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Letter :

The Shadow of Justice in Cambodia: The Value of Khmer Lives

The arrest of a former Khmer Rouge leader, comrade Sam Bit (also known as Bit or Ranh Bit), was an act of justice. However, it could also lead to a complete concealment of the truth if this Khmer Rouge cadre is prosecuted for the murder of foreigners before he is prosecuted for crimes against the Cambodian people. Approximately two million Cambodians died as a result of torture, slavery, exhaustion, disease, execution and starvation during the 1975-1979 Khmer Rouge regime.

Pol Pot, the leader of the regime, died in 1998. Other senior cadres such as Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan are still living in full freedom in Cambodia.


The Cambodian government arrested Sam Bit at his own home on Wednesday, May 22, at 7:30 a.m. for his connection to the July 1994 ambush on a train

south of Kampot province and the murders of three foreign passengers on the train. The three tourists were Briton Marx (English), Jean Michael (French) and David Wilson (Australian). Moreover, some Cambodian passengers were also killed during the attack.

Sam Bit was a second under-secretary of the Southwest Zone during the regime, which was controlled by secretary Ta Mok of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Ta Mok has been detained for more than three years for his crimes against humanity.

Will the sovereign Kingdom of Cambodia, which should be seeking justice for millions of Cambodian victims, begin with providing justice to three foreigners?

Youk Chhang
Editor-in-chief and Publisher



Autobiography of Chuon Kantha

(Document I05793)

I. Personal Background

1) Original Name: Chuon Kantha; Revolutionary Name: Nakk

2) Birthplace: Paris, France

Place of residence before joining the revolution: France

Birth Date: June 10, 1955

3) Sex: Female

4) Race: Khmer

5) Marital Status: Married

6) Social class: Bourgeois Student

I have a family of five. We had a five-room house and a car. For me, I had nothing; I cared only about studying. After living in France for one year, I returned to Phnom Penh. I was sent to Calmet School when I was six. In 1963, because the contemptible Sihanouk's men perceived my father as a Khmer Rouge, my father and I left for France in terror. Before arriving in France, we went to Czechoslovakia for a short time. We arrived France in May 1963. We lived with my father's brother, Chuon Mom, for a short time. In September 1963, I entered grade 8. Because my French proficiency was low, I repeated grade 9. In December 1963, my mother and younger siblings arrived in France. By then my father had a job and we bought a house and a car by installments. We bought a villa in May 1970.

Beginning in 1970, my father went to Peking, but I still lived in France, continuing my studies. I worked as a babysitter during vacations. The money I earned was spent on books and clothing for myself. Doing this did not mean my parents were unable to support me, but it was about self-reliance in personal needs. Simply speaking, we never lacked what we needed in our daily lives. In 1972, because French people at my school learnt that my father was in Peking, they began trying to prevent me from passing my grade. In the face of this situation, I decided to go to China. At that time due to

my poor knowledge about the situation in our country, I planned to stay in China for only one year in order to study Chinese. I went to China on October 29, 1972.

7) After joining the revolution, I stayed in Peking, living in a collective and eating collectively. However, I received a salary from them. That place was where Khmer people coming from many countries worked cooperatively on foreign affairs during the war. It was a place where people were trained. It was also used as a headquarters to investigate and analyze the situation in Kampuchea. Only a small number of people in the collective were loyal to the revolution. The rest acted against the revolution. These people were all KGB. I had no relationship with them, because I was the only unmarried woman. The rest were unmarried men and a small number of them were married men. Moreover, I had to study at a Chinese school once a week. Thus, from 1972 to September 1973, I studied Chinese for five months with a teacher. From September 1973 to June 1974, I was a student at a Chinese school. This was a school designed for teaching Chinese to foreigners. From September 1974 to September 1975, I went to Guangdong to receive basic medical training. In late September 1975, Angkar summoned us to return to Kampuchea. We complied. Some stayed on to complete their studies. I began devoting more time to the study of Khmer in 1974.

When I arrived, I stayed in a house close to K-2 for three days, then to Office B-4, a place reserved for Khmers arriving from overseas to study the revolution before setting off to work sites. Also it was where Penn Nouth and his family were detained. The man in charge was Comrade San (a youth who returned from overseas during the war in early 1973). We studied with Uncle Hem. After studying all of us were told to go to work sites in Kampong Cham. But, due to illness, I stayed in B-4 for three more weeks. After that I left for B-1 for three months. Then I was ordered to do translations at

P-1 and P-3.

8) I joined the revolution on October 29, 1972 in Peking, China. My father persuaded me through letters mentioning the situation in our country and comparing our future in a revolutionary society and in a capitalist one. Moreover, at the time I did not understand what a revolution, social classes and a revolution liberating the country and the people were. Consequently, I lacked nationalist attitude.

9) Before the revolution, I had no real responsibility. From 1973 to June 1974, I studied Chinese language in Peking. From September 1974 to September 1975, I received basic medical training in Guangdong. From October 1975 to February 1976, I undertook farming work, supervised by Uncle Hong. From February 1976 to January 1977, I translated documents into Chinese at the Revolutionary Hospital for P-1 Children. My supervisor was Brother Thy. From February 1977 until now, I have been translating texts into Chinese in the Revolutionary Hospital for P-3 Children under the supervision of Brother Minh.

10) My education in the old society: reached grade 9 in Phnom Penh (Calmet School). Reached grade 2 in France.

In the new society since participating the revolution: Studied Chinese in Peking (China) and medical techniques in Guangdong. Upon returning home, I taught our comrades.

11) When I was in France, most people who studied there were from the bourgeois and capitalist classes. For me, I had no close friends belonging to these classes, even though I was exposed to their influence every day. Besides, during my two-month vacation, I worked with workers. I had never lived with peasants.

When I was in China, even though I lived in the Khmer community, the community members were bourgeois students and scholars. Around me were our Chinese friends from worker and peasant backgrounds. That was why, when arriving in our country, I lived with peasants. In short, before becoming a member of the revolution, I spent time with bourgeois students and

scholars and after joining the revolution, especially after returning to our home, lived close to the peasants.

After being in these classes, I could see that people in the bourgeoisie still held onto the idea of private ownership, in both materials and ideology. They did not cooperate openly. Instead, they did everything for personal benefit. They were quick to understand and adhere to the guidelines of the party, but lacked nationalist attitude, causing them to fail to implement the party's tasks resolutely. The peasants' commitment was high; they bore all physical sufferings and went through all obstacles. Their solidarity was broad in all situations as long as they followed the revolution's advice and went through thick and thin with the revolution. However, their daily work was completed behind schedule.

12) Took five political classes (two in Peking and three in our country).

13) Wrote a brief biography once, detailed biographies twice (including this time), and made three self-criticisms.

14) I want to build myself into a woman with a strong nationalist attitude. I have eliminated much of my privacy. My greatest shortcomings were talking and joking in an immature manner and without responsibility for the party and its guidelines. This was influenced by France's bourgeois people, whose behaviors were unregulated, too disorderly. This negative influence has led to impolite behavior in conversation with men and other women. In France and China, this relationship between men and women is a normal behavior. As for me, because I lacked an understanding of Khmer culture, I made some mistakes in speaking.

Through many learning experiences, I have improved and have cut down this unregulated talking by up to 80%. The remaining 20% will surely be eliminated completely by following the strict guidelines of the party.

II. About My Parents

1) Father's original name: Chuon Brasith, alias: San

Mothers original name: Chuon Krysiyan. She did not join the revolution

2) My father's nationality is Khmer and mother's



is French.

3) Place: My father is at B-1 in Phnom Penh, while my mother is in France.

My father was born on February 3, 1930. He is now 48 years old and alive. My mother was born in Paris on May 8, 1930. She's alive.

4) Father's social class: Upper bourgeoisie; he's a scholar.

Mother's social class: Worker, but after she married, she became a bourgeoisie. My mother's education is low. However, after marriage she found a job and pursued her studies. Her job needed no certificate. At present, I do not know what she is doing.

As for my father, in France he was responsible for the economic section of a French airline. Though, I am not sure, but as far as I know, he used to gather forces to work for the revolution.

5) My father joined the CPK. He loved and supported the party resolutely. My mother did not join any organization. She did not understand anything about the revolution when she was in France. She walked in a different way from the revolution. She had some knowledge about the Russian revolution in 1921, but she did not understand what a collective society without money was.

6) My mother had some influence on me before I joined the revolution. She educated me to become French like her, from dressing to the way I talk. She tried to per-suade me not to join the revolution and choose capitalism, in which people are free to express their minds. She tried everything to instill the capitalist view in me, but she could not do it successfully. The reason was that this indoctrination was not based on strict procedures, but through the personal bond between mother and daughter.

My father spent very little time with me, since he was too busy with his job. Because he was not as mean as my mother, I listened to him more than to her. When he was in China, he tried to send me letters so that I could study Khmer language and learn more about the situation inside our country. He wanted me

to walk in the revolutionary way. Thus, I have loved my father more than my mother since I was young, but I did not have true affection for either parent. At present, I have nothing to do with them, but I cannot cut off my relationship with them without sadness.

7) I might have a strong influence on my mother, since she loved me more than others. My mother and siblings tried to persuade my father to abandon the revolution and said that they would not follow my father. This influenced his daily tasks.

III. About Siblings

1) Three siblings: Two sisters and one brother

1) Me

2) Chuon Ebebori: male, 21, born on August 18, 1957 in Phnom Penh. Presently lives in France with my mother.

3) Chuon Pascal Kira: female, born on June 6, 1961 in Phnom Penh. Presently lives in France with my mother.

2) The social class of my sister is bourgeoisie; she works as an engineer in France. The social class of my younger brother is bourgeois student. He may be studying currently.

3) When we separated, they were small and today we do not think much about each other, since we have taken different paths.

4) I had no influence on my brother. He loved me as a good sister who normally helped him. I always yelled at him, but did not hit him. My sister usually listened to what I said. I don't have any idea whether they are the same at the present.

IV. Close Friends

1) No close friends

2) Used to work with scholars. Most influences were bad.

V. Health

Beside a headache caused by a vein, which gets smaller, I am healthy. I can accomplish the tasks assigned by the party successfully.

February 5, 1978

At P-3, Phnom Penh

A Draft of the Party's Policy toward Women

Excerpt from Mon's Diary

The Importance of Women in the Revolution

Our national democratic revolution's goal is to destroy the reactionaries, capitalists, feudal imperialists and their authorities. Then we will build a revolutionary people's authority; in other words, the workers and peasants will be given authority under the control of the party.

In order to achieve a national democratic revolution, [we] need the participation of women in armed and political struggles.

Women account for 50% of the population. Thus, they are vital to the revolution in destroying the enemies and improving the sectors of politics, economy, social affairs, education, military, foreign politics, the front and the rear. To have a better understanding of the importance of women, [we] must eliminate two incorrect views:

a) The lack of understanding of armed and political struggles, which are being conducted extensively to destroy the enemies everywhere and weaken them constantly. Our revolutionary force consists of 50% women, who have been participating with us since World War II ended.

b) Like the capitalists, who use women merely as tools to serve their purposes, [we] overlook the importance of women.

The Task of Bringing Women into the Party

a) Convince women to join the revolution. The party must not fail to do this. The gathering of women "according to the class system" must be done in:

Politics, and
Assignment.

b) Drawing women in is not difficult, since they are half the population. They are everywhere—the battlefield, rice paddy, factory, school, work site, ministry,

market and family.

Moreover, women are honest, nationalist, brave, freedom-lovers, hard working and stern. They have good morals and do not commit sexual offenses like men. Most importantly, they are very unlikely to betray [Angkar] or treat other people unequally.

Since WWII, women have been courageously participating in our armed and political struggles.

The Role of Women in Building the National United Front

In building this front, the participation of women is important in:

Worker-peasant alliances
Special backup forces
Secondary backup forces.

Therefore, women play a key role in all kinds of forces of the National United Front. As a whole, their forces are big and strong. That's why the party needs them in order to accomplish its tasks.

The Role of Women in Building the Party

Equally important to the National United Front and in building the party is the presence of women in all chains of command.

As more and more women come to assist the party as the spearhead of the worker class, the role of women will be more prominent in all of the country's political activities. They can also take a leadership role in national politics and as the complete commander-in-chief of the revolution.

Therefore, the party must maximize the employment of women in the party ranks for its strength and growth.

The Roles of the Party in the Women's Movement and Increasing the Number of Female Cadres

a) The party has the role of putting tremendous efforts into increasing the number of women in politics

and assignments. There are important tasks to be done with absolutely full control.

b) Along with the tasks of the women's movement, the entire party has a principal task: encouraging women to take part in all leadership roles. The reasons are:

- ◆ Improving and caring for the morale of women in politics, work and materials, just like men.

- ◆ Increasing the number of female cadres who join the revolution, ideological practices, politics and organizations.

Factors in Achieving the Tasks of Introducing Female Cadres

In order to make the tasks of the women's struggle and the building of female cadres successful, women, men and the party must thoroughly understand and strongly grasp the following important factors:

a) Understand the leadership role of the party

The party is the leader in encouraging women because it has the right policies and is the top organization in the country. Therefore, to free themselves, to show their capability and to widen the scope of their rights, women have to place their complete trust in the party. All cadres and party members must thoroughly understand the policy of the party, so that this policy, when put in motion, can be achieved successfully.

b) Grasp the policy of keeping and building party cadres

Two policies of the party toward women that must be understood and followed are encouraging women and building female cadres. These policies will surely provide a fruitful result. They are:

- ◆ Care for and promote political spirit and endurance according to [each person's] ability with forgiveness and maximum commitment.

- ◆ Build up the spirit of comradeship among female cadres in all activities by handing tasks over to them and guiding them.

At the same time, the party has to focus its attention on instilling revolutionary ideology in women.

c) Understanding the roles of women in freeing

themselves from gender inequality in the revolution

One must understand clearly that women have to free themselves from capitalism and men's underestimation of them.

Only when they do it through the revolution and the struggle of workers and peasants, can they liberate themselves and their equality in leadership and working with men prevail.

Therefore, women must understand this point clearly in order to join the revolution more actively and resolutely. Men must also understand it in order to support the party's policy on women, so that the goal of equality between men and women in leadership and in the workplace becomes a reality.

d) Eliminating the wrong view of men and women toward women

- ◆ Eliminate all capitalist views and men's underestimation of women, especially those men who are members and cadres of the party.

- ◆ Eliminate all views that do not value women and then take the majority view of the party. [The majority views] are women's, since more than 50% of the population is women.

- ◆ Eliminate the view of relying on men. In contrast, one must see clearly and be confident about the importance of women to the revolution and the ability of women in all tasks associated with life.

e) Women must carry out the tasks of the party in the women's struggle and building female cadres

The party has the role of expounding its policy, but women themselves are important in realizing the policy for women to become self-reliant, confident and self-educated under the party's close supervision.

Conclusion

Now we have seen the importance of women in the revolution. We have seen the party's policy toward them. Therefore, the party, men and women must put great effort into accomplishing the party's policy to the maximum.

Locations of Memorials Holding the Remains of Victims of Democratic Kampuchea (77 Memorials)

Rasy Pheng Pong

No.	Name of Memorial	Location
1	Wat Kandal	Sras Chhouk Kandal village, Sras Chhouk subdistrict, Phnom Srok district, Banteay Meanchey province
2	Wat Sopheakmeangkul	O Ambel village, O Ambel subdistrict, Sisophon district, Banteay Meanchey province
3	La-ang Kirirum	Phnom Sampeou Lich village, Sampeou subdistrict, Banan district, Battambang province
4	Wat Samraong	Samraong village, Samraong subdistrict, Ekphnom district, Battambang province
5	Wat Ta Loas Chass	Wat Chass village, Ta Loas subdistrict, Mong Russey district, Battambang province
6	Wat Chrey	Chrey village, Chrey subdistrict, Mong Russey district, Battambang province
7	Wat Samdech Muny	Samdech village, Ta Pon subdistrict, Sangke district, Battambang province
8	Wat Kiribopha Ream	Batheay subdistrict, Batheay district, Kampong Cham province
9	Batheay Security Prison	Batheay village, Batheay subdistrict, Batheay district, Kampong Cham province
10	Wat Po Preng	Veal village, Speu subdistrict, Chamkar Leu district, Kampong Cham province
11	Wat Skun	Skun village, Sautip subdistrict, Cheung Prey district, Kampong Cham province
12	Wat Phnom Pros	Trapeang Cha village, Krala subdistrict, Kampong Siem district, Kampong Cham province
13	Wat Stung Trang	Prek Baraing village, Prek Kak subdistrict, Stung Trang district, Kampong Cham province
14	Kork Pring	Kork Kream village, Vihear Thom subdistrict, Kampong Siem district, Kampong Cham province
15	Wat O Trakuon	O Trakuon village, Peam Chikang subdistrict, Kang Meas district, Kampong Cham province
16	Wat Chihe	Phsar Thmey village, Peam Brar Thnuoh subdistrict, Koh Sotin district, Kampong Cham province
17	Wat Kork Chass	Kork village, Korky subdistrict, Memot district, Kampong Cham

38	Wat Champuh Ka-ek	Champuh Ka-ek village, Prek Thmey subdistrict, Kien Svay district, Kandal province
39	Po Tunle	Po Tunle village, Koh Thom “K” subdistrict, Koh Thom district, Kandal province
40	Wat Prek Dach	Prek Dach village, Prek Dach subdistrict, Leuk Dek district, Kandal province
41	Wat Rokakaong	Rokakaong village, Rokakaong 1 subdistrict, Muk Kampoul district, Kandal province
42	Wat Sngun Pich	Sngun Pich village, Kantok subdistrict, Angsnuol district, Kandal province
43	Phnom Udong	Phnom village, Phsar Dek subdistrict, Ponhea Leu district, Kandal province
44	Wat Angkor Serey Sour Sdey	Samraong Tbaung village, Samraong subdistrict, Ponhea Leu district, Kandal province
45	Basith Traey Troeng	Chhveang village, Chhveang subdistrict, Ponhea Leu district, Kandal province
46	Koh Kor	Chong Kohkor (north) village, Svay Brateal subdistrict, Sa-ang district, Kandal province
47	Koh Thmey	Koh Thmey village, Khporb subdistrict, Sa-ang district, Kandal province
48	Tuol Sleng	Boeng Kengkang 3 subdistrict, Chamkar Morn district, Phnom Penh
49	Cheung Ek	Roluos village, Cheung Ek subdistrict, Dongkao district, Phnom Penh
50	Phnom Kamblok	Svay Samseb village, Cheung Phnom subdistrict, Ba Phnom district, Preyveng province
51	Wat Peam	Peam Koh village, Peam Ro subdistrict, Peam Ro district, Prey Veng province
52	Wat Sla	Sla village, Kampong Russey subdistrict, Peareang district, Prey Veng province
53	Wat Romlech	Rumlech village, Rumlech subdistrict, Bakan district, Pursat province
54	Phnom Trung Bat Execution Kiln	Chambakk He village, Kampong Thkov subdistrict, Kralagn district, Siem Reap province
55	Wat Ksach	Roka Kambot village, Trapeang Thom subdistrict, Brasat Bakaung district, Siem Reap province
56	Kilometer 4	Kilometer 4 village (Reachnukaul village), Stung Treng subdistrict, Stung Treng district, Stung Treng province
57	Bos	Bos village, Mesthngak subdistrict, Chantrea district, Svay Rieng province
58	Tanar	Tanar village, Svay Toeu subdistrict, Kampong Ro district, Svay Rieng province
59	Wat Russey Sanh	Russey Sanh village, Prey Thom subdistrict, Kampong Ro district,

		Svay Rieng province
60	Wat Kampong Ampil	Kampong Ampil village, Kampong Ampil subdistrict, Romduol district, Svay Rieng province
61	Khporb Ampil	Kampong Ampil village, Kampong Ampil subdistrict, Romduol district, Svay Rieng province
62	Wat Bakrong	Bakrong village, Svay Chek subdistrict, Romduol district, Svay Rieng province
63	Wat Kampong Trach	Ta Trav village, Kampong Trach subdistrict, Romeas Hek district, Svay Rieng province
64	Thlork	Thlork village, Thlork subdistrict, Svay Rieng district, Svay Rieng province
65	Wat Svay Pha-em	Svay Ang village, Svay Ang subdistrict, Svay Rieng district, Svay Rieng province
66	Wat Chass	Andaung village, Svay Ang subdistrict, Svay Rieng district, Svay Rieng province
67	Wat Boeng Rey	Wat Boeng Rey village, Svay Ang subdistrict, Svay Ang district, Svay Rieng province
68	Wat Kdey Rumduol	Ak Neak village, Sang subdistrict, Svay Teab district, Svay Rieng province
69	Wat Sauphy, aka Wat Koh	Kandoeng Thom village, Kandoeng subdistrict, Bati district, Takeo province
70	Wat Troap Kor	Trakiek village, Trapoang Sab subdistrict, Bati district, Takeo province
71	Wat Preah Theat Sour Sdey	Kbal Damrei village, Kork Prech subdistrict, Kirivong district, Takeo province
72	Wat Pomeas Andet	Russey village, Ban Kam subdistrict, Prey Kabas district, Takeo province
73	Wat Sras Krang Banteay	Pech Intrea village, Boeng Tranh Cheung subdistrict, Samraong district, Takeo province
74	Tuol Ang	Ang Krauch village, Borey Chulsar subdistrict, Borey Chulsar district, Takeo province
75	Wat Krang Tachann	Kraing Tachan village, Kus subdistrict, Tram Kak district, Takeo province
76	Phnom Sanlong	Sras Trakuon village, Sanlong subdistrict, Treang district, Takeo province
77	Wat Prey Pha-av	Prey Pha-av village, Sanlong subdistrict, Treang district, Takeo province

Rasy Pheng Pong is the Mapping Project Team Leader with the Documentation Center of Cambodia. He is currently assisting the Center's Forensic Team.

List Of Prisoners Smashed At S-21 (Tuol Sleng)

Compiled by Nean Yin

(Continued from the May 2002 issue)

No.	Name	Role	Place of Arrest	Date of Entry	Date of Execution	Others
314	Samrit Khem	Student	Chak Angre	November 7, 1975	May 20, 1976	
315	Sim Sorn	Student	Prek Kdam	November 16, 1975	May 20, 1976	
316	Kai Kosal, called Pauk	Treasury staff	Region 15	December 1, 1975	May 20, 1976	
317	Dy Rama	Ministry of Interior	O Reang Ov	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
318	Long Yang	Civil medical staff	O Reang Ov	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
319	Ruos Saret	Cadre	Muk Kampoul	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
320	Kaet Vooun	Medical staff	Muk Kampoul	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
321	Saun Try	Mapping staff	Region 15	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
322	Phin Chanthan	Agriculture	Region 15	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
323	Mao Sambo	Catholic Relief Fund	Muk Kampoul	January 31, 1976	May 20, 1976	
324	Chhim Kongsin	Public affairs	Region 15	January 29, 1976	May 20, 1976	
325	Yun Hor, called Lim	Translator	Battambang	December 12, 1976	May 20, 1976	
326	Siv Saing	Doctor	Preah Net Preah	February 13, 1976	May 20, 1976	
327	Phung Sievbun	Student	Kampong Thom	February 13, 1976	May 20, 1976	
328	Ing Huoykheng	CARE organization	Preah Net Preah	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
329	Aung Tek, called Toek	Teacher	Prek Po	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
330	Pintharakim, aka Heng Horngkim	Doctor	Preah Net Preah	February 13, 1976	May 20, 1976	
331	Mao Sambo	Commerce	O Reang Ov	February 15, 1976	May 20, 1976	
332	Tork Kan	Medical student	Preah Net Preah	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
333	Ruos Sereysambun	Teacher	Muk Kampoul	January 15, 1976	May 20, 1976	
334	Chann Sophy, called Bo	Student	Muk Kampoul	January 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
335	Chhorn Sroul, called Srom	Public affairs	Preah Net Preah	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
336	Yi Hy	Mining engineer	Muk Kampoul	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
337	Leav Hor Se	Propaganda	Phnom Srok	February 14, 1976	May 20, 1976	
338	Ou Vindy, called Khauch	Foreign affairs	Lvea Em	February 13, 1976	May 20, 1976	



A Conversation Between Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary in Charge of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Commercial Delegation Led by the Vice-Minister of International Trade

Excerpt from Mon's Diary

December 2, 1978 at 5 p.m.

With comrade Ieng Sary were comrades Rit, Sen Rom, San Un and Lmut. With comrade vice-minister of China were Ambassador Sun, all Chinese commercial delegates and some personnel from the Chinese embassy.

Comrade Ieng Sary: On behalf of Kampuchea's Communist Party, the government of Democratic Kampuchea, and the Kampuchean people, we would like to extend our welcome to the delegation of the Peoples Republic of China, which is led by comrade vice-minister of international trade. We wish all comrades happiness and accomplishment during your stay in our country.

Chinese Comrade: Comrade Ly Chheang, minister of international trade, sent a message with us concerning the health of comrade Ieng Sary. We come to Kampuchea this time both to both visit and to gain some knowledge from Kampuchea. This is our great honor. Our two parties have a very deep friendship. We were very pleased to see that Kampuchea's party and people greeted our delegation, which was led by comrade Vang Kong Sinh.

Comrade Ieng Sary: Comrade Vang Kong Sinh gave us many souvenirs. The comrade has strengthened fraternal revolutionary friendship and strategic solidarity between our countries. We are like brothers. The delegation is now promoting strategic solidarity between China and Kampuchea at a level higher. It is our pleasure to invite comrade vice-minister to stay longer, but according to your schedule, you are staying only a week. We understand this.

Chinese Comrade: I am staying in Kampuchea for only a week; however, the deputy chief of the delegation and other members will stay longer than planned, so as to continue to work with our Kampuchean comrades. In the commercial sector, our countries have enjoyed a very good relationship. Our purpose in coming to Kampuchea is to discuss trade between our countries

for 1979. If you need any products, please make an appropriate list of goods and send it to us; we will then fulfill your requirements as best we can. Concerning our past commercial activities, please tell us if we are lacking in any area, such as the quality of the commodities, delivery time, etc. We are well aware of the difficulties of Kampuchea, which is fighting against the invasion of Vietnam, and we would be very glad to see Kampuchea win.

Comrade Ieng Sary: We believe that our trade issues are not complicated, and we rely on friendship to work together. We trust China. Only China understands us. Our discussion will now turn to our plans for the coming years. We had a conversation with comrade Deputy Prime Minister Ly Sien Nean of China, and notified him about the implementation of our commercial contracts with China. The reason was that this year we faced two devastating floods, which had not occurred in the last 70 years.

Chinese Comrade: Kampuchea is defending itself against the invasion of Vietnam, and yet it was devastated by two destructive floods. If there were changes to the contracts, it would not be surprising.

Comrade Ieng Sary: On the topic of the trade agreement between our countries: If it is implemented, China may benefit politically, but we will not mind. In the past, we were afraid we could not conform to the agreement. We need to conduct more studies on various statistics. We need a period of time to build data. In 1975, we did not predict that the war with the Yuon [Vietnamese] would be as enormous as it is today, but we calculated that by 1980, we would have reliable data. However, due to the war, we are not sure about this now. In the past three years, we have learned a lot about how to manage and conserve the power of the revolution. At present, we are self-reliant both in the front and rear

battlefields. Surprisingly, the Yuon still invite us to negotiate trade with them. Our agreement will make the world believe that we are close, but in fact, we are not close.

We assume that the signing of the agreement is about politics and technology. For instance, we cannot be indebted to the equipment manufacturers, but we can do so with the banks. Therefore, we are pleased to have a commercial agreement. In so doing, we will be able understand each other even better, and my country will understand more about trade. This agreement, too, will benefit comrades around the world, but in practice, we cannot implement it due to war.

Chinese Comrade: If you do not mind, we may hand you a sample agreement, which we will discuss later. For the moment, it is acceptable if you cannot meet its requirements. We would like to express that the agreement is just a formality. In reality, we will act according to the situation, which is our internal secret.

Comrade Ieng Sary: We believe that we can sign an agreement now, since in principle, we understand each other well. We suggest that comrade vice-minister work for two days, the 3rd and 4th, and visit Angkor Wat on the 5th, 6th and 7th. In our discussion, we will present only general points, while details and factual points should be left to other comrades in the delegation to discuss.

Chinese Comrade: We would like to express our gratitude to comrade Ieng Sary, who has spent his valuable time to work with us and to welcome us warmly. We believe that the discussion with comrade Vann Rit will be good, and accomplish the tasks set for us by comrade Ly Chheang.

The conversation was made in an atmosphere full of revolutionary fraternity and firm solidarity. It was ended at 5:50 p.m.

Phnom Penh, December 2, 1978

December 3, 1978 at 3 p.m.

The participants of both delegations were the same as in the morning session.

Before resuming negotiations, both sides decided to discuss commercial activities between Kampuchea

and China, and some global events, which contributed to the success of the revolution, the development of Kampuchea, as well as of China, and the failure of international diplomacy of the Soviets and their satellite, the land-encroaching Vietnam. Both sides were in agreement on all issues, and expressed their mutual support in order to prevail over the invasion of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

After that, the Kampuchean side presented a prepared article to the Chinese side, which conveyed the response of Kampuchea to the statement of the Chinese delegation in the morning:

In general, we are in complete agreement on all issues and views that our Chinese comrade highlighted this morning.

The current development of trade between Kampuchea and China is the result of the efforts of our two parties to create fundamental revolutionary friendship and solidarity between the parties and the peoples of both nations, through many exchanges of opinions.

In national defense, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, guided by comrade Pol Pot, we have managed to defend our western border. For the time being, we do not need to worry about this part of our border.

On the eastern border, Vietnam has endeavored to take away our land, eliminate the Kampuchean race, and launch successive attacks on us. Viewed from outside, it seems to be a border conflict, but in fact, Vietnam is trying to conquer our land. By the end of 1977, they mounted major attacks on us, using the tactics of “quick attacks, quick victories.” However, the courage of the Kampuchean army, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and led by comrade Pol Pot, overcame these invasions and humiliated Vietnam on January 6, 1978. Despite its defeats, Vietnam persists in invading us, and is going to launch major offenses in this dry season. Nevertheless, with our clear-sighted party and heroic army, we will surely be able to defeat Vietnam again.

Adding to the threat of war, we have suffered two

devastating floods this year, which were the largest in 70 years. This disaster affects our agriculture; as a result, we cannot export as we planned for this year.

The commercial relationship between our countries has been developing gradually and the trade volume has been increasing every year. Transportation in 1978 doubled over 1977. The telecommunication connection with China in 1978 has enhanced our trade activities. As a result, the International Trade Bank of Kampuchea and Chinese banks are able to work with each other more smoothly.

This morning, our Chinese comrades made a presentation on non-refundable aid, which includes a 140 million Yuan fund and a 20 million dollar temporary trade account. They also provided some data on the account. We appreciated the presentation.

Apart from this, we also concur with the opinion of our Chinese comrades on our exports. We understand that our products have poor quality and packaging, and so far, China has forgiven us on these points. Chinese technicians have helped us to improve a great deal, but we still have weaknesses. We will try our best to raise the quality of our exported products.

We are very pleased with the provision of machinery and mechanical equipment, and the technicians China sent to help us. China's assistance and the cooperation of its technicians have bolstered our morale and improved our workers' skills considerably.

We trust China in setting prices for our products. So far, China has set the prices of our exported products so they conform to the international market. This was yet another great help.

We discussed the commercial agreement yesterday. We believe that the commercial agreement is vital in increasing the political influence of both our countries. We will analyze this issue in detail in the future.

In the near future, we will discuss the commodities we will need for 1979 and clarify various aspects regarding them. This will ease China's burden in providing goods to us. We believe that everything will go as planned. If we cannot answer your questions

relating to technology, we are pleased to invite you to examine our factories, since our technicians have very little knowledge; sometimes they cannot explain things to you in technical terms.

In the end, I would like to wish all of the delegates happiness and success in your visit to Kampuchea.

Chinese Comrade: We have listened attentively to the statement of comrade Vann Rit about trade between our countries. We are aware of the Kampuchean people's accomplishments after liberation day (April 17, 1975), led by the Kampuchean Communist Party. We are very delighted that you have placed your trust in us. We will explain various organizations in our country to try to satisfy Kampuchea's needs completely.

Due to Kampuchea's development of its agriculture, industry and trade, we believe that it can set prices for its exported products in future contracts, since Kampuchea must do business with other countries. If you have any problems, please feel free to tell us; we will try our best to help. If our Kampuchean comrades want assistance in improving their product quality and packaging, please tell us and we will help make Kampuchean products competitive in the international market.

Should you have any purchasing problems, please let us know in advance and in detail, if possible. We will try to provide every good that you need.

You can present all problems that you may have to us now, or to our delegates who will be staying here longer, or to the Chinese embassy at any time.

Comrade Ieng Sary: Thanks to the comrade chief of the delegation for his speech. Because we lack relevant data and technicians, we would like to invite China to continue to set prices for us. We place all our trust in you.

We are very happy for the help of our Chinese comrades. We will try to improve our performance. We believe that in the future, the trade between our countries will grow. The negotiation was ended at 4:25 p.m. Both sides were in agreement on all issues presented.

After a short informal talk, the meeting was successfully completed at 4:45 p.m.

Phnom Penh, December 3, 1978.



The May 19, 1976 Conversation between Comrade Ieng Sary and the Vietnamese

Sophearith Chuong

(Continued from the May 2002 issue)

Ieng Sary continued, “We assume that those assigned to join the meeting will accomplish only what they were told to. Thus, more time is needed to consider. We consent to your request for a delay while you are waiting for some telegrams to arrive. Although comrades Neay Sarann, Seng Hong and Se are absent, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representing the delegation, is pleased to express our gratitude to all of you, who have made tremendous efforts to reinforce cooperation and friendship between our two countries.

As for our efforts in the days to come, we will work with each other via telegram. We will also specify the exact location later. Even though telegrams are not a clandestine channel of communication, the use of codes will help ensure secrecy.

We appreciate the message of comrade Trinh, which comrade Phan Hien presented earlier. We wish comrade Trinh and comrade Le Duc Tho good health and genuine success in this new revolutionary phase and historical period of Vietnam’s unification. We are not sure whether comrade Nguyen Thuong has met comrade secretary or not. Comrade secretary sent me a message wishing comrades Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap success and good health.

Your statement on the election will be sent to the standing committee. As comrade secretary mentioned, following World War II, some countries, like Germany and Korea, were divided in two. Only Vietnam has historically reunited. This was due largely to the courage of the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party headed by Ho Chi Minh. As Vietnam’s strategic ally, we regard this triumph as an achievement that we highly appreciate. With the alertness of its party, Vietnam is able to

track all of its enemies’ tricks. There is no doubt that in the future, the Vietnamese people will win more victories with their self-leadership.

Concerning comrade Trinh’s proposal to have cooperation between both countries’ ministries of foreign affairs in the international arena, we suggest that our cooperation should conform to each country’s conditions, so that we can obtain complete and strong cooperation. Therefore, a continuous exchange of opinions is necessary.

At the Colombo Summit, too, we will report to the Central Committee. Please be informed that we do not have many credible documents. We considered only Kampuchean issues at the Lima Summit. We will begin gathering more documents relating to important world issues. Thus, comrade Trinh’s message suggests new topics to us. The imperialist U.S., in short, has not changed its attitude. It is still imperialist. It is seeking all sorts of means to destroy our revolutions. We are not vague about this. For this reason, we totally agree with our Vietnamese comrades on building our forces to fight against both old and new imperialism. We endorse the independence movement and national liberation.

We will further consider the issue of providing funding to Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos. We prioritize solidarity among the countries in the non-aligned movement. Most of these countries are poor, and some are engulfed by wars. Thus, the fund should be provided to all of these countries, so that no discontent arises. We will analyze this further using available documents to examine its pros and cons.

Regarding ASEAN, I believe that its members are satellites of imperialist countries. Hence, they are not our friends. Yet, we agree with our Vietnamese comrades that ASEAN is vital for us. ASEAN is not

a progressive organization. It does not help our revolutions, but can destroy them. Its attitude in 1967, 1970 and 1972 was different from now; so were its activities. Due to the success of our three countries, it has changed its attitude. Therefore, I suggest that its countries are not friendly. However, a bilateral relationship, like the one the Vietnamese have suggested, will lead to a peaceful co-existence. We will work with them just to reinforce our revolutions, since neither co-existence nor revolution alone is enough. Although we will work with them, we will persevere in our stances.

Comrade Phan Hien also went to Bangkok and met Chhat Chhay Chhun Hawann. After meeting them in Poi Pet, they invited us to meet them seven more times. Seeing no benefit to this, we declined. Pichai Rattakul has asked to meet us twice. For us, there is no gain or loss in meeting them. Therefore, we are considering the case of the Thai government, as we have informed comrade Haysau and our Laotian comrades. We are trying to prevent the enemies from isolating us from the rest of the world. Our declaration about establishing diplomatic relations with Malaysia and the Philippines was just an utterance; we do not know when we will do so.

The attitudes and beliefs of our countries in the international arena are identical; there are no opposing points of view.

Due to our geographic proximity, comrades Haysau and Tam have asked to bring journalists and cameramen into Kampuchea. We have discussed this. Representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we would like to invite three to five North and South Vietnamese journalists and cameramen to come to Cambodia for a week to ten days. You may specify the exact date yourself; June is possible, though there may be some rain.

We are reviewing the airline relationship. In principle, we agree, although we have some technical problems to deal with. The Vietnamese airline delegation may come in July. We are doing whatever we can to strengthen solidarity and friendship between our countries. Please accept our apologies in future meetings for these technical problems.”

Comrade Phan Hien:

“I would like to express my sincere appreciation for our brother’s opinions and suggestions. What you have mentioned will be reported to brother Trinh and the Political Office.”

The conversation was regarded by both sides as a successful first step. The discussion was to be continued at the next meeting.

Sophearith Chuong is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.

To Brothers Khieu and Tum

(L1291)

Comrade Miev, a military attaché in the Chinese embassy, reported that between late June and early July, military equipment would arrive at the port of Kampong Som. The cargo weighed 1,000 tons. It included:

- ◆ 1) Equipment and tanks: Light tanks: 20, Submarine and land tanks: 10 ◆ 2) Generator for the tank unit: 1
- ◆ 3) Construction vehicle: 1 ◆ 4) Command vehicle: 1 ◆ 5) Crane: 1 ◆ 6) Fuel truck: 1 ◆ 7) Engineer’s truck: 1
- ◆ 8) Shells for tank guns: 10,000 ◆ 9) 12.7mm bullets: 30,000 ◆ 10) Equipment for the navy ◆ 11) Equipment for the air force ◆ 12) Radio equipment ◆ 13) Equipment for the construction team ◆ 14) Equipment for artillery regiments.

These pieces of equipment were listed in an agreement between Kampuchea and China.


Note: Two C-123 fighter planes have been repaired. These planes will make a trial flight on June 15, 1976 in Kampong Chhnang. The participants will be comrades ambassador Sun Hav and Toeng Khunsang.

The Chinese will leave Phnom Penh for Kampong Chhnang by plane from Pochengtong on June 15, 1976. June 12, 1976, Teanh



Nuon Chea Denies Killing People

Sophal Ly



Nuon Chea is the former chief of the Standing Committee of the People's Representative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea. Today, he is 77 years old. On October 15, 2001, he said, "I am extremely regretful for the unintentional, enormous loss of human lives that occurred under the leadership of our party. [Our party] had no intention of killing her own people." Along with this acknowledgement, he denied killing people: "I cannot accept this accusation; people died because of starvation and disease only." Nuon Chea's rejection, however, is contradicted by some confessions that were sent from lower-ranking cadres to top-ranking cadres, including Nuon Chea.

◆ Khek Pin, called Sou, the secretary of Region 4, was sent by Santebal to S-21 on June 21, 1977. His confession was copied from a tape recording about his traitorous activities and his 75 associates. Notes appear next to some of his associates' names as "already arrested." On this confession is a handwritten note: "Nuon Chea has already received a copy of this document." The name Khek Pin was on the list of prisoners to be destroyed on October 18, 1977. This means that after being detained for four months and tortured for information, he was executed.

◆ Nhim Sim, called Saut, a member of Battalion 701, Regiment 601 (Central Zone), was arrested on September 18, 1977 and interrogated ten days later. After the interrogation was completed, his confession was sent to "brother Nuon in the Central Zone one copy, dated November 11, 1977."

◆ Sieng Phon, called Pha, was born in Khsach Tup village, Chroy Banteay subdistrict, Prek Brasab district, Region 42, Central Zone. He was an assistant in Battalion 701, Regiment 601, Division 174, Central Zone. According his confession, he was arrested for conspiring to burn an ammunition warehouse and attempting to kill brother Pauk (Ke Pauk). Pha was arrested on October 2, 1977. One copy of his confession was sent to "comrade Nuon of the Central Zone, November 11, 1977." His confession also contains a list of 34 traitors. Twenty-six of the names are notated with: "to be arrested" and one with "to be destroyed." Pha was killed on December 9, 1977.

◆ An Kan, called Kol, the commander of Battalion 702, Regiment 601, was arrested on September 26, 1977 and interrogated on November 6, 1977. His confession was sent to "brother Nuon in the Central Zone one copy, November 11, 1977."

◆ Chout Nhe, age 24, was born in Chrolomng village, Chrolong subdistrict, Tang Kork district, Kampong Cham province (today it is Tang Kork village, Sauyong subdistrict, Baray district, Kampong Thom province). Prior to his arrest, he was a member of a battalion in Regiment 601, Division 174, Central Zone. He was arrested on September 1977 and interrogated on October 19, 1977. After he was tortured, Chout Nhe confessed to being a traitor and revealed his traitorous network. A copy of his confession was sent to brother Nuon on November 11, 1977.

The confessions of the last four prisoners were sent to Brother Nuon on the same day. Therefore, the decision and orders had to be made at the same time.

According to the execution list, all four were killed on December 9, 1977.

The names of the following prisoners do not appear on the execution list, but their confessions were also sent to Nuon Chea:

◆ Kuong Kien, called Ing Vet, the secretary of Battalion 631, Regiment 63, Division 164, was arrested on April 5, 1975. Please check highlighted dates. Ing Vet revealed that a person named Oeun, called Sophal, was in his traitorous network. Duch later confirmed that Oeun had already been destroyed... and Tann Meng was probably executed by Brother 15 (Mok) in 1974. On another confession, Duch wrote, “Sam who was Sam? was destroyed by the base, date May 21, 1977.” Later Duch wrote on the confession, “Respected brothers, I made some notes on this document.” In addition to the two notes above, the note “To Brother Nuon (directly)” was added before being sent to Nuon Chea.

◆ Pheng Sun, called Chey, the chief of the Central Zone’s commercial department, was accused of committing traitorous activities. His confession contains a note saying: “[I have] read and sent two copies to Angkar on October 16, 1977.” The last page of Chey’s confession contains the names of his associates.

◆ Ing Bun Hour, called Khmao, born in O village, Putrea subdistrict, Phnom Sruoch district (O subdistrict, Phnom Sruoch district today), Kampong Speu province, worked at the Ministry of Industry. He was arrested on March 12, 1977. In his confession, he described his pure view and attitude toward the Communist Party of Kampuchea. He wrote that the leadership of Brother Pol and Nuon inspired him to follow the revolution until death. The revolution’s theories were correct, he said, because they provided results, for example, the success of the evacuations during the Chenla period (Chenla was the name Lon Nol gave to two large battle fronts), the people’s war, being resolute in not negotiating in 1973, creating cooperatives, evacuating people from cities, eliminating markets and money, continuing to make socialist revolution, and especially,

self-reliance. He added that the intelligent leadership of brother Pol and Nuon in destroying the CIA and the KGB spies and the land-encroaching Vietnamese boosted the morale of the people. He also wrote that he was innocent.

◆ Chou Chet, called Si, was secretary of the Western Zone. His confession described his support for the policy of eliminating the Central Committee’s enemies. He wrote: “One day, brother Nuon Chea met [me] at Chakto Ruos school, and informed [me] about the traitorous activity in the Western Zone. He advised [me] not to trust the veteran soldiers, since they could hardly abandon their old ideas; thus, [we should] destroy all of them. I answered him: At present, those who oppose the revolution are to be destroyed. If only children remain, I am pleased.”

Other documents reveal the relationship between the party’s lower and higher ranks. The ends of these documents always contain a note sending a copy of the document to those in the upper ranks: “Copy to Uncle, Uncle Nuon, Brother Vann, Brother Vorn, Brother Khieu and Documentation.” In his October 12, 1976 telegram, Lang replied to Nuon Chea: “To beloved and respected Brother Nuon: 1) We have received your telegram. Your advice is highly appreciated. 2) We have set up a commercial group in Phnom Penh. 3) The damaged radio has been repaired and is being used. The new radio is here.” This document was copied to brother Nuon and documentation. A document sent to Pol Pot and copied to Nuon Chea, which described the outcome of “battle 47,” reported, “We have destroyed 100 enemies. They were cut into three pieces. We arrested three. We shot two when they tried to jump into the river. The remaining one is to be sent to S-21 this afternoon.”

Looking at the evidence provided in the above documents, can Nuon Chea be held responsible for making decisions and executing people?

Sophal Ly is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.




When Hunger Crept In

Kalyan Sann

On April 17, 1975, Kruoch Sam-An was evacuated from Phnom Penh to Pursat province in northwest Cambodia. Although the Khmer Rouge considered its land to be fertile, this mountainous province had little water in the dry season as well as some malaria-prone areas.

After April 17, 1975, many Phnom Penh residents were sent to Pursat province. The Khmer Rouge called these former urban dwellers “April 17 People” or “New People.” Because of Pursat’s harsh conditions, most of the New People who were relocated there perished.

Like many other New People, Kruoch Sam-An’s family was sent to live in vast woodlands and grasslands that were previously uninhabited. They lived in Svay Sar Cooperative, situated in Svay Sar subdistrict, Krokhar district, Pursat province. The majority of the cooperative members were April 17 people. This cooperative was divided into smaller groups, and family members were separated from each other and sent to work in different groups.



Kruoch Sam-An

Kruoch Sam-An and her younger sister lived in a mobile unit. One of her younger brothers lived in a “plowing unit” and her younger twin brothers were sent to live in a children’s unit. Her parents were ordered to stay in the cooperative. In 1976 they died of starvation. She said that before they passed away, they were desperately hungry and constantly craved food. One of her brothers perished after a fight with other children.

When they first began living in the cooperative, the Khmer Rouge provided enough food for the cooperative members. One person received one and a half cans of rice a day. However, this period of plenty lasted only about six weeks. After that, the rice allowance fell to

one can for two people each, and then to one can for three, and then one can for four, and then one can for eight. By early 1976, one can of rice was boiled in a large pan for the whole cooperative. This meant that each person was given only one coconut-shell of watery boiled rice per day. Starving, the residents of Svay Sar tried to harvest wild plants; catch fish, snails, carp, and edible insects to fill their stomachs. Nonetheless, these foods did not stop their hunger.

When their hunger became extreme, some people consumed human flesh, generally the flesh of a family member. As family members became ill and were nearly dead, other members would not let them die of



Relatives of Khmer Rouge victims returning to their respective

natural causes, but instead killed them for food. This had to be done secretly, since Angkar strictly prohibited people from eating in private, which was considered to be betraying the cooperative. If they were caught, they might be executed.

Other people dug up freshly buried corpses for their flesh. Kruoch Sam-An revealed that in the 20th unit of her cooperative, a widow killed her ailing child for its flesh. In the 19th unit, a couple killed their two children for food. In the 23rd unit, three sons murdered their father and then preserved his flesh to eat. Around May 1976, Kruoch Sam-An's younger brother asked to be made a member of the children's unit of Tik Chum Cooperative, 20 km away from Svay Sar Cooperative. But he was rejected and bullied by other children, leading to a serious wound on his calf. A day later, he died after the wound had become infected. After his body was buried, someone excavated his grave and

stole the body. A week later, Khmer Rouge soldiers arrested the thief after finding human flesh in his house. The thief was a ten-year-old child.

One night in 1977 in Koh Chum Cooperative, when a livelihood meeting was being held, there was a sudden clamor when people discovered that some of their children had been kidnapped by bandits. After the Khmer Rouge soldiers arrested the seven bandits, they confessed that before April 17, 1975, they had been soldiers. Following liberation day, they were assigned to a transportation unit, but after a short time, they escaped into the forest and had stayed there since. Their diet included the flesh of people who they kidnapped from cooperatives.

In his diary, comrade Nhok Sakhon wrote: "Hunger is the most powerful disease." This adage implies that the Khmer Rouge knew that without food, people could not live. Despite this knowledge, they provided far too little food for people when they needed it the most. The lack of food also made people more prone to disease. Kruoch Sam-An related that only 35 of the 200 people in her cooperative survived the regime. Her family of eight was reduced to four.

Pol Pot, secretary of the CPK and the prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea, frequently declared to the world that under his leadership, Kampuchean people lived in harmony: they had adequate food, shelter and clothing; there were good social services; the country was self-reliant and independent; and it was free of discrimination. But in reality, people were treated like slaves and forced to work like animals. They had nothing. The entire country was converted to a prison without walls and all citizens were its prisoners.

As a result of death due to starvation, forced labor, execution and the lack of proper medical services, nearly 40% of the Cambodia's population perished during the Khmer Rouge regime.



ve homesteads in 1979.

Kalyan Sann is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.



“Rabbit Dropping” Medicine

Sokhym Em

“Rabbit dropping” medicine consisted of plant roots, tree bark, the sap of the tropical thnung tree, and other “natural” compounds. It was produced by female medical staff (many of whom were illiterate or semi-literate) during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime. Made without proper scientific testing, it was rarely known to help patients, and often made them worse or killed them.

Users coined the term “rabbit dropping” because of the medicine’s appearance and ineffectiveness. Uk Lay Im said that the black thnung tree sap and the fact that the mixture was shaped into small pills made it look like rabbit droppings. He also noted that taking the pills was like “swallowing rabbit feces.”

Pol Pot, the secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, officially declared that this and other medicines that could be manufactured by all hospitals around the country were to be used. Angkar asserted, “We do not rely on technology. We develop our country through revolutionary attitude. Things that are not revolutionary are not to be done. Socialist medical staff must eliminate rubbish from the old society [Sangkum Reastr Niyum, 1960s] and modern medication.” Pol Pot claimed, “We have to establish a research team to do research and conduct experiments on traditional drugs. Even though we do not have proper formulas, we can still produce them. We are practicing self-reliance in medicine.”




Sok Kim

Sok Kim was on the medical staff in Takeo province during the DK regime. She said, “Angkar ordered the manufacture of traditional medicines, rabbit dropping medicines, because it wanted people to use

locally produced medicines. It did not want to rely on foreign suppliers. It believed if people used western medicines, they wouldn’t be able to produce medicines for themselves. Available modern medicines were prohibited from use.”

The DK Ministry of Health taught medical staff to manufacture cures for fever, headache, stomach ache, and faintness, as well as quinine for malaria. Fever medication, for instance, was a mixture of damlong mei (a kind of potato), and parts of the kampaoy chen and bramaoy damrei trees. The plants were dried, ground and then mixed with water, and the resulting compound was shaped into pills. Nhem Han, on the medical staff of the North-western Zone, noted that there were several ways of curing fever. At her hospital, they made fever medication from bandaul pich vine, seeds of the sleng tree (nux vomica) and damlong mei. The plants were ground, mixed with palm sugar, and made into white tablets. She added that she did not know whether these drugs were effective; she just obeyed orders.



Nhem Han

Headache medicine was a combination of ground damlong mei and alum or lemon juice. This mixture was molded into small pills. The final product was white, or black if the sap of the thnung tree was added to the mixture.



Miech Than

Miech Than was a member of the Tram Kak district medical staff, which was under the supervision

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Khmer Rouge medical women chopping woods for traditional medicine.

to be used so that we can learn.”

Comrade Krin, the chief of a hospital in Dei Chhnang, Western Zone, swallowed three tablets of rabbit dropping medicine, one after another, trying to make a quick recovery from malaria. But he died immediately after taking them. At a hospital in Kampong Cham, three pregnant women miscarried soon after taking rabbit dropping medicine. Oeun almost lost her life in a hospital in Prey Lvea because of rabbit dropping medicine. Each time she took them, she was “poisoned,” became dizzy, and lost her ability

of Poun. Even though he was illiterate, Poun was able to make medicines for Angkar. Miech Than remembered that Khmer Rouge soldiers in Noreay took out the gall bladders of people who had been executed, and if they were in good condition, sent them to the Tram Kak district hospital every month. The fluids from these gall bladders were used to cure fever. Her story is corroborated by a witness during the Khmer Rouge trials in 1979, named Khoem Malischan, who revealed that Khmer Rouge soldiers cut open people’s bellies to take their gall bladders for medicine. Hieng, the chief of militiamen in Sa-ang Phnom subdistrict and head of the monastery at Sa-ang Phnom Pagoda, showed a fresh gall bladder to her. He said the gall bladder from a healthy person was full of fluid, and in contrast, an unhealthy person’s gall bladder contained half that amount.

In the minutes of a meeting of the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s Standing Committee, Ieng Thirith, the minister of social affairs and education, reported on the ineffectiveness of many Khmer Rouge medicines. Nonetheless, Pol Pot insisted that they be used. He pointed out, “Ineffective or effective, these drugs have

to reason. She said that when doctors gave patients medicine, they had to take it; otherwise, they would be reprimanded and sent back to the work site (sometimes, however, patients were able to throw the drugs away).

When the medical staff identified a patient being poisoned by a drug, they tried to neutralize the effect by giving him or her palm sugar.

During the regime, medicines were produced without proper processing or technology. Angkar just used old traditional doctors to teach the medical staff of hospitals. Poun, a traditional doctor, was promoted to chief of social affairs at Tram Kak hospital. His role was to teach female medical staff how to make traditional medicine. Hem Ang was on a medical staff in Phnom Penh. He said that when Angkar ordered him to learn to make medicines, he did so with no basic knowledge. Combined, these factors produced low-quality medications.

Sokhym Em is a member of DC-Cam's Promoting Accountability Project.

(Continued from the May 2002 issue)

Explaining S-21

Knowing what we do about a “total institution” like S-21 that poignantly embodied and fastidiously documented so much terror and history in the service of a desperate, inept regime, how can we explain what happened there in terms that might be useful to survivors, historians, and readers?

This chapter attempts to answer this question. By taking a more detached view of what happened at S-21, I do not intend to minimize the cruelties inflicted at the prison or the criminality of the Party Center. The preceding chapters have documented the crimes against humanity that occurred at S-21. But there is more to understanding S-21 than merely condemning it as evil. Trying to figure out what happened within its walls, how, and why is more fruitful, I believe, than passing judgment and moving on.

Comparisons have frequently been made between S-21 and the Nazi extermination camps in World War II. Writers who have examined the Nazi camps illuminate the culture of obedience that suffuses total institutions and the numbing dehumanization that occurs, among perpetrators and victims alike, within their walls. Studies of the Holocaust also bring us face to face with the indifference that the Nazis, like the Cambodians, showed their victims, coupled in some cases with the pleasure they derived from causing pain. The same callousness toward “guilty people” and similar bursts of sadism characterized, among others, the judges in the Moscow show trials in the 1930s, the perpetrators of scares in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, the military torturers in Argentina, and those who

organized the mass killings in Bosnia and Rwanda in 1995. As a twentieth-century phenomenon, S-21 was by no means unique.

Even so, when we sift through the dossiers from the prison, the scale of horror is overwhelming. Words fail us. A similar feeling of helplessness swept over the French historian Alain Forest when he visited the site in 1982. “It’s stronger than me,” he wrote, “and there’s no chance of thinking or writing about it. I pull my head instinctively down into my shoulders.” When Boris Pasternak toured collective farms in the USSR

in the 1930s, when thousands of people were dying of starvation, he recoiled also. “What I saw,” he wrote, “could not be expressed in words. There was such inhuman, unimaginable misery, such a terrible disaster that it began to seem almost abstract, it would not fit within the bounds of consciousness. I fell ill.”

When we confront so many extinguished histories, we need to say something to make sense of S-21 and to bear witness to the victims; but, as Jonathan Spence has reminded us, coming at the issue from another angle, “It is one of the tragedies of

writing about tragedy that the weight and texture of words matter unduly, for suffering needs a measure of grace to be bearable to others.” In a sense, Mai Lam’s effort to turn S-21 into a museum was an attempt to make its raw terror “bearable to others.” The map of skulls that he designed for the museum is so grotesque that it increases our distance from the prison. In the same way, the ersatz stupa that Mai Lam erected at Choeng Ek imposes a spurious Buddhist reading onto the skulls displayed inside it. Anything we say or write about S-21, or about the Holocaust, has the effect



Voices from S-21
Chapter six: Explaining S-21
David Chandler

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of softening and cleaning what went on. This is as true of the banal, repetitive, mean-spirited cruelty of S-21, and of Mai Lam's museum, as it is of the facilities in other times and places to which S-21 has been fruitfully compared. Words fail us also because, as Judith Shklar has written, "We talk around cruelty because we do not know how to talk about it."

Why, then, do we persist? Are there advantages to getting close to the terror and intimacy of S-21? Does writing about its victims make their sufferings "bearable to others?" If so, who are the beneficiaries, besides my readers and myself? Historians are always invasive. In these pages I have been an uninvited visitor to S-21, inducing my evidence from the traces left behind by the victims and victimizers at the prison. In the process, I have been talking "around cruelty," and this is a perilous exercise, as Shklar has pointed out: "For all our wealth of historical experience, we do not know how to think about victimhood. Almost everything one might say would be unfair, self-serving, undignified, untrue, self-deluding, contradictory or dangerous. Perhaps the best intellectual response is simply to write the history of the victims and victimizers as truthfully as possible."

In this book I have tried my best to follow Shklar's humane suggestion, so as to bear witness to the victims, to grasp how S-21 could come to be, and to consider how similar institutions have come to life in the past and might reappear again. To perform these tasks, I have had to overcome my reluctance to move in close, my reluctance to share responsibility for what happened, and my eagerness at all costs to maintain my balance. I need to find the words that fit, and what happened at the prison continually overwhelms the words. As a historian and a student of literature I have tried, over the years, to control the data I deal with and to comprehend the writings that I read. When I have immersed myself in the S-21 archive, the terror lurking inside it has pushed me around, blunted my skills, and eroded my self-assurance. The experience at times has been akin to drowning.

Writing about state-induced violence in Argentina in the 1970s, Marcelo Suárez-Orozco has taken issue with people who were reluctant to confront and analyze the phenomenon. These timid figures, he writes, have asserted that "the materials are simply too sinister for any form of detached analysis. Any attempt at analyzing the materials would invariably do violence to an immensely complex and delicate subject. In the end, analysis simply reproduces the discourse of violence, albeit in another idiom." Suárez-Orozco argues that the analysis of horror must continue, even though the materials in question are "so unnerving that no distancing from the terror can ever be truly achieved," not because understanding what happened will allow us to pardon the perpetrators but because "terror is part of the every-dayness of life." By confronting terror, he suggests, we are confronting something that is not only "out there" but also inside ourselves. S-21 is closer to all of us than we would like to think. Along with trying to write the history of the place as "truthfully as possible," therefore, I have tried to penetrate the everydayness that Suárez-Orozco describes. If "S-21" in a sense is everywhere and we are all inside it, the prison becomes simultaneously harder to cope with and easier to explain.

In 1971 the British journalist Gitta Sereny spent several weeks interviewing Franz Stangl, the SS colonel who commanded the extermination camp at Treblinka, where over a million people, the vast majority of them Jews, were put to death from 1941 to 1943. Stangl was arrested in 1967 in Brazil, where he had been living under his own name. When Sereny talked to him, he had stood trial in Düsseldorf for his activities in World War II and had been sentenced to life imprisonment. He died of a heart attack in prison in 1972, after Sereny's interviews with him and before the publication of her book.

In the interviews Stangl apparently struggled to be helpful and to align what remained of his Catholic upbringing and his honor as a career policeman with what he had seen and done in World War II. Sereny

was courteous with him but pulled no punches. Asked at one stage why the Nazis had exterminated the Jews, Stangl replied that it was because the Nazis “wanted their money.” Sereny then asked him, “If they were going to kill them anyway, what was the point of all the humiliation, all the cruelty?” and he answered, “To condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it possible for them to do what they did.”

Over time, Stangl assured her, the workers at Treblinka became conditioned to performing horrible tasks, so long as the horrors were sanctioned and encouraged and so long as the victims meant nothing to them “personally” and could be thought of as outside the human race. In a similar fashion, the “ordinary men” of the SS reserve police battalion described by Christopher Browning, after some initial aversion, were able to massacre thousands of Jews in Poland in 1941. For workers at S-21, a similar toughening process was hastened and intensified not only by the supposed ubiquity of “enemies” in Cambodia but also by the merciless discipline of the place. If they refused to work or worked too slowly, the guards and interrogators at S-21, unlike their Nazi counterparts, might become victims overnight. Their survival soon became a corollary of hard work. As Kok Sros has recalled, “I tried to work my hardest. If I died, so be it. If I died after I had worked very hard, it would be better than if I hadn’t tried hard enough.”

For Kok Sros, Stangl, and perhaps Browning’s

“ordinary men,” the importance of doing a good job eclipsed the nature of what they were doing. As the director of Treblinka, Stangl believed that he had been able to prevent worse atrocities by working hard and by adopting a conscientious, even-handed command style. “Of course, thoughts [about what was happening at Treblinka] came,” he told Sereny. “But I forced them away. I made myself concentrate on work, work and again work.” Even so, he said, he needed several glasses of brandy every night to get to sleep.

After noting her agreement with what Stangl had just said, Sereny wrote: “To achieve the extermination of these millions of men, women and children the Nazis committed not only physical but spiritual murder: on those they killed, on those who did the killing, on those who knew the killing was being done and also, to some extent on all of us, who were alive and thinking beings at the time.” Sereny’s troubling comment suggests that to achieve the murders at Treblinka, the Nazis could count on the spiritual deadness of the world at large. In a similar sense, I suggest, we allowed S-21 to happen because most of us are indifferent to phenomena of this kind happening far away to other people. Evil, we like to think, occurs elsewhere.

Browning, Sereny, and other authors, however, suggest that under extreme conditions, such as those that applied in World War II, boundaries of this kind become impossible to draw. Primo Levi has written that a “gray zone” enveloped many of the guards and



prisoners at Auschwitz. Browning refers to the “zone” from the point of view of perpetrators as a “murky world of mixed motives, conflicting emotions and priorities, reluctant choices and self-serving opportunism and accommodation wedded to self-deception and denial.” At S-21, in one sense, there was no such zone, because there was too little connivance among victims, perpetrators, and the outside world to construct it. Yet although prisoners at S-21 could never become interrogators or guards, workers at S-21 could become prisoners overnight. In this sense, everyone in S-21 inhabited a gray zone all the time.

To complicate things further, we need to remember that the people working in the Nazi camps and at S-21 were not inherently brutal or authoritarian. Most of them appear to have been unexceptional, often poorly educated men and women who were cast in brutal roles. How much free choice, peer pressure, obedience, and ambition were involved in what they did is impossible to determine. What we know about the workers at S-21 points in most cases, as Browning’s research would suggest, to their ordinariness and banality. Bonded with people like themselves and abjectly respectful of those in charge, the workers at S-21, like the prisoners,

were trapped inside a merciless place and a pitiless scenario.

To be entrapped like this, and to act in this way, does not require the context of Treblinka, Auschwitz, or S-21. The process was chillingly demonstrated, under relatively genteel conditions, in Palo Alto, California, a few years before S-21 began its operations. In the so-called Zimbardo experiments in 1971, a group of Stanford University graduate students, all volunteers, were placed in a role-playing situation that sought to duplicate the culture, practices, and power relations of an American prison. As the “guards” began to relish their empowerment and the “prisoners” became fearful and dehumanized, the experiment spun out of control. It was cut short before anyone was seriously hurt.

(Continued in the July 2002 issue)

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Anlong Veng Residents Believed Ta Mok did not Commit Crimes

Vannak Huy

Most people in Anlong Veng who were under the control of Ta Mok do not believe that he conspired or committed crimes that led to the deaths of two million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979.

One Anlong Veng resident joined the Khmer Rouge revolution in 1970 and later defected. He admitted that more than two million innocent people died from execution, torture, starvation and forced labor during the Khmer Rouge regime. However, he denied that Ta Mok killed people.

He believes that the regime's internal enemies who conspired with foreigners were the cause of these casualties. He also stated that seven out of every ten Khmer Rouge cadres were internal enemies. These enemies always misinterpreted Angkar's guidelines. When Angkar ordered them to bring people to be educated, they killed them instead.

In 1997, he heard Pol Pot tell journalists about the Cambodian deaths during the Khmer Rouge regime. Pol Pot said that during the constructive era (the Khmer Rouge regime), he killed 30,000 Lon Nol soldiers and officials. He also had their names, which he kept until 1998. After his death, his followers burned these lists. Pol Pot blamed the internal enemies, who worked with foreigners, for all the deaths.

Many Anlong Veng inhabitants respect and love Ta Mok. They usually call him "Ta" (grandpa or elder). Uon Van, Ta Mok's nephew, who now lives north of Anlong Veng district, said, "I do not support the accusation that Ta Mok killed people."

Uon Van stated that Ta Mok always helped lighten people's burden by providing them clothes, mosquito nets, blankets, hammocks, medicine and food. He constructed a concrete bridge, a hospital, a

school, an army headquarters, three gravel roads, an ammunition factory, a sawmill and a plant that produced counterfeit money.

Ung Chooun or Chhit Chooun, alias Ta Mok or Ta 15, was born in Brakeab village, Trapeang Thom subdistrict, Tram Kak province. Before joining the revolution when he was 19, he had been a Buddhist monk



for ten years and learned all the Buddhist principles.

He became a district chief of the Issarak Khmer insurgents in Takeo province in 1949 and a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1963. In 1968, he was promoted to secretary of the Southwest Zone. He was one of the members of the standing committee of the CPK in July 1971, and became deputy secretary of the CPK in November 1978.

On March 6, 1999, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces arrested Ta Mok and is still detaining him. Ta Mok is now waiting for an independent tribunal to be set up to try him for his crimes.

Before his arrest, he used to say: “On earth is



Ta Mok

Mok and on Mok is my hat.” However, he forgot to look down and realize that just beneath the soles of his feet are the mass graves of tens of thousands of people killed under his orders, and that his head is not above the law.

In addition to Ta Mok, there are many other Khmer Rouge leaders who continue to flout the regime’s victims. Nuon Chea, Brother Number Two, asked, “Was I suitable to be a murderer?” In his letter on August 16, 2001, Khieu Samphan, the former president of Democratic Kampuchea’s state presidium, claimed, “I did not have the right to question executions. Executions were carried out by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Son Sen.”

In a February 7, 1999 letter, Ieng Thirith, former minister of Social Affairs and Education and a reserve member of the central committee, stated, “As a nationalist, I still have deep respect for the sacrifices of those people [Khmer Rouge] whether they are dead or alive. Without them, Cambodia would have disappeared from the world.”

The Khmer Rouge tribunal law was approved by King Norodom Sihanouk on August 10, 2001. Cambodian people have been waiting for justice for more than 23 years now. What will the law do with Ta Mok and other Khmer Rouge leaders?

Uon Van, who worries about the health of Ta Mok, pleads for the establishment of an independent tribunal to prosecute him. He said, “I want them to try him to see black or white.” He added if he had enough money to travel, he would come to visit Ta Mok in Phnom Penh, despite the fact that the police would be unlikely to allow this.

The prolonged detention of Ta Mok without a tribunal causes frustration to the many people who raise the question: Who were the real murderers of two million Cambodians ?

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guidelines, rebuild and develop the country in all sectors” stated that agriculture was the key to developing and defending the country. This was the reason why the revolution considered the “knowledge in manipulating nature, cultivation and national and class struggles” as being of paramount importance. The only people who possessed this knowledge were workers and peasants.

In the second cabinet meeting on May 31, 1976, Ieng Thirith admitted that the difficulties being experienced by the young cadres in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health resulted from illiteracy.

On the September 30, 1977 anniversary of the party, its representative stated that the old society’s educational system had been copied from other countries, and was thus impractical in developing Kampuchea. Moreover, using this system could result in Kampuchea becoming a lackey of the west and being continually dependent on foreigners. To serve the country’s defense and development needs, education had to be “learning and doing” —learn theories and carry them out. He also stated that education should be closely linked to labor and cultivation, and that students should also learn practical techniques from their study sessions in cooperatives and factories. The Khmer Rouge’s immediate goal was to eliminate illiteracy and improve scientific technologies in agriculture, rice, rubber, industry and irrigation.

Access to Education

Although the Khmer Rouge began educating Tram Kak children in 1970, education was not universal. Some regions were still under the control of the Republic of Kampuchea, while others were plagued with war, forcing children to run to shelters every time bombing and shelling occurred.

Only the first three grades were taught in Tram Kak district. After completing these three grades, children could read and write to some extent and had some grasp of geography. But according to Dul Chim, “The most important aspect of children’s education was agricultural study, such as learning to grow crops and to make compost.”

A 1976 document entitled “The situation of rebuilding the country in all sectors,” stated: “The educational process does not happen in classrooms, but in the field. The certificate is given according to the quality of one’s transplanting and tending of the crops.” This document also mentioned that Tram Kak had no classrooms, tables or chairs. Children had to sit on the ground.

Ouch Man said that her children had no proper classrooms. They had to study in the shade of a tree near their work site. Phatt Samot added that she had to sit under a coconut tree during class time.

Age Limits and Education by Gender

Before 1975, boys and girls in Tram Kak district studied in the same class. After the 1975 liberation, children were made to live in children’s units, which were generally boys or girls only.

In Tram Kak, only children between the ages of 6 or 7 and 15 or 16 were allowed to serve in children’s units. Children were allowed to go to school when they were 6 years old or when they could pass their right hand over their head and touch their left ear.

Kindergarten teacher Ham Horn talked about the education of children in Tram Kak during the Pol Pot regime: “Only children were allowed to attend school; people in the women’s unit were not, since it was considered as a waste of time. The women’s unit was


classed principally as a work force, and was subject to intensive labor.”

Being in a children’s unit, however, did not guarantee an education. For example, 15-year old Saom Narin was assigned to a male youth unit in 1975.



During the regime, he did not attend school at all. Likewise, Brak Pheou was ordered to live in a children’s unit, but less than a year later, she was transferred to a woman’s unit and her education ceased.

Locations and Hours of Education



Saom Narin

In 1970, children in Meas Phalla village were taught in tattered huts and pagodas in order to avoid being bombed. Din Dorn was a kindergarten teacher who taught others to teach children in liberated regions. He stated that during the

regime, children learned from two to four hours a day. After his village was bombed by B-52s in 1972, the children were sent to study in safe places like the forest. Only when aircraft were not near the village were the children allowed to study, and they always had to be near some sort of shelter.

Before 1975, study hours differed from one region to another. In some places, children could study three or four hours a day, either in the morning or afternoon. However, in other regions, one hour was the longest study period. The length of study generally varied according to the situation and availability of teachers.

According to the document “Investigate; endeavor to understand; and adhere to political guidelines, rebuild and develop the country in all sectors,” studying was to be done at midday, thus allowing students to work in the mornings and afternoons.



Phatt Samut

Phatt Samut was in a children’s unit that allowed only half an hour of study per day. She paid little attention to her studies because she was exhausted from working, and usually she took her study time to rest before returning to work

in the afternoon. So Chamraen mentioned that her one or one and a half hours a day of study were not enough.

Textbooks

The Khmer Rouge published a few school textbooks. They were an arithmetic and literature text for grades one and two; a political geography for grade

two; and another geography textbook whose cover has not survived. There were no examinations or certificates given.

One textbook published in 1976 consisted of 3 chapters and 108 pages. The first chapter had 46 lessons focusing mainly on learning to read and write Khmer. The second chapter had one lesson on grammar. The final chapter contained 15 prose and poetry lessons that indoctrinated children to be loyal to Angkar and the revolution, and to work hard in the rice fields. In addition, the Ministry of Education issued an arithmetic textbook for grade one in 1976. Its 53 pages were divided into 22 lessons, covering adding and multiplying numbers from 1 to 10,000.

Khmer language, arithmetic and political geography textbooks were prepared for grade 2. A 130-page Khmer language textbook had chapters on agriculture, industry and handicrafts, the revolutionary army, social affairs and health, and general subjects. Each chapter required children to undertake practical exercises. The arithmetic textbook, published in 1977, had 3 chapters and 112 pages. The first chapter had 17 lessons on multiplying multi-digit numbers and calculating fractions. The second chapter consisted of one lesson on calculating surface area. The third chapter had 9 lessons focusing on geometry. The 1977 political geography textbook had 70 pages and 2 chapters. The first contained a lesson about Cambodia and its people. The second chapter had 11 lessons on governmental administration, cooperatives, unions and provinces in Cambodia.

Although only three grades were taught in Tram Kak district, there were only two textbooks—literature and arithmetic—for grade one, and a geography textbook for children in all age groups.

After liberation, Tram Kak authorities distributed textbooks to teachers, but not students. Teachers had to teach children according to the textbooks, and were not to use other materials. Not all teachers received a textbook. Although Angkar issued an order to publish more textbooks, some teachers in Tram Kak never



received any.

Teachers

In the Democratic Kampuchea regime, those who were well-educated and held certificates from the old society were classified as “bourgeoisie.” The Khmer Rouge perceived people in this class to possess an infirm and disdainful attitude. All of them were regarded as an impediment to the success of the revolution. As a result, the Khmer Rouge always kept an eye on the bourgeois people.

The Khmer Rouge document “Educational Policy at the Present” was written before they took power. It declared that education was to be provided at the elementary level and conducted in conformity with the slogan “the educated teach the uneducated.”

“The educated” in this slogan did not include scholars of the previous regimes, who were considered to be bourgeois. A Khmer Rouge cadre’s notes from a meeting on July 23, 1975 mentioned that scholars were not to be allowed to teach, except those who had lived in liberated regions or received education from the party between 1970 and 1973. Even the latter were discriminated against.

A village chief made Chea Touch become an elementary teacher in 1972. After 1973, Angkar replaced him with someone more staunchly pro-CPK. After that, well-educated teachers were dismissed from teaching one by one. In 1975, Touch was prohibited from teaching, since his education was grade 4 (grade 9 today) in the old society (in Sangkum Reastr Niyum, the lower the grade, the higher the education).

Teachers in Tram Kak were appointed by the educational committee or village subdistrict committee. Their backgrounds had to be clean and they were required to be long-time members of the revolution. The roles of a teacher were to serve as the chief of the children’s unit, the children’s overseer in labor, and the instiller of revolutionary stances. Teaching children to read and write seemed to be a secondary activity.

Din Dorn revealed that Angkar limited the objectives of education to being able to read and write

and calculate numbers. As a result, teachers did not have to be well educated themselves. Those who met these criteria were ideal recruits. While political leanings were not a requirement for teachers before 1970, they were after 1975.



Dul Chim, the chief of Popel subdistrict from 1976 to 1979 said, “Knowledge was not very important for a schoolteacher. What Angkar needed from them was lo-yalty. Teachers were selected after they were examined on their understanding of socialist ideology,

not literature or other subjects.”

In 1970, 12-year old Ouch Man quit studying at grade 8 (grade 5 today). In 1973, the National United Front selected him to be a teacher; he held this position until 1978, the only thing Ouch Man taught was how

Children under the Democratic Kampuchea regime.



to work in the fields.



Ham Horn

Ham Horn taught children one hour a day during midday break after lunch. He remembered, “The goal of education was to teach children to read, write and perform simple calculations.”

Pen Yeang was 16 in 1972 and had completed grade 9 (grade 4 today). He was considered to be the best teacher in Tram Kak. After April 17, 1975, Pen Yeang taught grade 3, the highest grade. But because the answers for the exercises were in the back of the book, teaching was not difficult for him or the other teachers.

Pen Nam was in a children’s unit after 1975 and studied very little. After a year in the unit, he was appointed by its chief to be the unit’s teacher. Unprepared to teach, Pen Nam instead led students to chat under a tree.

Educational Facilities

The document “Investigate; endeavor to understand; and adhere to political guidelines, rebuild and develop the country in all sectors,” states that classroom students were required to have a pencil and notebook.

Despite this requirement, Tram Kak children were poor and lacked even this basic equipment. They instead found dry fine mud taken from the bottom of a pool or pieces of damlorng mei (a kind of potato) which they used as chalk. Phat Samot had neither pencil nor paper. His teacher copied lessons on the black-board for the students to read.



Ouch Man

Ouch Man said her students had pencils to write with. Her pupils made books themselves from large sheets of paper left in factories from the previous regime. Those who could not find

paper lacked books in which to write.

Technical Studies

In addition to learning to read and write, some Tram Kak children whose parents were cadres were selected to work as medical personnel, soldiers, factory workers, etc. These children were assigned to take technical training. Some of them studied in Tram Kak, while others went to Takeo provincial town, Phnom Penh, other provinces, and sometimes, China.


Cursory medical and military tactics training were provided in Tram Kak. Most of the time, students learned on the job from experienced cadres. Even though technical training was compulsory, it was not widespread in Tram Kak, for there were other, more pressing jobs to be done.

Sophat began living in a Tram Kak children’s



Sophat

unit in 1976, yet he received no education during the regime. It Sdaeng was taught some basic reading and writing soon after she joined the children’s unit in 1976. But as her work increased in the following year, she was not allowed to study. In each session, her teacher taught her revolutionary songs and two or three letters, again and again, every day.



It Sdaeng

Because they were children during a regime that did not value education, many of Tram Kak’s adults are illiterate today.

Kannitha Keo Kim is an author of the soon to be published, Children Under the Khmer Rouge. She is working on another paper entitled, Khmer Krom Under the Khmer Rouge.

Cyan Magenta Yellow Black 100 100 100 100 50 50 50 50

16. In case a guarantee, as referred to in paragraph 15, is provided to the satisfaction of the fact-finding mission, the latter should, on hearing witnesses, either provide an opportunity for the state concerned to be present and to question witnesses, or make available to the state concerned a record of the witnesses' testimony for comment.

17. The fact-finding mission may withhold information which, in its judgment, may jeopardize the safety or well-being of those giving testimony, or of third parties, or which in its opinion is likely to reveal sources.

18. On the basis of data generated by its staff, written statements, and testimony of witnesses, the fact-finding mission should make its own determination as to whether it needs to conduct an on-site inspection.

V. The On-Site Investigation

19. The fact-finding mission should draw up its work program, including the list of witnesses it wishes to interview at the site of the investigation, places it wishes to visit, and the sequence, timing and location of its activities at the site.

20. The fact-finding mission may operate as a whole or in smaller groups assigned to conduct specific parts of the investigation.

21. The fact-finding mission should insist on interviewing any persons it deems necessary, even if they are incarcerated.

VI. Final Stage

22. After the conclusion of the on-site investigation, members of the fact-finding mission should draw up a set of preliminary findings and submit these, together with supplementary questions where appropriate, to the state concerned, giving it an opportunity, within a reasonable time, to present comments and/or to rectify the matter investigated.

23. A final report shall be prepared by the chairman reflecting the consensus of the fact-finding mission. In the absence of a consensus, the mission's report should contain the findings of the majority as well as any views of dissenting members.

24. In case a decision is made to publish the report, it should be published in its entirety.

25. The organization establishing the fact-finding mission should keep under review the compliance of states with their undertakings regarding non-reprisal against petitioners, witnesses, their relatives and associates.

Fact-Finding by Non-Governmental Organizations

It is not merely—or perhaps even primarily—intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that are engaged in the process of fact-finding in the human rights field. NGOs are active in this sphere as well—perhaps even too active for the liking of certain countries. NGOs have so wide a variety of interests, functions and levels of material resources that they nearly defy generalization entirely. Even their purposes and the information they gather vary enormously. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, has extensive experience in investigations of the conditions in which prisoners are held during armed conflicts. This organization resolutely shuns publicity. Its function is essentially to carry on discreet negotiations with the states immediately concerned. Organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, do reports on the human rights situations in various countries and disseminate those reports to the general public as widely as possible. Still other groups are engaged in litigating human rights issues before international or domestic courts. They must gather the kind of evidence that will pass the stern muster of a court of law.

*Please send letters or articles to
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Cambodia's Defense Strategy against Vietnam

*Phnom Penh home service 1100 gmt 10 May 1978.
Excerpts from a broadcast on the national defense
situation from April 1977 to April 1978:*

What has been our national defense situation during the past year? During this period, we fought vigorously against all enemies—domestic and foreign, and won complete victory.

(1) *The defense of the western border:* This year there were some clashes, but we were in full control of the situation and there was nothing to cause us concern. We are now capable of defending this border, and in the future we shall be even more so.

(2) *The defense of the eastern border:* The defense of the eastern border has been a matter of vigorous and strenuous battle because to the east, Cambodia shares a border with Vietnam. The Vietnamese want to take our territory and turn Cambodia into its satellite, making it part of Vietnam. It was for this reason that during the past year, a number of serious and violent battles were fought against the Vietnamese.

During the period from 17th April 1977 to 17th April 1978, fighting took place continuously in small-, medium- and large-scale battles. The level of fighting actually increased this year. The fighting against the Vietnamese has been even more serious than in previous years. Because they do not have their forces inside our country, the Vietnamese must attack us from outside, and launching attacks from outside requires a larger number of troops.

We smashed and drove the aggressive Vietnamese forces out of our territory on 6th January 1978, killing and wounding 29,000 of their troops, and smashing 5 of their divisions. This was our opening victory in the first phase. At the time we attacked the enemy forces and won our first victory, we had not yet properly organized

our forces. Like the armed forces of the Party Central Committee [kamlang robas kangtoap robas machempak], our forces in each region were not fully organized for such large-scale fighting, and the troops and weapons were not yet fully prepared. However, we succeeded in smashing the Vietnamese forces.

The Vietnamese forces then attacked us in the second phase. This phase of the offensive started towards the end of February 1978, and was intended to create the conditions needed to smash us in March and then occupy Cambodian territory in April. This is why the Vietnamese engaged 11 divisions in this phase, 2 more than in the first phase. What happened then?

As soon as we had won our victory of 6th January 1978, we did not let the Vietnamese initiate further attacks against us, but kept launching attacks against them. We launched a series of attacks until the end of January. We also attacked them in February. The Vietnamese forces became weaker, losing a number of troops. They were then obliged to send fresh troops in order to launch new attacks against us. However, by March the Vietnamese did not have the strength to attack us: instead, we continued to attack them. The fighting was serious and fierce in March. A number of divisions were deployed to each front—this was by no means a small war. While the Vietnamese suffered defeats in January and February, their defeat in March was even more serious. Because of their heavy defeat in March, the Vietnamese did not have the strength to attack us again in April. Thus, they turned to guerrilla tactics or engaged in smaller attacks, but just as they were defeated in their large-scale offensives, so too they will suffer even more serious losses in their smaller attacks.

We absolutely must fight to defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia. We



fully aware of these lines, views and stand. Now, how well did we implement this combat line in winning victory? In brief, the target of one against 30 has been attained.

How are they [the Vietnamese] going to attack us in future, and how are we going to handle it? We have to foresee the prospects. In order to do this, we have to review past events and look into the future. Did the Vietnamese succeed in beating us? They have wanted to turn Cambodia into their satellite since 1930. In 1945, we joined in the fight against the French. The Vietnamese then wanted to conquer and annex Cambodia the easy way. Did they succeed then? No, they did not. Did the Vietnamese succeed in conquering Cambodia in 1950, 1960, 1970 or 1975? No, they did not. This is why we need not adopt a defeatist view. We must review our history. Have the Vietnamese succeeded in swallowing Cambodia? No. They wanted to swallow us in 1970, but they could not. They entered into negotiations in 1973 in an attempt to swallow us, but they did not succeed. They tried again in 1975. Their plan was to capture Prey Nokor [Saigon, Ho Chi Minh City] first, and then attack Phnom Penh, in order to impose their control over us. This time again, they were a step behind Cambodia, and Cambodia was victorious. After our victory, the Vietnamese wanted to stage a coup d'état, and attacked us; again they were defeated. They were defeated in 1975, 1976 and again in 1977. Their April 1978 attack was also defeated.

So, we must read history and have full confidence, and we must not believe the lies and confusion of other people who wonder how we, with only 8,000,000 people, can defeat Vietnam with its 50,000,000 people. We must not believe that we cannot defeat Vietnam, just because we have about 100,000 troops against Vietnam's 1,000,000.

What is the solution to the contradiction of using a small force to defeat a larger force? It is necessary for the smaller force to know how to use what power it has to defeat the larger force, as we mentioned earlier—that is to say, one against 30? If we can use one against 30, we shall certainly win, even if this fight lasts 700

years or more. But if we do not adopt this line, we shall not win. Therefore, 1) We must be resolutely determined to defend our territory. Defending Cambodian territory means defending the Cambodian race. If the Vietnamese succeed in conquering the country, the Cambodian race will be completely erased within about 30 years, so it is imperative that we defend Cambodia. 2) We must be confident that we can defeat the Vietnamese. 3) How do we defeat them? We must understand and know how to use a small force to defeat a large force. We must use one against 30. This is just the number fixed by the Party, but in real situations, some of our comrades fought one against 10; so we shall certainly win with one against 10 or one against 5. Some of our people have fought one against 20, and some have even tried to fight one against 50 or one against 100. There was no problem. We were still victorious. This is the combat line to implement, to apply the science of people's war, to solve the contradiction, for we have to use a small force to defeat a large force. We won victory because we solved this contradiction properly. This is what happened in the past, and is happening at present.

What must we do in future? We must: 1) believe that we shall be able to continue to fight as successfully as we have in the past; and 2) have confidence in the implementation of the same combat line—one against 30. Some of our units must fight one against 40, and others must try one against 50.

During the past three or four months of fighting the Vietnamese aggressors, our armed forces have developed tremendously, increasing fourfold. This is the first change. The second change is the fact that the number of cadres has also increased. In order to develop the armed forces, it is necessary to have cadres. After one or two months of fighting, our cadres can handle battalions. After the same period of time those who were in battalions can handle regiments, and those who were in regiments can handle divisions. We have used our army cadres in the development of our armed forces throughout the country. That is why our armed forces

are in control of the situation in the Kantuy Neak area [words indistinct], from the tip of Ratanakkiri down to Mondulkiri, Kratie, Snuol, Memot, Prey Veng, Romease Hek, Prey Veng again, Kandal, Takeo and Kampot. We can smash an enemy regiment attacking us on one front in one or two days.

Why are our forces so powerful? Because we have powerful army cadres. Powerful army cadres make for powerful combatants, because combatants are under the guidance of the cadres. Why are these cadres so powerful? Because they are army cadres who have been properly selected in accordance with the lines set by the Party and who implement the lines of pure army cadres. These cadres are extremely powerful. They are powerful, but they never engage in battle without serious planning. They are powerful and can fight effectively. They have succeeded in preserving their forces to the maximum and in destroying a large number of enemy troops. Our forces fight like thunderbolts. They have adhered first to a strong and resolute stand, and second to the correct combat lines, and third to the concept of the permanent presence of commanders in their units and on the battlefield. Unit commanders must be present on the spot in order to grasp the situation on the battlefield, such as on the battlefronts in Kampot, Takeo and the eastern front. The commanding officers must always be present so that whenever the enemy attacks, we can defeat them immediately and order the units to counter-attack the enemy, and so that after the enemy forces are smashed, we can assign the units to pursue them immediately. When the enemy forces continue to run, we can order our groups and units to follow them. We follow and attack the enemy forces until they are routed and run across the border. This is what we call the thunderbolt attack.

All forces are permanently on alert. The enemy cannot resist because our command operates in this manner. When this system of command is in operation, orders from the divisional command to regiments, to

battalions and to companies are not needed. If we had to wait for reports from platoons to companies, from companies to battalions, from battalions to regiments, and from regiments to the divisional command, and then if orders from the divisional command had to go down the same number of levels, we would give the enemy forces time to prepare attacks against us. While we were drawing up plans, the enemy forces would be ready to attack us again.

We must hold firm to the belief in our masses of people, our armed forces, our Party, our line of the people's war, and in our combat lines. Whenever the enemies, far or near, conduct propaganda campaigns to deceive us, to intimidate us and make us fear the enemy, we must counteract them. We must not allow these germs to attack the masses, our Party or our armed forces.

We must purify our armed forces, our Party and the masses of people in order to continue fighting the enemies in defense of Cambodian territory and the Cambodian race, for if we do not do so, our race will disappear. Do we want to see the end of the Cambodian race? If we do not try to defend our territory, we shall lose it, and then our race will also disappear. The Vietnamese will bring in one or two million of their people into our country every year, and then we shall lose our territory and our race will be completely swallowed up.

The Vietnamese thought that they would gain from what they have done, but in fact, their acts have only served to heighten the flames of anger among our people and our armed forces, thus strengthening our revolution. They could not weaken our revolution. They would have weakened our revolution if we had surrendered, but instead of surrendering, we have become even stronger. We have been able to defend our country and we shall be able to do everything. However, we can only carry out our task of building the country provided Cambodia is preserved. If we lose Cambodia, what will become of our work? Thus, as we have succeeded in defending Cambodia, we shall certainly be able to do anything.



I Have Missed My Older Brother for More than 20 Years

Vannak Huy



Vannak Huy (1989)

Whenever we talk about our family's lives during the Khmer Rouge regime, my mother cries. I know she misses my older brother, who was separated from us in late 1978. We have never heard about him since then. Is this separation destiny?

I was very young when the Khmer Rouge came to power. Perhaps I was the luckiest person in my family, because I never worked at distant work sites. I was born in mid-1978 in a Khmer Rouge hospital in Prey Kabass district, Takeo province.

Every time we have a family gathering, my mother always recalls our family's history during the Khmer

Rouge regime. She always has new stories to tell us. The regime lasted for only three years, yet many things happened to us.

My mother said that during the regime our family had seven members: my parents, four brothers and one sister. I was the youngest. Each had his or her own tasks. My father was ordered to make clothes at the subdistrict office. My mother was told to work in a "mothers' unit." My eldest brother, Sophat, and older sister, Phalla, were in a children's mobile unit. Sophat was assigned to a dam building site in Angkor Borey. The dam was about 10 kilometers from our home. Consequently, he was allowed to visit home only once every two or three months. At that time, he was a skinny 14-year-old. His skin was encrusted with a thick layer of dirt, which was difficult to rub off. He had long hair and was badly infected with fleas. My mother cut his hair every time he visited home.

My 11-year old sister was assigned to slash and collect a kind of small, common plant, called *tunrien khet* [a plant used to make compost]. During the day, she was fed boiled rice in her children's unit. At night, she returned home. One day when she was holding her porridge bowl, a child accidentally bumped into her, causing the smoky, hot porridge to spill onto her. The burn was so severe that it developed into a wound. She only let my mother know about this when she could no longer work. She always had to gulp the juice of her porridge because she could not fight her way to the porridge pan as fast as the other kids. My mother always hid rice in her pants to give to my sister.

My second brother, Sopheak, and third brother, Vannat, were 6 and 5 years old. Both of them had to live in a children's center supervised by an old woman. The center was approximately 3 kilometers

from our hut. Their daily work was collecting cow dung. They worked during the day and returned to the center to sleep at night. They lived with hundreds of other kids in disorganization and worked without wearing shirts. They frequently returned to sleep at home at midnight and went back to the center at daybreak. They told my mother that at it was difficult for them to sleep at the center, since the place was infected with fleas. Most children in the center wet their beds while sleeping. Because they were always hungry, my two brothers stole prahok [salted fish used as an ingredient in many Khmer dishes] and ate it with raw bananas. My mother was scolded and criticized many times because of my two brothers.

My grandfather (my mother's father) could not work because half of his body was paralyzed. During the midday break, my mother returned home to change her clothes and feed him. My father had little time to look after him. He made a hole on the floor of our house that my grandfather used as a toilet. Day by day, my grandfather's condition worsened. His body swelled due to malnutrition. My mother could not find medicine to cure him. Even though he had been a Buddhist vegetarian before the regime, he craved meat during this time. When he saw a chicken walk past him, he told my mother he wanted to eat chicken. Sadly, my mother could only find palm sugar from the cooperative's common house for him instead of chicken before he passed away.

One night in 1977, a few militiamen knocked on the door and called my father. My mother was frightened. She feared they had come to take my father and kill him. After he opened the door, the militiamen called the four "April 17" people who were staying at my house to come down. They tied them up and escorted them away. No one could do anything about this; we couldn't even protect our own lives. One of the Khmer Rouge slogans went, "Mind your own business."

In late 1978, the Vietnamese troops were attacking intensively to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime. While retreating, the Khmer Rouge brought all the people to the Thai border. My family traveled to the

west along with many other people. My mother told me that I was six months old at the time. Khmer Rouge cadres said, "If you don't go, when the Vietnamese arrive, they'll kill you by cutting open your throats and bellies and fill your bellies with grass." Our belongings consisted of only a few dishes and spoons, and two or three sets of clothes. We traveled on an ox-cart, pulled by a cow on one side and my father on the other. The most difficult part of the journey was the lack of water.

When we arrived Pursat, Vietnamese tanks shelled the Khmer Rouge soldiers. That evening people were restless, fearing the Vietnamese would arrive and cut open their throats. My father prepared the ox-cart in order to continue our journey, while my mother, who was cooking rice, stood up and called for my four older siblings to return to the cart. Hearing my mother's call, my older sister and eldest brother returned. However, my other two brothers did not. As we traveled, we asked other refugees about my two brothers. People told us they were at the front. Even though my parents, uncles, aunts and grandparents (father's side) tried to find them, my brothers were nowhere to be found. My parents and relatives decided to return home and wait for them there. A few days later my second brother appeared.

He said when the Vietnamese troops were shelling the village, he and my third brother had dashed away hand in hand. When the attack had subsided, they had tried to find us, but couldn't because it was already dark. My second brother wore a knee-length coat, while my third brother had no shirt. That night it was very cold. My brother took the clothes off a fresh corpse and wore them to keep himself warm. They continued their trip up a mountain to find my parents. When hungry, they picked up cow bones to eat. The journey caused my third brother's foot to swell so much he couldn't walk. My second brother, whose belly was larger than his body, carried my third brother on his back to the top of the mountain.

My second brother said the weather that night was freezing cold. They couldn't find any cow bones

to eat. They sat hungrily in front of a fire. He said there were many monkeys on the mountain. They slept with empty stomachs. Sometime during the night they awoke and my third brother said he was thirsty. Then my second brother left to find water for him. When he returned, my third brother was gone. He could not find him. Hopeless, he climbed down the mountain and returned home. We've been waiting for him for 20 years now.

My family has discussed the loss of my third brother many times now. My parents believe he was taken to Vietnam, because in 1979 the Vietnamese took many Cambodian orphans to their country. My eldest brother says that even though he was saved by the Vietnamese, it is unlikely that he will return home. This is because he was brought up in a children's center during the Khmer Rouge regime and not by our parents. Thus, he may not remember my parents or his home village well.

Not only was a brother of mine lost to the regime, but my uncle and aunt who were Khmer Rouge soldiers

also disappeared. We have never heard about them. I don't know whether the three of them are still alive.

In 2000, when I was reading documents in the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), I came across a list of children's names. On that list was my uncle's name: "Huy Phy." When I told this to my relatives, they were extremely happy, even though we do not know whether he's still alive or dead.

The Khmer Rouge did not kill my relatives directly. But what they did to us was the equivalent of "killing." They did not murder my grandfather, but providing insufficient food and medicine to him was enough to make him die. Ordering my family members to live separately was yet another cruel act of the Khmer Rouge—killing hearts of our family.

Vanak Huy is a supervisor of DC-Cam's Publication Project. He is also the author of Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-destruction.

Khmer Rouge Novel:

The Cleverness of a Young Water Buffalo Tender

The Kamchay Mear district of Prey Veng province borders South Vietnam. Almost all of its inhabitants are poor and lower-middle class peasants. The region is on a large plain with no forest except small bushes here and there. People make their living by farming. In some years when the rain is adequate, the rice output is high. However, before liberation day, due to the excessive oppression inflicted by traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh and their networks, the people here faced starvation every year.

After the coup d'état of March 18, 1970, the traitors in Phnom Penh offered eastern Kampuchean land to contemptible Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu] of South Vietnam to administer. As a result, thousands of Americans and Thieu's troops brutally invaded Eastern Kampuchea. People in Kamchay Mear, as well as other border dwellers, endured tremendous hardship and punishment from this intrusion. Sexual abuses were committed on wives and daughters, and there were robberies of rice and farm animals. Houses were burned and crops destroyed. People were arrested, tortured and sometimes killed like animals. These sufferings caused the people to hate the intruders, and they tried to take revenge.

Soon after liberation, Thieu still sent aircraft to raid and bomb villages, farms and the people's cattle. Sometimes, they sent troops to steal rice and domestic animals from them and transport the stolen property to South Vietnam. These fascist acts of the U.S. imperialists and the South Vietnamese Thieu clique aroused the

anger of the people along the border. Even though the enemies oppressed and killed them and destroyed their property, our people did not leave their land. They were determined to stay and fight against them, defending Kampuchean land, the heritage of our ancestors, so that not a meter of our land was lost to the enemies. Under the ingenious leadership of the revolutionary Angkar, our people created armed militiamen to defend their villages, while such strategic agricultural produce as rice, corn and potatoes were hidden in secret places far from the villages soon after they were harvested.

Even young cowherds were on the alert. Whenever they heard the sound of an aircraft, they quickly herded their cattle to hide in nearby bushes. And when Thieu's soldiers attacked a village, they led their cows and buffaloes away from the village.

One day, it was the turn of Phat, a cowherd, to tend the buffaloes of his cooperative. Because it was the dry season, grass and water were scarce. Therefore, he had to lead his buffaloes to pastures far from the village in order to find enough food for them. He loved the cooperative's buffaloes very much and worked hard to find good grass for them. He changed grazing spots many times a day so that his animals were well fed. He bathed them three or four times a day to prevent dehydration.

One afternoon, after bathing his buffaloes, he rode one to guide the herd back to the village. Because it was so far, he did not reach the village until dusk. It was his revolutionary alert habit to investigate the areas around the village and listen for odd sounds before entering the village. That evening when he was nearing the village, he saw many unusual fires. As a precaution, he hid his buffaloes in a safe place. Then he sneaked into the village to observe what was happening. He spotted some of Thieu's soldiers in the village. They had just arrived and demanded that the people boil rice and slaughter a buffalo for them to eat. However, the cows and buffaloes had not returned from grazing yet. In the face of this situation, Phat crept back and drove his buffaloes away from the village.

(Continued in the July 2002 issue)

Letter from Norodom Elementary School

May 3, 2002

To the director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia:

I would like to express my deepest gratitude for your dispatch of four Searching for the Truth magazines every month, from issues 19 to 28 and issues 1 to 12 of the magazine's English version, and one volume of the book Victims and Perpetrators to our school.

I would like to bless you and your colleagues, who are working hard to help establish the Khmer Rouge tribunal. This tribunal is what the victims, both dead and alive, need to find justice for the abuses they received. Only when the Khmer Rouge are punished for their crimes, can the souls of the victims peacefully rest and those who are living receive a sense of satisfaction and relief, necessary for them to build a new society full of freedom, democracy and justice, a society which they desperately need.

Faithfully yours,

Lim Sreiphala

50

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50

50

100

100

100

100

100

100

Black

Yellow

Magenta

Cyan

RESOLUTELY DEFEND OUR MARVELOUS BORDER

- 1) The Kravanh and Dangrek Mountains stretch to the northeast, the east, the south, the central plain and the sea.
- 2) Our citizens, armed with weapons and vigilant eyes, scare away the enemies.
- 3) They stay at posts in the jungles, forests, and plains - anywhere the enemies can't find a way to reach them.
- 4) Even in the most isolated valleys, rivers and lakes, our people lie and wait to destroy the enemies.
- 5) Our border, which used to be enormous, was violated when the oppressive, traitorous regime led the country.
- 6) Now our people are determined and strongly defend our borders.
- 7) Now the border defense is strengthened and all enemies' tricks are tracked.
- 8) When the enemies come, we use our bodies as a bar and drive them away.
- 9) Now that the land and sea borders are fortified, we can safely practice our great-leap-forward, our plan to lead our country to prosperity.
- 10) Workers, peasants and armies, you must dedicate your lives to defend our country now and in the future.

Revolutionary Flag magazine, Issue 3, March 1976.

The Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support for the publication, *Searching for the Truth*. To contribute, please phone (855) 23 21 18 75 or (855) 12 90 55 95 or Email: dccam@online.com.kh. Thank you.

A magazine of the Documentation Center of Cambodia: *Searching for the Truth*. Number 30, June 2002.

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