so its framers claimed to be restating customary international law. Indeed, the acts prohibited track closely Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. So it is legally wrong for Schabas to attempt to freeze “crimes against humanity” from 1945 up to 1994 (when the nexus requirement to international armed conflict was

definitely no longer required in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) or even to 1998 (the Rome Treaty of the ICC). Domestic mass murder and many of the other crimes of the Khmer Rouge were already crimes against humanity during their regime.

Bill Schabas’s definitionalist denials of genocide by the Khmer Rouge and by the Yugoslavia Army in Kosovo unfortunately have pernicious effects. He means well. He would like to limit use of the word “genocide” so that governments will act when it really happens, and he thinks they won’t act very often, so it must be very narrowly defined (“strict construction”). His view of the policy process is naive. Governments will choose not to act even when the facts are abundantly clear that the term genocide does apply. The UN withdrawal from Rwanda in 1994 at the urging of genocide-denying U.S. State Department lawyers is the most famous case.

It is, in fact, a superb example of the way definitionalism of the sort Schabas advocates can paralyze policy while lawyers wrangle over whether the legal definition of the Genocide Convention has been met. The Human Rights Watch report on Rwanda in Spring 1994, before the genocide, which Schabas helped write, also refused to warn of “genocide,” out of fear that it would misuse the word genocide.

Now Prof. Schabas has been amply cited in a decision declaring that the massacres in Kosovo did

not constitute acts of genocide. His book, *Genocide in International Law*, provides the basis for this finding, when Schabas argues in effect that ethnic cleansing and genocide are mutually exclusive, because the intent in ethnic cleansing is to drive a group out, whereas the intent in genocide is to destroy the group. Schabas, in dividing human social acts so neatly, ignores the obvious fact that acts of mass murder (including genocidal acts intended to destroy part of a national, ethnic, or religious group, as such) were committed in Kosovo in order to terrorize the population into leaving. In other words, both genocide and ethnic cleansing were committed in Kosovo. Schabas’s denial arises out of his error in confusing motive with legal intent.

The Yugoslav motive may have been to drive Kosovo’s out, but their mass murder carried ample legal intent to destroy part of the Kosovar group. Schabas ignores the fact that multiple crimes can be committed in the same systematic program, which in Kosovo included both acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Prof. Schabas’s genocide denial, despite (indeed, because of) his expertise, has already made a difference in history. Prof. Schabas needs to confront the facts about the Khmer Rouge, who did commit both genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as the development of the law since Nuremberg. He also should recognize that genocide and ethnic cleansing are not mutually exclusive, and that both were



EVIDENCE IN THE PROSPECTIVE TRIALS OF FORMER KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS

John Ciociari

(Continued from the October 2001 issue)

6. Document 107bbkkh/010

A confession report by Sieng Hong (alias Pha) included the names of 34 people associated with his alleged betrayal of the revolution. Next to one such person, named Than, was a handwritten note: “Smash.” The document was sent to Nuon Chea and was supposed to be sent to the Central Zone (whose chairman was Ke Pauk) as well. This note would help to establish Nuon Chea’s (and possibly Ke Pauk’s) command responsibility for crimes against humanity. The note demonstrates the required mens rea (again assuming no punitive action was taken), and the actus reus can be demonstrated by evidence that Than was later killed. The context of the handwritten note also provides some evidence of a broader plan to “smash” perceived political enemies.

7. Document 176bbkkh/014

The report of the interrogation of Nhim Sim (alias Suot) includes a statement that the interrogator “began torturing him” until Nhim Sim confessed that he was a spy and CIA agent. The report was sent to Nuon Chea and the Central Zone (whose chairman was Ke Pauk). The language clearly indicates that Nhim Sim was tortured to extract a confession, and assuming neither Nuon Chea nor Ke Pauk took punitive action against the interrogator, the elements for command responsibility for the crime of torture are satisfied.

8. Document L0122 (01bbk): Minutes of the Standing Committee’s Visit to the Southwest Zone (8/20/76-8/24/76)

a. The minutes contain a statement that in “some places it has been observed that where there [are] good leadership cadres, core leadership and people are stable, and where there are no cadres, core leadership is not stable and does not work smoothly. People move about freely.” All of the members of the Standing Committee, which at the time included Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Mok,

and possibly Ke Pauk and Khieu Samphan, can reasonably be imputed to have known about the content of the minutes. The statement indicates that people were not permitted to move freely, which suggests forced labor or a practice analogous to enslavement. It also clearly indicates that the CPK Center encouraged that practice. Thus, the document contributes to an argument that the members of the Standing Committee can be held liable for forced labor or slavery.

b. The minutes also include a statement that “along [the] railway, the Thais illegally came about 3 kilometers into our territory to cultivate rice. We are seeking to smash them. They committed small-scale subversion, spreading written leaflets at Phnom Malai. Their partisans are supported by America.” The members of the Standing Committee thus demonstrate the mens rea for crimes against humanity by their expressed intent to “smash” the Thais on grounds of their political activity or nationality. If it can be proven that some Thais were later killed, the requirement of actus reus will also be met, and the Standing Committee members may be held criminally responsible for crimes against humanity.

The examples above represent only a small fraction of the documentation that implicates Nuon Chea in certain criminal activities. Additional examples are provided in Elizabeth Moorthy et al., Memorandum: A Preliminary Evaluation of Evidence Held by the Documentation Center of Cambodia (1998). It is important to emphasize that the memorandum prepared by Moorthy et al. should not be relied upon as a complete evaluation of the DC-Cam materials. Like this Legal Report, it simply provides examples, drawn from limited documentary review, of the types of materials that could be useful to a prospective prosecution.

B. Ieng Sary alias Van

Documentary evidence against Ieng Sary is somewhat less substantial, though the precise value of

the 1979 trial documents is unclear and could add substantially to the evidence against him. His de jure command authority is clear in CPK party documents, and he was the addressee of multiple correspondence memoranda indicating that enemies of the party had been “smashed” and/or tortured. The correspondence, phrased as a progress report, suggests his orders or complicity, and there is no evidence that he took steps to prevent or punish similar offenses. He was a member of several high-ranking committees which discussed and collectively recommended, in vague terms, the continued purges of dissidents. He was also the recipient of certain reports from Office S-21, which implicate him for torture. Thus, added to the mapping reports, interview transcripts and other documents, the circumstantial evidence against Ieng Sary is strong, even if more direct evidence is moderate. In total, the documentation provides a strong case against him for torture and crimes against humanity. Circumstantial evidence also implicates him in war crimes, genocide and forced labor.

Some examples of documents relating to Ieng Sary are as follow, with very brief discussions of how they could be used as evidence in a criminal trial and what additional evidence, if any, they would require to be most useful to the prosecution:

1. “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions,” March 30, 1976 (translated and reprinted in *Pol Pot Plans the Future* by David P. Chandler et al.)

a. Item 1 sets forth “The Authority to Smash (People) Inside and Outside the Ranks.” The legal implications of this section for Ieng Sary are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above.)

b. Item 6 declares that the Armed Forces “demolish” the Christian cathedral. The legal implications of this section for Ieng Sary are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above.)

c. Ieng Sary’s position as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs is evidence that he occupied a high leadership position and is probative of his de jure and de facto civilian command authority.

2. Document D02106 (15bbk): “Report to Respected and Beloved Committee 870” (dated 4/10/78). See the discussion relating to Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary (above in subsection A).

3. Document D02116 (15bbk): handwritten note dated 4/21/78. See the discussion relating to Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary (above in subsection A).

4. Document L0122 (01bbk): Minutes of the Standing Committee’s Visit to the Southwest Zone (8/20/76-8/24/76) See the discussion in subsection A above. Ieng Sary was a member of the Standing Committee and bears responsibility for the content of the minutes.

Moorthy et al. provide additional examples of documents that could be employed in a criminal prosecution of Ieng Sary. Their examples are drawn from 25 files in the DC-Cam holdings, which contain information that could be of evidentiary value.

C. Chhit Chhoeun alias Mok

Like Ieng Sary, Mok was clearly in a position of command authority, as official documents, committee minutes and party correspondence demonstrate. He was also the addressee of multiple confession reports, in which interrogators reported torture and “smashings.”

He was the Zone Party Chairman of the Southwest Zone, and mapping reports and transcribed witness accounts provide strong circumstantial evidence that he was on notice of the mass killings which occurred in his region. The same sources of evidence indicate that he either encouraged or tolerated such criminal activity beneath him. In sum, a strong case exists against Mok for crimes against humanity and torture. Circumstantial evidence also implicates Mok in forced labor and genocide.

Some examples of documents relating to Mok are as follow, with very brief discussions of how they could be used as evidence in a criminal trial and what additional evidence, if any, they would require to be most useful to the prosecution:

1. “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions,” March 30, 1976 (translated and reprinted in *Pol Pot Plans the Future* by David P. Chandler et al.)



a. Item 1 sets forth “The Authority to Smash (People) Inside and Outside the Ranks.” The legal implications of this section for Mok are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above).

b. Item 6 declares that the Armed Forces “demolish” the Christian cathedral. The legal implications of this section for Mok are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above).

c. Mok was named 2nd Vice—President of the Assembly, the representative body of the central government. Mok’s position as 2nd Vice-President of the Assembly is evidence that he occupied a high leadership position and is probative of his de jure and de facto civilian command authority.

2. Document L0122 (01bbk): Minutes of the Standing Committee’s Visit to the Southwest Zone (8/20/76-8/24/76) See the discussion in subsection A above. If it can be established that Mok was a member of the Standing Committee at the time this document was prepared, he bears responsibility for the minutes’ contents.

3. The DC-Cam Mapping Reports (1997 and 1998). The mapping reports prepared by DC-Cam provide myriad eyewitness accounts of genocidal practices, torture and other crimes against humanity. None of the eyewitnesses had contact with the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge, most of whom appear to have distanced themselves somewhat from the atrocities committed by their subordinates. However, the enormity of physical evidence of the Khmer Rouge atrocities, in the form of prisons and mass burial sites in each of the major DK Zones, may lead a court or tribunal to impute knowledge to the respective Zone Party Chairmen, and perhaps to their superiors in the CPK Center.

In this section, I will discuss the Mapping Reports only with respect to Mok and Ke Pauk. However, it should be noted that they provide very strong (if slightly less overwhelming) circumstantial evidence against former CPK Center officials such as Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan as well.

Mok, who chaired the Southwest Zone, and Ke Pauk, who chaired the North (later Central) Zone, are

the only surviving Zone Party Chairmen from the DK regime.

The following tables present some of the results of the 1997 and 1998 mapping studies by DC-Cam in the areas over which Mok and Ke Pauk presided. As demonstrated below, each of the Zones contained numerous prisons and mass burial pits, wells or other spaces used to dispose of the dead. It should be noted that the provinces listed do not correspond precisely to the DK Zone designations and should be viewed as approximations. Further, the statistics below represent only new findings of DC-Cam in 1997 and 1998 and thus represent only a fraction of the actual number of prisons, mass burial pits, other burial sites and victims.

a. Southwest Zone (Mok, Chairman)

Province	Prisons	Mass Burial Pits	Other Burial Sites	Victims
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1

b. North (later Central) Zone (Ke Pauk, Chairman)

Province	Prisons	Mass Burial Pits	Other Burial Sites	Victims
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1
Stung Treng	1	1	1	1

Although the foregoing statistics are approximations and represent only the new findings of DC-Cam in a two-year period, the staggering numbers of burial pits dug and people killed makes it extremely difficult to conceive that Mok and Ke Pauk were unaware of mass executions taking place in their Zones.



None of the documentary evidence reviewed suggests that either Zone leader took significant, if any, disciplinary action against his subordinates for the mass executions. Therefore, the vast physical evidence makes it overwhelmingly likely that Mok and Ke Pauk were (a) aware of the commission of mass killings and (b) met the requirement of participation, if not by ordering the executions, by failing to punish those who performed them.

Even if Mok and Ke Pauk claim that they were unaware of the existence of thousands of mass burial pits in their Zones and the killing of hundreds of thousands of people, it is beyond doubt that they should have known and had a duty to investigate the situation. Any reasonable investigation of the Southwest or Northern (later Central) Zone during the period of DK rule would have uncovered mass killings. In order to convict Mok and Ke Pauk of genocide or crimes against humanity, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the persons were executed with (a) an intent to destroy all or part of their national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in the case of genocide, or (b) on cultural, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds. The existence of the mass graves does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the killings were based upon those rationales. For that inquiry, reference to other evidence will be needed.

Moorthy et al. provide a very brief discussion of additional documents that could be applied as evidence against Mok in a criminal trial. Namely, they cite examples of hand-written notes on files sent to Mok by CPK cadres.

D. Ke Pauk

The evidence against Ke Pauk is similar in magnitude to the evidence against Mok. As a Zone Party Chairman and Central Committee Member, the evidence of his de jure command authority is clear in a number of documents. Several documents detailing torture or crimes against humanity were also copied to the “Central Zone,” of which he was chief. His name is mentioned in additional confessions and reports not addressed to him. As with Mok, the circumstantial evidence against him is compelling, and relatively

strong cases exist against him for torture and crimes against humanity.

Some examples of documents relating to Ke Pauk are as follow, with very brief discussions of how they could be used as evidence in a criminal trial and what additional evidence, if any, they would require to be most useful to the prosecution:

1. “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions,” March 30, 1976 (translated and reprinted in *Pol Pot Plans the Future* by David P. Chandler et al.).

a. Item 1 sets forth “The Authority to Smash (People) Inside and Outside the Ranks.” The legal implications of this section for Ke Pauk are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above).

b. Item 6 declares that the Armed Forces “demolish” the Christian cathedral. The legal implications of this section for Ke Pauk are essentially the same as those for Nuon Chea (see subsection A above).

2. Document 107bbkkh/010

See the discussion of the confession report of Sieng Phon (alias Pha) in subsection A above. The document was sent to Nuon Chea and was copied to Ke Pauk, chairman of the Central Zone. If it can be established that Ke Pauk received the document, he bears similar responsibility for its contents.

1. Document 176bbkkh/014

See the discussion of the confession report of Nhim Sim (alias Suot) in subsection A above. The report was sent to Ke Pauk and establishes command responsibility for torture, assuming the perpetrators were not punished for their actions.

3. Document 202bbkh/021

Tuy, who interrogated Koan Chan (alias Chorn), wrote in his confession report that “I tortured him for half a day” and engaged in several subsequent rounds of torture to obtain confessions. Thus, the report contains a clear indication of the repeated use of torture and beatings. It appears that this report was sent to Ke Pauk. If that fact can be established, and if Ke Pauk failed to punish Tuy, Ke Pauk bears command responsibility for torture. **(Continued in the December 2001 issue)**



FIGHTING FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE

Robert Carmichael

The *Phnom Penh Post* is interviewing leading opinion-makers in Cambodia. In this issue we talk to Youk Chhang, Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam).

How did you come to be involved with the Documentation Center?

I lived through the Khmer Rouge (KR) period and afterwards went to America. When I was in the US I wanted to tell people what had happened to me under the KR, but people tended to question it - when I told them what had happened, I had trouble putting it into words.

To give you an example: my sister was killed because she was accused of stealing rice. The KR wanted proof, so they cut her open with a knife to see if the rice was in her stomach. This happening to your own family member, you could not imagine, and people could not believe it.

In the beginning it made me angry because this type of thing happened to all of us. I wanted people to accept the truth, but it was very difficult. I realized that I had to do research so people could see the facts.

My mother is my second motivation. I was the youngest child and usually in our culture, you treasure the little boy. But that wasn't so in my case, because I grew up in the war and all the attention went to my older brothers and sisters. I was 14 years old when the KR came. I was home alone and was evacuated with the whole town. I walked for a couple of weeks and tried to locate my mother in her own home village.

We were reunited after four months, but were then separated again by the KR. One memory that remains with me is this: one of my sisters was pregnant and had not had enough food for several months. So I went out to the rice field and picked up

some water grass, some mushrooms. In the eyes of the KR, that was a crime because even grass belonged to the Angkar. If you picked it up without permission you would be considered an enemy of the revolution and would be punished.

They spotted me in the field and arrested me, hit me with an ax and put me in jail. I will never forget this - they tortured me in front of my mother, who held back the tears seeing the KR torturing her youngest son.

Finally, I wanted to tell the KR that human beings are capable of surviving and resist dying under any circumstances. I want to tell them that I am back - you can torture me, you can kill my sister, you can kill members of my family, but you cannot destroy my soul. I have not come back for revenge, but to tell them that as a human being, you cannot just tell people to stop having feelings, to love, being with the family.

For these reasons I wanted to come back and do this work. I also wanted to tell my mother: I am educated, I am strong, I am fine and I am doing this for you and you should not worry about me any longer. Through my research I found that my mother is not alone. We have thousands and thousands of mothers and many sons who had similar experiences.

In 1987 while I was living in the US I started to contact scholars. I simply wrote to them, asking: What can I do? How can I help? Just let me know - I can speak Khmer and English, and I know some people in the community. That's how I started.

You spent many years living in the United States. Were there any particular attractions the US held?

One of my relatives was the Minister for Information in the Khmer Republic [1970-1975], which meant there were always [foreign] reporters

coming to my house. These men and women were tall and blonde. I really wanted to become a reporter and I wanted to speak English. I heard of Kennedy, America and Israel during the war. I heard that Israel was very strong, very brave, and heard America was very aggressive, dedicated and independent.

It built a dream for me. I had a dream that one day I would go to America, be able to speak English, be educated and then come back. It was a little boy's dream. My first major was in journalism, but I switched to political science. I went to Texas. The place where I worked in Dallas was just a couple of blocks from where Kennedy was assassinated. Can you imagine? For years I would go to that bookstore every November 22nd to write my thoughts on his assassination.

How many years has DC-Cam been in existence and how would you describe your accomplishments?

We started around six years ago, and I would say that the one achievement I would most like to highlight is that we have touched the hearts of the victims. We have reached out - not to all of them, but to many of them. Just being there to talk to them is for me our main achievement.

What materials have you collected?

We estimate we have about 600,000 documents (which can be anything from a personal notebook to telegrams and confessions) and about 30,000 photographs as well as documentary footage. Long process. However, we don't do any analysis. I am purely a researcher and all of what we have is raw data for anyone to use. Our main focus is the KR period, but our documents run across the period before and after that.

We go out to the provinces at least three times a month to hear people's stories, which are also documents. We have a very broad definition of the term "document," from people to mass graves and pieces of materials.

All this material constitutes trying to keep history alive so that the younger generation can learn from it. It is done to provide a guideline, a direction so that they can do more searching.

Have all the materials collected been copied so that there are sets outside Cambodia? If so, where are they?

Yes, we have backup in several parts of the world, but we make sure the originals remain here. They are protected by fireproof cabinets, by safeguards, in different locations, things like that. There are complete sets around the world: in the US, Europe, on CD-ROM and at several embassies.

You rightfully have some security concerns for yourself, your staff and DC-Cam's material. Have you ever received threats and, if so, what was the nature of these?

Personally I don't believe in life insurance companies. I believe in God and that He will protect us. However, I came to the decision that if I am targeted by the KR, I am willing to sacrifice for truth and justice, even if I have to trade my life for it.

But there is no need for anyone to be afraid of us. This project is for the good of humanity and the people of Cambodia - we have no wish to harm anybody. If we ever feel unsafe we will call the government or we might hire private security. Personally, I leave it up to God.

How much funding has DC-Cam received to date and who were the most important donors?

All our supporters, regardless of what they give us, are equally important. The main countries that support us are the US (core funding of \$50,000 a year), the Netherlands (\$90,000 a year), Sweden, Britain, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Japan and Canada.

Among the Asian countries, the only one that gives us any help is Japan. I am a little shocked... This is not about Asia, Europe or America - it is about all of us. Human rights violations are perhaps right now the most troublesome [of countries' problems] and we should all take a very strong interest in it. This is about the cause of justice, about the future. It is about dedication for better human rights and a better society.

Have your efforts been hampered by a lack of funding, and if so, what would you do if you had



more?

Our work is based on volunteers and dedication. All of the staff, including myself, had to start as volunteers. But of course we need money to implement other projects. So we ask for money, but we do not beg for money. I ask for dedication but we do not compromise ourselves with any unjust commitments. We would not compromise the search for justice. We do not commercialize, because this is not a market, it is about liberty. We need money but money is not everything.

Another point is that the money we receive is taxpayers' money, which we are honored to receive. We have a responsibility to account for every penny we have spent and we want to show this can be done. If we had more money, it would mean we could take on more professionals which would speed up our work. We also want to build a museum and obtain supplementary funding for a school textbook [to explain the history of the KR period]. We want to talk to every single former perpetrator, to hear what they have to say. We would also like to record our interviews on video camera.

[My point is that] if the killings could happen here, they could happen anywhere in the world. When I was a young boy I had not heard about the Holocaust. Imagine if when I was nine years old - before the country fell into the hands of the KR - I had learned of the Holocaust at school, perhaps we could have helped prevent [the atrocities]. Who knows? Knowledge is a strong weapon and people should be aware of what has happened.

There has much speculation over the years that the Vietnamese took documents back to Hanoi after their arrival in Phnom Penh in 1979. Has DC-Cam received cooperation from the Vietnamese government?

I don't know how much material is in Hanoi. We have a very small list of the material that I think was involved in the tribunal in 1979 and that their expert was involved in collecting. Perhaps that material was taken to Hanoi in 1979, but it is not clear yet how much they have. The Vietnamese

recently announced that they will open their archives to the tribunal.

On a personal basis, what would you like to see out of the proposed KR trial?

That the truth will prevail and provide answers to the questions that have been posed by the victims over the past 20 years. I also hope we have equal participation, so that it does not just involve the UN and the government. The people themselves should take an equal role. Even though they don't have a legal right, they should have a civil right to see, too. What we want to know is why they killed our family members? Why was my sister killed? Why did they torture me as a young boy just for taking grass from the rice field? Who gave the order to do that? That is as important as knowing what happened and I think knowing this will set us free.

In the streets of Cambodia there are question marks everywhere [about that time]. But the tribunal by itself will be nothing without a support program involving the people. I have raised this issue with the King, suggesting that the people should have a role in the tribunal process, and I think he has forwarded my letter to Prince Ranariddh to take into consideration.

What do you think the outcome of the trial will be?

This depends on the [support] program. If you allow the tribunal to go by itself without a support program, the outcome will be very difficult to accept. The number of people to be prosecuted does not really matter, but the process itself and what it reveals is most important.

And the tribunal must ensure that it is a fair trial. People like Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea should have good lawyers. The outcome of the tribunal depends on the participation of the public, and the program for that should start now so that we can ensure that the process will not be jeopardized.

If a trial gets under way, what do you think the relationship would be between DC-Cam and the prosecution and defense teams?

We will serve both the defense and the prosecution. They can have access to all our material because ours is not analysis material - it is historical

data. We hope some countries will help with funding to expand our facilities.

There has been some talk of a ‘smoking gun’ in terms of evidence collected by the DC-Cam, Are you confident that material held by the DC-Cam can be used to convict former Khmer Rouge? If so, what is it?

First, we never use the word evidence - we use the word information, and we have that from village chiefs all the way to Pol Pot. The prosecutor and defense can only decide what is evidence and what is not. But I am very confident that the information will tell more than half, if not the whole story, of what happened under the Khmer Rouge regime.

And this is speaking only in terms of material [already held], not about possible witnesses, not about possible physical evidence. Prosecutors and defendants don’t have to start from scratch with a blank piece of paper - they can start today with 600,000 pages, visit 13,000 mass graves and examine 157 prisons.

Do you think that the trial will prove as important in telling what happened as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

I am a bit troubled by the terms “truth commission,” “reconciliation” and “healing” - with that language. Maybe I am a non-academic person, so I am not up to that terminology. But look what people have done since 1979: they have built their own memorials, built stupas, written songs. Every survivor has their own personal story. More than one million people signed a petition telling the government what happened to them under the Khmer Rouge.

It is clear to me that people have coped with the trauma by practicing their own version of a truth commission in Cambodia. When people talk about what happened they make their own truth commission. The effort itself is a healing process. People offering to their ancestors, praying and talking - that is a truth commission. People writing their story - to me that is a truth commission.

Perhaps there should be a more public

nationwide forum - people could meet every month in every village and talk about it. People could watch a TV broadcast of the court process or a film about the Khmer Rouge. Before we could not do this, but now Cambodia is a free country. So to me, invisibly, a truth commission is already being practiced in Cambodia.

Why is the DC-Cam so important for Cambodia and what long-term plans do you have for the organization?

We are working together with the Tuol Sleng (S-21) genocide museum in Phnom Penh. We have a piece of land and we are hoping to build a permanent center in conjunction with Tuol Sleng to create an educational exhibition - not propaganda, but an official history of the genocide in an educational way.

I think the younger generation has the right to know their own history and the government has the obligation to provide the whole truth. For example, in the history book for Grade 9 (age 16 and 17) there is only one paragraph about the Khmer Rouge.

[The proposed new center] would also be the permanent documentation center of Cambodia where people can come for research and to write books and papers. We also want to work closely with the history department of the Royal Phnom Penh University to encourage students to study this topic. We envision that in 15 years DC-Cam will become a part of the university - not collecting documents, but producing books and reaching out to people around the world.

KHMER ROUGE SLOGANS

1. Every individual, every unit, the whole country has to learn carefully from heroic revolutionary efforts of the forefront battles.
2. The forefront battle is a defensive steel fence, protecting independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, national reputation, and the Kampuchean race.
3. The forefront battle is the excellent symbol of revolutionary pride of Kampuchea and its people.






Thomas Hammarberg

HOW THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL WAS AGREED: DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UN

Thomas Hammarberg



(Continued from the October 2001 issue)

When the law, at long last, was adopted by the National Assembly on 2 January 2001 it contained some differences in relation to what was discussed during the Corell mission in July. The major point was that the law did not state that a previous amnesty would be ignored for the crime of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity. The issue, again, was whether Ieng Sary could be prosecuted or not. He was the only Khmer Rouge leader who had been granted an amnesty signed by the King. It was clear that no further amnesties would be considered - but what about Ieng Sary?

Corell had proposed in July that a sentence might be added to the relevant article (Art. 40) in the tribunal law: "An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the chambers shall not be a bar to prosecution". This suggestion, obviously referred to the case of Ieng Sary. In a separate note Corell had written that the UN was "prepared to discuss this matter when we finalize the MOU". This had been interpreted by the Cambodian negotiators as opening for such a discussion after the law was adopted and the sentence suggested by Corell was not included in the law as adopted by the National Assembly.

A letter was sent from Corell on 9 January to Sok An expressing dissatisfaction about developments. The draft Memorandum of Understanding had made clear that an amnesty to any person should not be a bar to prosecution. Corell also stressed that this had been a major issue during the discussions in July. Sok An's comment to the media was that this issue could be clarified in a future meeting with Corell.

The Assembly, and later the Senate, had approved a special court within the existing Cambodian judicial system, with participation of UN nominated judges and one UN nominated co-prosecutor. The majority of the judges would be Cambodian and appointed by the Supreme Council of Magistracy while the Secretary-General would suggest that foreign judges and the co-prosecutor, also to be approved by the Supreme Council.

Senior Minister Sok An analysed the compromises made with the UN when he introduced the final law proposal to the Assembly on 29 December 2000. The first was that foreign judges would take part in

this national, but extraordinary trial. The second compromise related to whether Cambodian or foreign judges would be in majority; the solution was that the majority would be Cambodians, but that there would be a “blocking minority”. The third was about the prosecution: there would be two co-prosecutors; one Cambodian and one foreign. Next compromise related to how a disagreement between them or the investigating judges would be handled: a special Pre-Trial Chamber would be set up to resolve any such disputes. Finally, the law states that the Government would not submit to the King any proposal on amnesty or pardon in these cases (thereby not undermining the constitutional Royal authority to grant amnesties).

What did this mean in regard to the four concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his letter of 8 February 2000? The first, that those indicted be arrested, had met no formal opposition from the Cambodian side. The second, that there would be no amnesties or pardons, appeared to be covered by the somewhat unusual formulation in the law that the government would not ask the King to take such decisions (and assuming that he would not take such an initiative himself). The third, that the prosecutors be foreign, had not been accepted, though the formula presented appears to give both co-prosecutor room for independent initiatives. The special mechanism to resolve conflicts between them requires a broad majority to bloc any move by one of them (which probably means that the panel will not be used other than in an extraordinary situation).

The Secretary-General’s fourth point, that most of the judges be foreign and appointed by himself, had not been met. The Cambodians would be in the majority at all three levels, the two groups of judges would be nominated through different procedures and all of them would finally be approved by the Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy. To strengthen the foreign element in the decision-making, a requirement of broad majorities had been introduced. This was one of the solutions which the Cambodian non-governmental groups had warned against.

PERSONAL REMARKS

Key Issues

The ideal model would have been an international ad hoc tribunal in Cambodia with judges, prosecutors and other staff appointed through a credible international mechanism. This could have been designed through an enabling law in the Cambodian parliament which would have invited the UN to come for this purpose.

It would have been possible to include some Cambodian jurists in the process, including as judge or prosecutor, but these would be appointed on merit and act as international appointees. Such an arrangement would have several of the advantages hoped for in the “mixed” tribunal approach. In the end, this model was not politically possible. But for the UN to agree to participate in a “mixed” tribunal, there had to be guarantees for the integrity of the process. This is fundamentally what the discussions had been all about.

Such guarantees for international standards require watertight protection against the risk of direct or indirect political pressure. Of course, the Cambodian participants are more vulnerable than the international



appointees. It is also a question of demonstrating to the Cambodian public that genuine justice is being carried out. In view of the cynicism in Cambodia about the justice system, some really clear signs of change are necessary.

That is why it would be important also for the Cambodian judges to be endorsed through an international mechanism and that there be no limits to recruit them outside the list of now practising judges. The pool of possible candidates needs to be widened, also considering that so many Cambodians have a personal stake in any process against the Khmer Rouge.

The “super majority” notion is clearly a compromise and not without problems. It carries an implicit notion of there being two categories of judges—which would be an unfortunate perception even in more normal circumstances. Such a notion of two “sides” seems to be based on a lack of trust which ought to be handled more directly. Also, the model could in real life lead to stalemate situations in which there would be a majority, but not a large enough one for a decision.

If international standards indeed are to be met, neither the Prime Minister nor any other politician in Cambodia should influence the trial—or be seen to do so. The tribunal should not be an instrument for political purposes. The main problem with the final compromise is that it does not offer full guarantees on this crucial aspect; there is a widespread concern in Cambodia that Prime Minister Hun Sen will be able to influence the proceedings heavily.

Hun Sen once said, with apparent pride, that he had defeated the Khmer Rouge first militarily, then politically and now would like to seal these achievements through a trial. On other occasions he talked about the tribunal as a means of crushing the movement; but when that happened, that there was no longer a need for the trial (except for one against Ta Mok, who never surrendered).

His strong reactions against the proposal of a tribunal outside Cambodia appeared to have several roots. One was that it might have give the impression that the government was unable or unwilling to have a trial organised at home. Though he admitted the inadequacy of the Cambodian judicial system in the June 1997 letter, this has not been an easy recognition for him. And if there were to be a trial he would definitely want to take credit for it.

This raises the question of the border between the executive and judicial authorities. A truly independent trial in such a fundamentally important case would be a huge step in a land which has not yet moved from previous notions of Royal or “socialist justice” to true independence of the judiciary. The protracted discussions with the government, the executive branch, on how to set up the trial may have perpetuated the impression in Cambodia of a blurred line between judicial and political authorities. Prime Minister Hun Sen himself sometimes stated that he stood outside the process while he in reality dominated every bit of it and most often made no secret of that fact. His repeated and contradictory statements on whether Ieng Sary should be prosecuted or not is a flagrant example.

This, in turn, may have given some credence to the strange notion that there is a contradiction

between international standards for a just trial and “national sovereignty”. One of the most important Cambodian statements in this whole discussion was the note King Sihanouk made in his monthly bulletin that there is no such contradiction.

Strategy Considerations

The strategy of the Prime Minister appeared to have been based on three options: a) an agreement with the UN on a “mixed” tribunal, b) inviting some governments (e.g. US, France, Russia, Japan and/or India) to co-operate directly through sending judges, or c) inviting individual lawyers (e.g. US lawyer Ramsey Clark) to take part in the process.

He clearly had mixed feelings about the UN option, partly based on his old animosity towards the organisation. He therefore wanted to set limits for how much he was ready to compromise with the UN and force it to say yes or no. If the answer was no, he could blame the UN and at the same time try option b) or c).

He was faced with UN legal experts who stated that the UN could only take part in the process if there were clear guarantees for the international standards on justice, fairness and due process. Very important was that the key member states in the end decided to avoid going it alone and to support the UN discussions. This effectively blocked option b). It also became clear to the government, I believe, that option c) would not be credible—in particular, after a breakdown of talks with the UN.

Therefore, the real options for the government turned out to be an agreement with the UN (which would require guarantees for the independence of the process) or trying Ta Mok and Deuch and perhaps some more in an existing domestic court without international participation. The latter alternative would meet all the problems which had been identified in the discussion so far. Also, such a trial would be thoroughly monitored by the Cambodian media and organisations as well as by the international community—and its shortcomings exposed.

It has been argued that a less-than-ideal compromise between the UN and the government on the tribunal might be corrected by the dynamics of the process itself once started. One factor would be the personal influence of the (hopefully) independent and competent foreigners involved, even if these were in minority. These would also have the option of leaving the process if they became dissatisfied and the awareness of this risk/probability might also function as a protection against abuses. The scrutiny by the media and the NGOs may also have a positive influence. Therefore, for the government to exert distorting pressure on the tribunal might therefore, in reality, not be so easy.

There may be a grain of truth in this prediction, but this is no good reason to accept an unsatisfactory model which might cause procedural infighting in the tribunal and thereby weaken its moral stature. Also, it is important to realise that the Cambodia tribunal may potentially be an example for the future in other situations. Also for that reason it would have been important to build its construction on principles, rather than on political compromises.



WHY DID VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES PROVOKE A VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA BORDER CONFLICT?

(Full text of People's Daily Commentator, July 12, 1978)

(Continued from the October 2001 issue)

It is ludicrous that the Vietnamese authorities, who attack China for supporting Kampuchea and accuse Kampuchea of “provoking” the border conflict at China’s instigation, should at the same time talk profusely about Kampuchea’s maltreatment of Chinese nationals residing there. Isn’t this a case of slapping their own faces? According to the logic of the Vietnamese authorities, Kampuchea has acted at the instigation of China, but it is opposed to the very same China on matters concerning Chinese nationals there. How can this be possible! The Vietnamese authorities have been so addicted to rumor-mongering that they do not mind producing statements full of inexplicable contradictions. It is the Kampuchean Government’s policy to give equal treatment to both Chinese nationals and Kampuchean citizens, and allow Chinese nationals the right to free choice on the question of their citizenship. The Vietnamese authorities want to blame China for “provoking” the Vietnam-Kampuchea border conflict and at the same time seek to cover up their own criminal persecution of Chinese nationals, sowing seeds of dissension between China and Kampuchea. This dual purpose has failed them and their arguments are indeed untenable.

It is none other than the Vietnamese authorities, and not China, who dream of manipulating, controlling and swallowing up Kampuchea and then lording it over Southeast Asia. The slanders of the

Vietnamese authorities against China are just like a robber’s cry of “stop thief.”

People have seen that the Vietnamese authorities are confronted with the heavy and difficult task of healing the wounds of war and rebuilding and developing the economy after victory in the war of resistance against US imperialism. But the Vietnamese authorities have disregarded these pressing needs. They are committing more manpower, material and financial means, and utilizing the great quantities of military aid they received during the war as well as the several billion dollars’ worth of arms and armaments left by the United States, to reinforce their military build-up. It may well be asked, “why have they acted in this extraordinary way?” Their own actions have given a very good answer.

Their victory in the war against US imperialism and the great amounts of arms now at their disposal have made the Vietnamese authorities’ heads swell and their hand itch to get more. They style Vietnam as the “big power” in Southeast Asia, boasting that Vietnam is now one of the few major military powers in the world. It is precisely with this “capital” that it dreams of becoming the overlord in Southeast Asia, and considers the rigging up of an “Indochina federation” with Vietnam at its head as the first step.

Since Kampuchea firmly opposes Vietnam’s ambition to achieve hegemony in the region, the Vietnamese authorities have no scruples about

bringing pressure to bear upon Kampuchea by means of armed aggression and subversion.

The expansionist desires of the Vietnamese authorities go far beyond an “Indochina federation.” Their ambition is much greater as can be clearly seen from their attitude towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Vietnamese authorities, formerly opposing ASEAN and attacking it as an “imperialist tool,” have suddenly changed their attitude toward ASEAN since the extension of the border conflict with Kampuchea at the end of last year. Flouting the banner “for genuine peace, independence and neutrality in Southeast Asia,” they urged ASEAN to undergo a structural reform with a view to “suiting the situation” and “bringing about regional cooperation” by replacing ASEAN with a so-called “Organization for Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation,” an organization very similar to the “system of collective security in Asia” advocated by the Soviet social-imperialists. This, they say, will enable various Southeast Asian nations to gain “genuine independence.” In other words, the Vietnamese authorities consider that the Southeast Asian nations have not yet gained a “genuine independent” Vietnam to cooperate with them and lead them. Does one need to explain further what part and role the Vietnamese authorities are thinking to play among the Southeast Asian nations?

The Vietnamese authorities’ invasion of Kampuchea in its design to rig up an “Indochina federation” and their activities in Southeast Asia have won the approval of the Soviet Union, which praised them for making “a constructive contribution to the spread of détente in Asia” and for having “opened new prospects for the relaxation of tension.”

The Soviet Union described Vietnam as a “firm outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia” and recently had it join “the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance” (COMECON). This further proves that the Soviet Union is the behind-the-scenes supporter of the Vietnamese authorities in seeking regional hegemonism.

It has become quite clear that the border conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea is by no means accidental. This conflict, together with the Vietnamese authorities’ anti-China acts, including the persecution and expulsion of Chinese residents in Vietnam and the using of the question of overseas Chinese to disrupt the relations between China and Southeast Asian nations, forms a component part of the whole plot. In this plot, the Soviet superpower with its own hegemonistic aims provides cover and support for the Vietnamese authorities’ regional hegemonism, while the Vietnamese authorities serve as a junior partner for the Soviet Union. This is a new style of operating in the current international situation, and a new maneuver for Soviet expansion. People have seen one expression of this style in Cuba, and now see another manifestation in Vietnam. This is a phenomenon demanding close attention throughout the world.

The Vietnamese authorities can deceive nobody by its mean slanders against China. China has repeatedly and solemnly stated that she will never act as a superpower and never seek hegemony. China opposes superpower hegemonism as well as regional hegemonism.

No matter how the Vietnamese authorities smear China, China will continue to resolutely support the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-hegemonic struggles being waged by the people of the world, including the Kampuchean people. The Vietnamese authorities’ tactics of rumor-mongering to confuse the public can only deceive those who do not know the truth. Once the truth becomes known to all, the Vietnamese authorities’ ambition for regional hegemonism will be laid bare in its true colors.



Letter from a reader:

A TRUE STORY

I am so excited that I almost shed tears, and I feel extremely sad when I read your article mentioning the biography of my father and some description of the biography of my older brother, called Chen Sydin. These accounts are the result of the immense efforts of you, your colleagues, and the director of the magazine. Together, you expended tremendous effort to look for documents every place [in Cambodia] and managed to find some documents which contain the name and letters of my older brother. However, some parts of his writing [his confession] were not true; he did that in order to avoid unbearable, brutal torture. After all, death was the reward of this effort.

The surviving members of family and I, as well as all other Cambodian citizens, still remember the terror of the genocidal Pol Pot regime, and it will forever remain in our minds.

I would like to say thanks, specifically to Keokannitha Kim, my niece, who prayed for the peacefulness of the souls of my father and older brother during the Phchum Benn festival.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to the director and his colleagues, who have spent their valuable time to conduct research on the regime, and especially, for publishing the biographies of my father and older brother. May successes fall upon all of your missions.

Chan Srey Touch



Mousa Sokha

Math Rorkeiyah

MALE AND FEMALE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTHS DETERMINE TO FIGHT, DEFEND, AND REBUILD THE COUNTRY IN GREAT LEAPS

(Revolutionary Youth issue 12, December 1976)

The Cambodian homeland is liberated
 Just one year out of the war.
 Plains, mountains, islands and sea
 Were converted by male and female youths.
 Gaze at dikes and water channels
 Water in small pools reflects sunlight.
 Water is plentiful
 For male and female youths who believe
 In cooperatives, the army, and factories
 Within ministries and offices.
 Young farmers are strong
 Cultivating the fields giving their best
 They take no rest from dusk till dawn
 Adjusting the water level in the field.
 Young workers are strong
 Making all sorts of products
 Transportation units
 Move food and equipment.
 While comrades, brothers, and soldiers
 Ready, silent, but their eyes are vigilant
 Yet they participate in agricultural works
 To obtain the highest possible output.
 Male and female revolutionary youths
 Accomplish their great duties
 Determined to reeducate themselves
 To protect the revolution.

Now leaping forward fast
 A grieving landscape is turning into a cheerful one.
 Cities, countryside, and all other places
 Become pleasurable places.
 Crisscrossing endlessly, making new scenes
 Like silver plates do
 Is the result of strong determination
 In the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
 Youths fight strenuously
 To achieve their tasks.
 Remain at the work sites without the need for families
 To achieve three tons per hectare.
 Transplant rice and plow the field
 Use appropriate fertilizer to obtain maximum output.
 Work days and nights to increase production
 To supply the cooperatives.
 Work quickly with a pure heart
 Continuously everyday.
 Hold weapons firmly in your hands
 To defend our nation
 Vigorously with our people
 To make our country prosper.
 Take part in achieving tasks vigorously
 For socialist revolution in Kampuchea.
 Stand strong and ready
 For its eternal existence in the future.

ដើម្បីទប់ស្កាត់ការបោះពុម្ពនិងចែកចាយដោយឥតគិតថ្លៃដល់មន្ទីរស្រុកនិងឃុំនៅទូទាំងព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា
 ទស្សនាវដ្តីចំនួន១០០០ច្បាប់ជារៀងរាល់លេខនឹងដាក់លក់តែនៅក្នុងរាជធានីភ្នំពេញប៉ុណ្ណោះ មួយច្បាប់ក្នុងតម្លៃ ៧០០០ រៀល

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The Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support of the publication of
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